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UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


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LIBRARY 


SEVEN 


C  O  E"  V  E  1ST  T  I  O  N  S 


BY 

A.  W.  CLASO^ 


NEW  YORK 
D.   APPLETON    AND    COMPANY 

1888 


T 


COPTEIGHT,   1888, 

BY  D.  APPLETON  AND  COMPANY. 


PEEFACE. 


WHAT  can  a  history  of  the  Constitution  do  toward  in- 
terpreting its  provisions  ?  This  must  be  done  by  compar- 
ing the  plain  import  of  the  words  with  the  general  tenor 
and  object  of  the  instrument.  The  instrument  was 
written  by  the  fingers  which  write  this  letter.  Having 
rejected  redundant  and  equivocal  terms,  I  believed  it  to  be 
as  clear  as  our  language  would  permit ;  excepting,  never- 
theless, a  part  of  what  relates  to  the  judiciary.  On  that 
subject  conflicting  opinions  had  been  maintained  with  so 
much  professional  acuteness,  that  it  became  necessary  to 
select  phrases  which,  expressing  my  own  notions,  would 
not  alarm  others  nor  shock  their  self-love ;  and,  to  the  best 
of  my  recollection,  this  was  the  only  part  which  passed 
without  cavil.  But,  after  all,  what  does  it  signify  that 
men  should  have  a  written  Constitution  containing  un- 
equivocal provisions  and  limitations  ?  The  legislative  lion 
will  not  be  entangled  in  the  meshes  of  a  logical  net. 

The  Legistature  will  always  make  the  power  which  it 
wishes  to  exercise,  unless  it  be  so  organized  as  to  contain 
within  itself  the  sufficient  check.  Attempts  to  restrain  it 
from  outrage  will  only  render  it  more  outrageous.  The 


4  PREFACE. 

idea  of  binding  legislators  by  oaths  is  puerile.  Having 
sworn  to  exercise  the  powers  granted  according  to  their 
true  intent  and  meaning,  they  will,  when  they  desire  to 
go  further,  avoid  the  shame  if  not  the  guilt  of  perjury,  by 
swearing  the  true  intent  and  meaning  to  be,  according 
to  their  comprehension,  that  which  suits  their  purpose.  — 
Gouvcrneur  Morris  to  Timothy  Pickering. 


NOTE.  —  On  the  6th  of  August,  IW,  the  committee  of  five  submitted  the 
draft  of  a  Constitution.  The  preamble  read,  "  We  the  people  of  the  States 
of  New  Hampshire,  Massachusetts,"  etc.,  seriatim.  That  was  accepted  unani- 
mously, and  the  Convention  passed  to  and  upon  each  other  article.  The 
number  of  States  needed  to  ratify  and  make  the  Constitution  a  government 
between  them  was  then  fixed  at  nine.  The  draft  when  amended  was  sent  to 
a  committee  of  revision  and  style.  As  only  nine  States  were  needed  to  es- 
tablish the  Constitution,  and  as  which  nine  could  not  be  guessed,  the  enumer- 
ation of  States  was  no  longer  possible  ;  therefore,  the  "  We,"  signifying  sev- 
eral, and  "  people,"  being  either  plural  or  singular,  the  signification  of  the 
preamble  first  accepted  and  that  subsequently  accepted  was  to  the  minds  of 
men  at  that  period  identical.  Therefore  the  objection  of  Henry  was  treated 
as  too  trivial  for  argument.  His  political  sagacity  was  awake  to  the  pos- 
sibility of  the  preamble  being  misrepresented,  and  dreaded  the  result. 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

THE  ISSUE  BETWEEN  GEEAT  BRITAIN  AND  THE  COLONIES. — Tna 

DECLARATION  OF  INDEPENDENCE 7 

THE  FEDERAL  CONVENTION .27 

THE  EATIFTINQ  CONVENTION  OF  MASSACHUSETTS       .         .        .49 

THE  RATIFYING  CONVENTION  OF  VIRGINIA 68 

THE  RATIFYING  CONVENTION  OF  NEW  YORK  ....  103 
THE  NON-RATIFYING  CONVENTION  OF  NORTH  CAROLINA  .  .120 
THE  RATIFYING  CONVENTION  OF  SOUTH  CAROLINA  .  .  .  139 
THE  CONVENTION  OF  THE  DEMOCRATIC  PARTY  AT  CHAP.LESTON  .  160 
THAT  CONVENTION  ADJOURNED  TO  BALTIMORE  ,  .166 


SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 


1776. 

IN  the  latter  half  of  the  eighteenth  century  two  classse 
of  colonies  were  connected  with  Great  Britain — colonies 
by  conquest,  as  Canada  and  Jamaica ;  colonies  by  settle- 
ment, those  which  became  the  United  States.  The  politi- 
cal relation  of  the  former  was  settled  by  the  common  con- 
sent of  mankind  and  the  usage  of  ages.  That  of  the  latter 
had  not  been  so  defined ;  colonies  under  similar  conditions 
originated,  not  having  before  existed.  The  ties  between 
Great  Britain  and  those  colonies  were  many  and  strong — 
a  common  ancestry,  a  common  religion,  a  common  pride 
of  race,  a  common  language,  common  political  tradi- 
tions, and  a  common  share  in  the  memories  of  the  past, 
the  objects  of  the  present,  and  the  hopes  of  the  fu- 
ture. As  in  all  political  connections  between  a  stronger 
and  a  weaker,  the  weaker  had  on  some  subjects  suffered 
injustice,  but  none  so  keenly  felt  as  to  weaken  a  sense  of 
union  with  the  mother- country,  or  to  lessen  loyalty  to  the 
crown  or  affection  for  the  people  of  England.  Such  a 
condition  of  things  might  have  remained  unchanged  for 
years ;  it  could  not,  after  either  side  had  determined  on 
drawing  a  line  which  would  force  an  issue.  Neighbors 
with  adjacent  open  land  may  be  careless  of  metes  and 
bounds,  and  indulgent  to  occasional  trespass ;  but,  if  one 
begins  to  run  a  fence,  the  other  turns  to  his  title-deed. 


8  SEVEN   CONVENTIONS. 

Great  Britain,  as  the  stronger  always  will,  drew  a  line 
which  must  force  an  issue.  The  colonies  accepted  the 
challenge.  The  question  was  simple  and  single.  "Wrong 
must  have  been  wholly  on  one  side  or  the  other.  Walpole, 
upon  a  suggestion  to  tax  the  colonies,  answered,  "Who 
does  must  be  a  bolder  man  than  I,  and  less  a  friend  to  the 
British  Constitution."  The  bolder  man  appeared,  and 
taxation  was  attempted.  It  was  not  heavy ;  its  returns  for 
a  year  would  not  have  paid  the  cost  of  an  army  for  a  week. 
The  colonies  had  before  contributed  large  free-will  offer- 
ings, when  the  equity  of  such  contributions  was  manifest 
to  them,  and  were  ready  to  do  so  again.  But,  glad  to  give, 
they  denied  a  right  to  take.  Upon  an  aggression,  which 
involved  a  right  of  aggression,  they  justly  thought  it  more 
wise  and  equally  safe  at  once  to  risk  all  in  contesting  it. 
Submission  would  make  a  precedent  for,  and  give  color  of 
right  to  future  aggressions.  The  debate  which  preceded 
an  armed  solution,  so  far  from  convincing  either  dispu- 
tant of  wrong,  confirmed  both  in  their  sense  of  right. 
This  was  inevitable,  for  their  premises  differed,  and  conse- 
quent reasoning  from  those  premises  developed  conclusions 
so  repugnant,  that  one  disputant  must  yield  unreservedly,  or 
be  made  to.  Those  premises  need  to  be  clearly  stated,  not 
only  that  their  irreconcilable  discord  may  be  appreciated, 
and  the  merits  of  the  controversy  correctly  judged,  but 
that  the  subsequent  history  of  those  colonies  be  understood  ; 
for  the  opposite  theories  of  the  relation  of  communities 
politically  connected  survived  the  contest,  and  men  in  the 
United  States  have  divided  into  parties,  one  of  which  un- 
der various  names  has  revived  and  embodied  the  British 
conception,  the  other  retaining  and  embodying  the  colonial 
conception.  The  colonists  claimed  rights  under  the  con- 
tracts of  their  ancestors.*  After  the  battle  of  Hastings, 

*  So  that  the  right  of  colonies  (to  be  held  commonwealths  or  provinces) 
saving  honor  and  league  with  their  metropoles  dependeth  wholly  on  their 


1776.  9 

William  of  Normandy  was  master  of  England.  Part  of 
its  territory  lie  took  for  the  crown,  part  lie  left  to  the 
vanquished  race,  part  he  divided  among  his  followers  upon 
feudal  tenures.  The  feudal  system  was  a  system  of  con- 
tracts :  if  the  feudal  tenant  kept  to  the  bargain,  his  duty 
was  performed  ;  if  the  overlord  did  not,  and  sought  more 
than  the  bargain  gave  him,  he  might  be  justly  and  legally 
resisted.  If  a  contest  ensued,  it  was  held  legitimate  war. 
Contract  recognized  as  the  basis  of  relations  between  free- 
men, resistance  to  an  invasion  of  rights  under  contract  not 
merely  legal,  but  demanded  by  manhood,  and  the  social 
elevation  of  women,  are  the  legacies  of  the  feudal  system 
to  our  civilization.  After  the  Great  Charter  and  its  nu- 
merous confirmations,  all  free  men  in  England  were  fully 
recognized  as  entitled  (subject  to  the  law)  to  complete 
mastership  of  person  and  property.  If  the  king,  for  public 
purposes,  needed  more  than  his  own  domain  and  the  feudal 
tenures  could  supply,  he  asked  aid  of  his  subjects.  Their 
right  of  refusal,  though  often  evaded,  was  never  denied. 
"If  the  king  stepped  over  the  constitutional  line,  they 
claimed  the  right  to  step  over  it  themselves,  and,  that 
failing,  promptly  armed  and  appealed  to  the  God  of 
battles."  Subject,  then,  within  his  kingdom  to  some 
limitations,  in  external  matters  the  king  was  supreme. 
Title  to  land  in  America  was  in  him ;  he  dealt  with  it  as 
he  pleased.  To  have  value  it  must  be  peopled ;  therefore 
he  gave  tracts  of  it  to  emigrants  upon  a  tenure  and  rental, 
and  charters  erecting  them  into  bodies  politic  and  corpo- 
rate, which  assured  them  the  rights  and  privileges  of  Eng- 
lishmen. The  transaction  was  wholly  between  the  king 
and  the  emigrants ;  England  as  a  nation  neither  supplied  a 
penny  nor  furnished  a  man,  and  was  then  as  disconnected 
from  any  right  of  control  as  Spain.  The  emigrants  were 

license  or  letters  by  which  their  sovereign  authorized  them  to  plant. — 
"  Leviathan,"  p.  2 10. 


10  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

to  form  communities,  of  which  the  King  of  England  by 
virtue  of  his  office  was  to  be  the  king,  and  the  relation  be- 
tween him  and  them  was  as  easily  as  it  was  clearly  defined. 
Whatever  rights  and  privileges  his  English  subjects  then 
had,  or  ever  afterward  should  have,  his  American  sub- 
jects should  also  have.  The  .bargain  was  one  of  recipro- 
cal advantage ;  a  consideration  passed  on  both  sides.  All 
political  systems  in  the  United  States  originated  from  con- 
tract ;  political  systems  in  Europe,' with  scarcely  an  excep- 
tion, have  conquest  as  their  basis.  Inattention  to  this  dif- 
ference makes  all  foreigners  and  many  Americans  mis- 
understand our  political  system,  and  not  realize  that  much 
is  permissible  to  a  man  as  the  citizen  of  a  State,  which  is 
forbidden  to  him  as  a  subject  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States.  Under  their  charters  the  emigrants  had 
organized  separate  societies  and  instituted  governments. 
Each  had  its  elective  Legislature,  a  judiciary,  and  an  ex- 
ecutive, the  king.  The  colonies  had  made  war  upon  the 
natives,  and  conquering,  enslaved  them  ;  in  one  colony  a 
tribe  had  been  exterminated,  and  the  work  of  extermina- 
tion was  progressing  in  all.  They  had  coined  money, 
issued  a  paper  currency,  pledged  public  credit,  raised  and 
employed  armed  forces  on  land  and  at  sea,  and  like 
other  communities  had  misused  power  to  persecute  dis- 
senters from  dogma,  and  to  hang  Quakers  and  witches.* 
The  conclusion  they  drew,  when  forced  to  a  logical  conclu- 
sion was,  that  the  colonies  were  nations,  bearing  the  same 
relation  to  Great  Britain,  as  Scotland  had  to  England  be- 
fore the  union,  when  their  king  was  the  same,  or  Hanover 
at  that  very  time ;  and  that  their  citizens  were  subjects  of 
the  king,  but  not  subjects  of  his  subjects.  They  did  not 

*  Salem  exhibited  the  almost  solitary  instance  of  men,  protected  by  public 
functions,  making  a  public  acknowledgment  that,  under  a  delusion,  they  had 
perpetrated  grave  wrongs,  for  which  they  asked  the  forgiveness  of  men  and 
the  mercy  of  God. 


1776.  11 

press  this  claim,  until  immunity  from  taxation  under  their 
charters  was  denied ;  and  then  they  could  not  withhold  it, 
for,  though  the  right  of  an  Englishman  not  to  be  taxed 
without  representation  was  their  right,  yet  if  not  nations, 
but  parts  of  a  nation,  or  dependencies  of  a  nation,  and  one 
of  the  three  they  must  be,  the  government  of  Great  Britain 
was  their  government,  and  its  action,  no  matter  how  in- 
equitable, legal. 

Highly  as  they  prized  their  connection  with  Great 
Britain,  and  strongly  as  their  hearts  yearned  for  the  old 
friendly  relations,  they  felt  that,  if  they  were  to  be  con- 
verted into  inferiors,  even  disastrous  war,  if  it  aggravated 
servitude,  must  leave  them  self-respect.  The  British  argu- 
ment is  nowhere  so  clearly  stated  or  so  closely  reasoned  as 
in  the  "  Taxation  no  Tyranny."  The  premises  of  that  very 
able  paper  are :  Land  in  the  colonies,  in  the  view  of  polit- 
ical law,  is  the  territory  of  England,  and  the  colonists  are 
units  of  the  English  nation ;  the  Parliament  is  their  Parlia- 
ment, in  which  they  are  virtually  represented  as  the  greater 
number  of  Englishmen  who  have  no  votes  are  virtually 
represented ;  consequently  that  Parliament,  as  the  dele- 
gated sovereignty  of  the  nation,  supreme  in  all  things,  may 
legally  if  not  equitably  alter  or  repeal  any  charter,  and  im- 
pose any  law  or  duty.  England,  from  the  nature  of  things 
the  stronger  element  in  the  nation,  both  in  numbers  and 
wealth,  is  necessarily  the  preponderant  portion,  and  as  such 
ought  to  command,  while  the  colonies,  as  the  minority  of 
the  nation,  ought  to  obey.  If  the  colonists  have  the  rights 
and  privileges  of  Englishmen,  they  must  be  subject  to  the 
obligations  of  Englishmen.  The  issue,  nation  or  nations, 
could  not  be  more  distinctly  presented.  If  the  premises 
were  true,  the  conclusion  was  legitimate  and  true,  and  the 
Americans  must  have  been,  as  they  seemed  to  Johnson  and 
to  three  fourths  of  his  countrymen,  insubordinate  from 
avarice,  or  malignant  from  obstinacy.  But  the  premises 


12  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

were  not  true,  because  not  based  upon  the  genesis  of  the 
colonies,  nor  of  the  word  nation.  Nation  has  but  one 
meaning,  and  can  have  no  other.  It  is  the  mark  by  which 
mankind  have  agreed  to  express  the  fact  that  a  certain 
number  of  human  beings,  inhabiting  a  defined  territory, 
have  coalesced  by  consent,  or  been  compacted  by  conquest, 
into  a  general  copartnership,  having  feelings  for  each  other 
very  different  from  those  they  entertain  toward  the  rest  of 
mankind,  extending  among  themselves  sympathy,  and  dis- 
tributing and  regulating  selfishness.*  In  a  nation  there 
can  be  but  one  sovereignty,  Force ;  and  one  standard  of 
right  and  wrong,  its  Will ;  therefore  Johnson  properly  de- 
duced his  conclusion  that,  if  the  colonists  were  units  of  a 
nation,  resistance  to  the  act  of  the  sovereign  was  a  violation 
of  the  social  order.  He  saw  clearly  that  "  in  sovereignty 
there  are  no  gradations;  there  must  be  in  every  society 
some  power  from  which  there  is  no  appeal,  which  admits 
no  restrictions,  which  pervades  the  whole  mass  of  the  com- 
munity, regulates  and  adjusts  all  subordination,  enacts 
laws  and  repeals  them,  erects  or  annuls  judicatures,  extends 
or  controls  privileges,  exempt  itself  from  question  or  con- 
trol, and  bounded  only  by  physical  necessity.  By  this 
power,  wherever  it  subsists,  all  legislation  is  animated  and 
controlled  ;  from  this  all  legal  rights  are  emanations  which, 
whether  equitably  or  not,  may  be  legally  recalled.  It  is 
not  infallible,  for  it  may  do  wrong ;  but  it  is  irresistible, 
for  it  can  only  be  resisted  by  rebellion,  by  an  act  which 
makes  it  questionable  what  shall  thenceforward  be  the 
supreme  power."  This  truth,  familiar  to  antiquity,  appar- 
ent to  all  who  think,  was  so  far  from  being  controverted  by 
the  colonists  that  they  made  it  the  basis  of  all  their  reason- 

*  "  Nation  "  is  often  used  as  a  convenient  abbreviation  in  a  non-technical 
sense,  they  who  use  and  they  who  hear  conscious  of  the  impropriety.  So  we 
say  habitually  the  sun  rises  and  sets,  not  thereby  denying  the  Copernican 
theory. 


1776.  13 

ing  and  action.  His  own  exposition  of  sovereignty  should 
have  shown  to  Johnson  that  men  not  under  one  single  and 
exclusive  government  can  not  be  the  units  of  a  nation. 
That  objection  pressed  him  so  sharply  that  he  could  only 
find  escape  from  it  by  the  assumption  that  a  colony  in 
America  and  a  county  in  England  were  politically  identi- 
cal. As  Great  Britain  really,  though  incidentally,  through 
the  king,  exercised  some  important  functions  of  govern- 
ment affecting  the  colonies,  he  may  have  confounded  gov- 
ernment with  sovereignty,  as  more  acute  minds  have  before 
and  since,  honestly  or  dishonestly.  The  colonists,  however, 
were  familiar  with  the  distinction  between  original  and 
derivative  power,  and  knew  that  sovereignty  makes  and 
unmakes  governments.  To  an  American  confusion  on  the 
subject  ought  to  be  impossible,  for  he  knows  that  in  thir- 
teen communities  governments  were  in  full  and  complete 
operation  while  the  sovereignty  in  each  was  debating  and 
deciding  upon  a  new  distribution  of  the  functions  of  gov- 
ernment between  two  agencies,  delegating  power  after  it 
had  decided.  In  the  lifetime  of  Johnson's  father  the  army 
which  had  defeated  Charles  I  was  sovereign  in  England. 
It  offered  terms  to  the  king,  and,  agreement  failing,  struck 
off  his  head.  It  turned  Parliament  out-of-doors,  it  set  up 
Oliver  Cromwell,  it  pulled  down  Richard  Cromwell,  not 
representing  the  feelings  or  opinions  of  one  fourth  of 
Englishmen,  it  ruled  them  as  absolutely  as  the  Conqueror 
William,  nor  did  it  cease  to  be  the  sovereign  until  weakened 
by  dissension  it  ceased  to  be  the  force.  Government  with- 
in a  nation  is  the  functionary  of  the  society  to  maintain 
peace  and  order  among  its  different  elements  and  to  adjust 
the  relations  between  the  stronger  and  the  weaker.  It 
continues  unchanged  so  long  as  the  proportion  of  strength 
and  weakness  remains  unchanged.  It  properly,  because 
equitably,  changes,  as  the  proportion  of  strength  and  weak- 
ness changes.  The  right  of  future  management  is  the 


14  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

same  as  the  right  of  original  management ;  the  reason  for 
both,  the  welfare  of  the  society.*  A  government  of  all  of 
them  in  communities  politically  connected,  is  their  func- 
tionary to  maintain  the  original  terms  of  union  between 
equals ;  the  shifting  of  strength  is  not  a  shifting  of  right ; 
disputes  between  them  are  to  be  decided,  if  justly,  by  the 
law  of  contract,  not  by  that  of  force,  either  expressed  in 
numbers  or  by  armies,  f  Great  Britain,  ignorant  or  careless 
of  the  only  rule  under  which  connected  communities  can 
abide  together  in  peace,  assumed  mastership.  If  the  prac- 
tical wisdom  of  her  great  war  minister,  or  the  genius  of 
her  great  philosophical  statesman,  could  have  saved  her 
from  (what  now  all  admit)  a  silly  scheme  of  discord,  they 
were  not  wanting.  Chatham  not  merely  justified  the  colo- 
nies in  resistance  to  taxation,  but  in  armed  resistance.  He 
reminded  the  Lords  that  what  is  known  as  the  British  Con- 
stitution is  certain  accepted  principles  of  political  rights 
evolved  in  the  growth  of  the  nation ;  that  representation 
inseparable  from  taxation  was  one  of  those  rights,  and 
that  the  colonists  had  been  guaranteed  its  protection.  He 
warned  them  that  contempt  of  constitutional  restraint,  un- 
just to  America  in  the  present,  must  work  harm  to  Great 
Britain  in  the  future,  and,  prescient  of  that  future,  pointed 
to  France  and  Spain,  eagerly  watching  the  maturity  of 


*  The  distinction  between  the  nobility  and  the  commons  was  originally  a 
real  one — that  is,  it  was  grounded  upon  a  real  superiority,  physical  or  moral. 
But  every  successive  generation  tended  to  make  it  more  and  more  imaginary, 
till,  at  the  moment  of  the  final  struggle  between  the  two  orders,  it  had  no  real 
existence  at  all.  The  commons  then  had  become  as  well  qualified  as  the 
nobles,  both  physically  and  morally,  to  conduct  the  affairs  of  peace  and  war. 
— Arnold,  Preface  to  "  Thucydides." 

•j-  The  claim  in  the  "  Leviathan "  that  a  commonwealth  can  alienate  its 
sovereignty,  and  that  any  government  it  institutes  is  an  entity  distinct  from 
and  master  of  it,  not  its  agent,  was  supposed  buried  with  the  jure  divino. 
It  has  been  revived  in  the  United  States  by  such  respectable  authority  as  to 
merit  a  rehearins;. 


1776.  15 

error  for  the  opportunity  of  war.  Burke  declined  to  dis- 
cuss a  right  of  taxation.  Evidently,  to  his  mind,  if  it  did 
not  exist,  there  was  an  end  of  controversy ;  if  its  existence 
was  so  doubtful  that  men  might  honestly  differ,  English- 
men had  no  right  to  force  their  new  conclusions  upon 
Americans ;  and  if  it  did  exist,  its  exercise  would  be  inex- 
pedient, unwise,  and  unjust,  considering  the  relations  up  to 
that  period  subsisting.  "  Such  is  my  opinion  of  the  absolute 
necessity  of  keeping  up  the  concord  of  this  empire  by  a 
unity  of  spirit,  though  in  a  diversity  of  operations,  that,  if 
I  were  sure  that  the  colonists  had,  on  leaving  this  country, 
sealed  a  regular  contract  of  servitude,  that  they  had  sol- 
emnly abjured  all  rights  of  citizens,  that  they  had  made  a 
vow  to  renounce  all  ideas  of  liberty  for  them  and  their 
posterity  to  all  generations  ;  yet  I  should  hold  myself 
obliged  to  conform  to  the  temper  I  found  universally  prev- 
alent in  my  own  day,  and  to  govern  two  millions  of  men, 
impatient  of  servitude,  upon  the  principles  of  freedom.  I 
am  not  determining  a  point  of  law,  I  am  restoring  tran- 
quillity ;  and  the  general  character  and  situation  of  a  people 
must  determine  what  sort  of  a  government  is  fitted  for 
them.  That  point  nothing  else  can  or  ought  to  determine. 
In  the  character  of  the  Americans  a  love  of  freedom  is  the 
predominating  feature,  which  marks  and  distinguishes  the 
whole ;  and,  as  an  ardent  is  always  a  jealous  affection,  your 
colonies  become  suspicious,  restive,  and  untractable,  when- 
ever they  see  the  least  attempt  to  wrest  from  them  by 
force,  or  shuffle  from  them  by  chicane,  what  they  think 
the  only  advantage  worth  living  for.  This  fierce  spirit  of 
liberty  is  stronger  in  the  English  colonies,  probably,  than 
in  any  other  people  of  the  earth,  for  the  colonists  emigrated 
from  you  when  this  part  of  your  character  was  most  pre- 
dominant, and  they  took  the  bias  and  direction  the  mo- 
ment they  parted  from  your  hands.  They  are  therefore 
not  only  devoted  to  liberty,  but  to  liberty  according  to 


16  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

English  ideas  and  upon  English  principles.  Abstract  lib- 
erty, like  other  mere  abstractions,  is  not  to  be  found.  Lib- 
berty  inheres  in  some  sensible  object,  and  every  nation  has 
formed  to  itself  some  favorite  point,  which,  by  way  of  emi- 
nence, becomes  the  criterion  of  their  happiness.  It  hap- 
pened that  the  great  contests  for  freedom  in  this  country 
were  from  the  earliest  times  chiefly  upon  the  question  of 
taxing.  Most  of  the  contests  in  the  ancient  commonwealths 
turned  primarily  on  the  right  of  election  of  magistrates, 
or  on  the  balance  among  the  several  orders  in  the  state. 
The  question  of  money  was  not  with  them  so  immediate. 
But  in  England  it  was  otherwise ;  on  this  point  the  ablest 
pens  and  most  eloquent  tongues  have  been  exercised,  the 
greatest  spirits  have  acted  and  suffered.  In  order  to  give 
the  fullest  satisfaction  concerning  the  importance  of  this 
point,  it  was  not  only  necessary  for  those  who  in  argument 
defended  the  excellence  of  the  English  Constitution  to  in- 
sist on  this  privilege  of  granting  money  as  a  dry  point  of 
fact,  and  to  prove  that  the  right  had  been  acknowledged 
in  ancient  parchments,  and  blind  usages,  to  reside  in  a 
certain  body  called  a  House  of  Commons ;  they  went  much 
further :  they  attempted  to  prove,  and  they  succeeded,  that 
in  theory  it  ought  to  be  so,  from  the  particular  nature  of  a 
House  of  Commons  as  the  immediate  representative  of  the 
people,  whether  the  old  records  had  delivered  this  oracle 
or  not.  They  took  infinite  pains  to  inculcate,  as  a  funda- 
mental principle,  that  in  all  monarchies  the  people  must 
in  effect,  themselves,  mediately  or  immediately,  possess  the 
power  of  granting  their  own  money,  or  no  shadow  of  lib- 
erty could  subsist.  The  colonies  draw  from  you,  as  with 
their  life-blood,  these  ideas  and  principles.  Their  love  of 
liberty,  as  with  you,  is  fixed  and  attached  on  this  specific 
point  of  taxing.  Liberty  might  be  safe,  or  be  endangered, 
in  twenty  other  particulars,  without  their  being  much 
pleased  or  alarmed.  Here  they  felt  its  pulse,  and  as  they 


1776.  17 

found  that  beat,  they  thought  themselves  sick  or  sound. 
I  do  not  say  whether  they  were  right  or  wrong  in  applying 
your  general  arguments  to  their  own  case.  It  is  not  easy, 
indeed,  to  make  a  monopoly  of  theorems  and  corollaries. 
The  fact  is,  that  they  did  thus  apply  your  general  arguments, 
and  your  mode  of  governing  them,  whether  through  lenity 
or  indolence,  through  wisdom  or  mistake,  confirms  them  in 
the  imagination  that  they,  as  well  as  you,  have  an  interest 
in  those  common  principles."  To  the  assertion  that  a 
power  of  granting  vested  in  the  assemblies  of  the  colonies 
would  dissolve  the  unity  of  the  empire,  he  answered: 
"  Perhaps  I  am  mistaken  in  my  idea  of  an  empire  as  dis- 
tinguished from  a  single  state  or  kingdom.  An  empire  is 
an  aggregate  of  many  states  under  one  common  head, 
whether  that  head  be  a  monarch  or  a  presiding  republic. 
I  do  not  know  what  this  unity  means,  nor  has  it  ever  been 
heard  of,  that  I  know,  in  the  constitutional  policy  of  this 
country.  The  very  idea  of  subordination  of  parts  excludes 
the  notion  of  simple  and  undivided  unity.  England  is  the 
head,  but  she  is  not  the  head  and  the  members  too.  My 
hold  on  the  colonies  is  in  the  close  affection  which  grows 
from  common  names,  from  kindred  blood,  from  similar 
privileges,  and  equal  protection.  These  are  the  ties  which, 
though  light  as  air,  are  as  strong  as  links  of  iron.  Let  the 
colonies  always  keep  the  idea  of  their  civil  rights  associated 
with  your  government,  and  they  will  cling  and  grapple  to 
you,  and  no  force  under  heaven  will  be  of  power  to  tear 
them  from  their  allegiance.  But  let  it  be  understood  that 
your  government  may  be  one  thing,  and  their  privileges 
another,  that  these  two  things  may  exist  without  any 
mutual  relation,  the  cement  is  gone,  the  cohesion  is  loos- 
ened, and  everything  hastens  to  decay  and  dissolution.  .  .  . 
Reconciliation,"  urged  Burke,  "can  hardly  be  expected 
if  it  must  depend  upon  the  juridical  determination  of  per. 
plexing  questions,  or  on  the  precise  marking  of  the  shadowy 


18  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

boundaries  of  a  complex  government;  but  it  is  certain, 
upon  a  return  to  that  path  of  peace  which  Great  Britain 
and  the  colonies  have  for  so  many  years  trod  together, 
with  security,  advantage,  and  honor."  The  resolutions  of 
Burke,  framed  upon  the  spirit  of  his  speech,  were  negatived 
by  270  to  78,  and  the  preponderance  of  opinion  was  even 
greater  in  the  nation  than  in  the  House.  In  the  colonies 
the  position  was  almost  exactly  reversed:  three  fourths 
held  Great  Britain  in  the  wrong,  one  fourth  in  the  right, 
technically,  if  ungenerously.  That  the  ministry,  the  king, 
or  the  English  people,  were  consciously  unjust,  is  far  from 
the  truth.  The  causes  of  their  misconception  are  obvious. 
After  continuous  civil  contests,  accompanied  by  two  civil 
wars,  much  of  the  power  of  the  crown  had  passed  to  the 
nation,  but  the  old  form  was  preserved,  and  all  service, 
civil  or  military,  is  still  her  Majesty's.  Whatever  right 
of  government  over  the  colonies  had  been  vested  in  the 
king,  passed  as  had  his  other  powers,  undoubtedly  with 
their  full  assent ;  but  the  obligation  of  the  contract  between 
him  and  them  was  the  same,  shared  or  retained.  No  more 
could  pass  than  he  possessed ;  king,  lords,  and  commons 
had  no  larger  right  of  rule  than  the  king  formerly.  The 
power  Great  Britain  saw,  for  power  is  easily  seen ;  the 
limitation  was  overlooked,  for  limitation,  except  by  those 
it  protects,  is  easily  overlooked.  The  taxation  of  Ameri- 
cans by  Parliament  seemed  an  ordinary  and  natural  exer- 
cise of  power  to  men  whom  it  continuously  taxed.  The 
recognition  of  its  right  of  complete  authority,  by  all  sub- 
jects except  one  portion,  made  the  denial  of  such  authority 
by  that  portion  apparently  factious.  Even  to  entertain 
the  idea  of  the  contention  of  the  colonies,  an  Englishman 
had  to  get  out  of  his  usual  habit  of  thought.  Had  the 
question  not  become  a  party  question,  men  might  possibly 
have  appreciated  distinctions  and  reasoned  without  bias ; 
but,  with  party  spirit  enlisted,  taxation  had  to  be  compelled, 


1776.  19 

that  opponents  might  be  confuted.  Bitterness  against  the 
colonists,  absent  from  the  Taxation  no  Tyranny,  is  intense 
against  their  English  advocates. 

"  Far  be  it  from  an  Englishman  to  thirst  for  the  blood 
of  his  fellow-subjects.  Those  who  most  deserve  our  resent- 
ment are  unhappily  at  a  less  distance.  The  Americans, 
when  the  Stamp  Act  was  first  proposed,  disliked  it  undoubt- 
edly, as  every  nation  dislikes  an  impost,  but  they  had  no 
thought  of  resisting  it  till  they  were  encouraged  and  in- 
cited by  European  intelligence  from  men  whom  they  thought 
their  friends,  but  who  were  friends  only  to  themselves. 
On  the  original  contrivers  of  mischief  let  an  insulted  na- 
tion pour  out  its  vengeance.  With  whatever  design  they 
have  inflamed  this  pernicious  contest,  they  are  themselves 
equally  detestable.  If  they  wish  the  success  of  the  colo- 
nies, they  are  traitors  to  this  country ;  if  they  wish  their 
defeat,  they  are  traitors  at  once  to  America  and  to  Eng- 
land. To  them,  and  to  them  only,  must  be  imputed  the 
interruption  of  commerce  and  the  miseries  of  war,  the 
sorrow  of  those  that  shall  be  ruined,  and  the  blood  of  those 
that  shall  fall."  No  words  ever  painted  more  vividly  the 
fate  of  him  who,  appreciating  its  danger,  opposes  some 
darling  scheme  of  his  people.  For  him  the  future  is 
black  ;  with  failure  he  is  a  mourner,  with  success  a  victim. 
Another  and  perhaps  the  leading  cause  for  the  misjudg- 
ment  of  Great  Britain  was  the  misapplication  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  majorities  and  minorities.  That  upon  a  contro- 
verted point  of  constitutional  rights,  less  than  three 
millions  should  not  defer  to  eight  millions  seemed  the 
unfairness  of  arrogance.  The  principle  so  consonant  to 
reason  and  so  salutary  when  interests  are  identical,  or  con- 
sequences will  be  equally  shared,  becomes  a  pure  despotism 
when  they  are  not.  To  crown  all,  the  very  liberality  and 
loyalty  of  the  colonies  told  against  them.  They  had  "  given 
to  satiety,"  and  were  ready  to  give  again.  If  they  were 


20  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

willing  to  part  with  their  money,  was  not  collision  upon 
a  mode  of  transfer  not  merely  the  unreason  but  the  wick- 
edness of  pride  ? 

That  Great  Britain  was  in  the  wrong  is  undeniable,  but 
no  people  ever  had  greater  excuse  for  being  in  the  wrong, 
and  none  with  an  object  of  desire  to  compass  has  ever  been 
honest  enough  to  cast  the  first  stone  at  her.  War  came, 
of  course  ;  between  communities  of  equal  civilization  and 
spirit  the  result  is  a  question  of  resources.  "  The  last 
louis  d'or  wins."  The  colonies  would  have  been  subju- 
gated, had  not  France  very  early  secretly  encouraged 
and  aided  them,  soon  to  become  an  open  ally.  Then 
the  disparity  of  force  shifted,*  and  Great  Britain  was 
forced  to  recognize  each  State  as  the  independent  com- 
munity which  the  Declaration  of  Independence  had  an- 
nounced it  as  such  to  the  world.  The  fate  of  that  famous 
paper  is  singular.  For  more  than  fifty  years  it  has  been 
assumed  by  many  to  mean  what  it  does  not  say,  and  not  to 
mean  what  it  does  say ;  though  there  never  has  been  a 
collection  of  words  of  which  the  intention  is  more  palpable 
or  its  expression  more  exact.  Its  propositions  are  four : 
that  men  are  created  free  and  equal,  entitled  to  life,  lib- 
erty, and  the  pursuit  of  happiness;  that  to  secure  those 
rights  they  form  societies  and  institute  governments ;  that 
just  governments  are  founded  on  the  consent  of  the  gov- 
erned ;  that  a  society  has  the  right  to  alter,  or  to  unmake, 
and  to  make  a  new  government.  These  it  terms  self- 
evident  truths.  If  self-evident,  they  can  not  be  novelties ; 
if  truths,  they  must  be  true  for  all  time  and  under  all 
circumstances.  Their  truth  may  be  tested  at  once  by 
taking  their  converse,  and  drawing  conclusions  from  it. 

*  On  August  31,  1781,  Count  de  Grasse  entered  Chesapeake  Bay  with 
twenty-eight  ships-of-the-line,  six  frigates,  and  three  thousand  soldiers,  the 
equivalent  of  thirty-five  thousand  men,  which,  in  the  exhausted  state  of  the 
principals,  brought  the  contest  to  an  end. 


1776.  21 

Then  their  self-evidence  will  result  from  the  nature  of  the 
human  mind.  That  men  in  a  state  of  nature  are  free  and 
equal,  and  may  do  as  they  like,  and  take  what  they  please, 
if  they  can,  few  would  venture  to  deny.  A  great  writer,* 
two  centuries  since,  not  only  asserted  that  fact,  but  proved 
it  with  the  rigor  of  mathematical  demonstration.  But  the 
freedom  and  equality  of  all,  is  equivalent  to  the  freedom 
and  equality  of  none ;  the  plus  one  to  each,  is  minus  the 
infinity  of  plus  ones  to  the  rest.  Such  is  the  condition  of 
beasts.  Men,  having  reason  and  speech,  learned  and  com- 
municated to  each  other  the  necessity  of  society.  They 
gave  nothing  in  forming  it,  they  exchanged  mutual  irre- 
sponsibility for  mutual  responsibilities;  each  put  into  a 
common  fund  the  freedom  and  equality  he  could  not 
maintain  for  himself,  and  got  in  return  as  much  as  society 
could  maintain  for  him.  Whether  the  family  was  the 
original  of  society  or  not,  agreement  in  one  of  its  forms, 
consent  or  assent,  must  have  been  the  basis  of  it.  The 
idea  of  rights  could  not  enter  the  mind  until  a  society  had 
been  formed,  nor  kept  out  of  it  afterward.  Only  society 
could  say,  as  it  did  at  once,  Propriamque  dicabo.  Experi- 
ence, which  had  led  to  the  formation  of  society,  taught  men 
that  its  collective  force  must  be  placed  somewhere  to  com- 
pel the  observance  of  the  conditions  of  its  being.  Then, 
by  consent  or  assent,  government  was  instituted.  One 
characteristic  has  marked  every  society ;  none  have  recog- 
nized the  right  of  a  man,  by  reason  of  a  common  humanity, 
to  become  a  member  of  it ;  all  have  recognized  that  right 
in  the  progeny  of  members,  and  in  all,  when  the  consent  of 
the  governed  is  spoken  of;  the  "governed"  have  been 
i 

*  Hobbes,  contending  that  a  monarchy,  an  aristocracy,  or  a  democracy, 
must  equally  and  necessarily  be  despotic,  and  that  a  mixed  government,  no 
matter  in  what  proportions  compounded  of  the  three,  must  after  constant 
dissensions  and  civil  war  be  resolved  into  one  of  the  simple  forms,  reiterates 
the  original  freedom  and  equality  of  man  to  superfluity. 


22  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

understood  to  be  those  entitled  to  political  power;  its 
members  by  descent  or  admission.  What  the  Declaration 
did  not  say  is  as  apparent  as  what  it  did  say.  It  did  not 
say  that  men  born  in  a  social  state  are  entitled  to  the  irre- 

</ 

sponsibility  of  the  savage  state.  It  is  not  an  evangel  of 
anarchy.*  It  did  not  say  that  government  must  be 
founded  on  the  consent  of  the  governed,  for  the  facts  of 
history  were  opposed ;  and  many  governments  existed, 
founded  on  conquest.  It  did  not  moot  questions  of  forms 
of  government  or  functions  of  government ;  it  said  to  what 
kind  "  just "  was  applicable.  It  did  not,  as  supposed  by 
those  who  do  not  weigh  words,  assert  a  right  of  revolution. 
Revolution  makes  a  right,  it  does  not  start  with  one  ;  it  is 
not  the  alteration  of  a  government  by  a  society,  it  is  the 
alteration  by  part  of  a  society  irregularly  and  forcibly,  and 
by  such  a  part  as  is  the  stronger,  whether  the  few  or  the 
many.  When  the  interests  of  parts  of  a  society  have  become 
totally  divergent,  and  passions  thereby  have  passed  beyond 
its  control,  its  basis  no  longer  exists,  its  members  have  re- 
verted to  the  savage  state,  in  which  force  must  settle  some 
new  conditions  under  which  peace  and  order  may  again  be 
possible.  The  colonies  could  not  have  asserted  a  right  of 
revolution  against  Great  Britain  without  stultifying  them- 
selves, and  admitting  what  they  had  so  long  and  so  persist- 
ently denied ;  for  revolution  proclaims  that  existing  rights 
ought  no  longer  to  exist ;  while  they  were  contending  that 
existing  rights,  between  contracting  men  and  connected 
communities,  ought  to  exist,  as  they  had  existed.  In  cases 
of  contract  between  men,  or  connection  between  commu- 
nities— for  only  by  contract,  express  or  implied,  can  com- 
munities have  been  peaceably  connected — "  the  force  of 


*  Baldly  stated,  reason  revolts  at  the  proposition,  but  as  the  higher 
law  it  was  welcomed  by  many  who  may  have  to  meet  it  under  some  other 
name. 


1776.  23 

words  being  too  weak  to  hold  men  to  their  covenants,  there 
are  in  human  nature  but  two  imaginable  helps  to  it:  a 
fear  of  the  consequences  of  breaking  their  word,  or  a 
glory  and  pride  in  appearing  not  to  need  to  break  it; 
the  latter  a  generosity  too  rarely  found,  to  be  presumed 
on,  especially  in  the  pursuers  of  wealth,  command,  or 
sensual  pleasure,  which  are  the  greater  part  of  mankind. 
Therefore,  unless  the  parties  to  a  question  covenant  mu- 
tually to  stand  to  the  sentence  of  an  arbitrator,  they 
are  as  far  from  peace  as  ever;  and,  seeing  that  every 
man  is  presumed  to  do  all  things  to  his  own  benefit,  no 
man  is  n't  to  be  an  arbitrator  in  his  own  cause ;  and  if 
he  were  never  so  fit,  yet  equity  allowing  each  party  equal 
benefit,  if  one  is  admitted  to  judge,  the  other  is  also, 
and  so  the  controversy  which  is  the  cause  of  war  re- 
mains "  Unless  this  reasoning  can  be  controverted,  the 
mind  can  only  conceive  one  solution  of  peace  where  no 
arbitrator  has  been  chosen :  that  the  contract  be  consid- 
ered canceled.  "War  may  indeed  find  another,  but  if  it 
ascertains  which  of  the  disputants  is  the  stronger,  it  can 
not  establish  which  of  them  was  in  the  right.  The  col- 
onists did  not  say  that  their  fourth  proposition  was  self- 
evident  to  force,  but  to  reason,  and  they  applied  it  to 
the  situation,  announcing  to  the  world  that  whatever  the 
nature  of  the  political  connection  between  them  and  Great 
Britain,  that  power  had  severed  it  by  attempting  to  exer- 
cise an  unwarrantable  jurisdiction  over  them.  They  could 
not  do  otherwise,  for  on  the  connection  was  based  that 
claim  of  jurisdiction. 

Following  the  precept  and  example  of  England  in 
1888,  they  declared  that  the  king  had  forfeited  his  right  to 
reign  over  them,  for  aiding  and  abetting  his  other  subjects 
in  an  invasion  of  their  liberties.  The  assent  of  a  colony  to 
an  announcement  that  the  connection  with  Great  Britain 
was  dissolved,  and  that  the  king  had  ceased  to  reign,  was 


24:  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

its  declaration  of  independence.*  In  1787,  when  twelve  of 
the  States  met  in  a  convention  to  make  a  system  differ- 
ent from  that  existing,  the  mass  of  men  in  each  State 
believed  in  its  nationality,  on  which  they  had  argued  so 
long,  and  for  which  they  had  fought  so  hard  and  suffered 
so  much.  To  them  the  truths  of  the  Declaration  were 
still  self-evident.  Their  conviction  that  an  unlimited 
government  must  end  in  imbecility  or  bloodshed,  had 
been  strengthened  by  the  disasters  which  had  followed 
the  attempt  by  Great  Britain  to  overpass  limitation,  and 
they  held  that  system  of  government  the  best  which  per- 
mitted the  widest  liberty,  personal,  social,  and  political, 
compatible  with  order.  There  was,  however,  in  each  State 
a  minority,  far  from  insignificant  in  number,  and  com- 
prising men  of  rare  ability,  which  did  not  have  faith  in  the 
governmental  practicability  of  the  majority  opinions,  but 
they  could  not  formulate  their  ideas  into  any  plan  which 
might  be  submitted  to  the  Convention,  f  The  Constitution 
which  that  Convention  elaborated  through  many  com- 
promises, and  submitted  to  the  decision  of  the  people  of 
each  State  in  their  sovereign  character,  is  very  simple  and 
equitable,  if  made  by  nations  for  nations ;  uselessly  complex 
and  inequitable,  if  made  by  a  nation  for  a  nation.  The 
improvements  upon  the  federal  systems  of  antiquity,  and 
upon  the  Articles  of  Confederation,  were  marked.  The 
principal  are  :  The  right  of  rule  limited  in  the  Union  by 

*  New  York  did  not  vote  for  the  Declaration.     Her  convention  assented 
some  days  later. 

f  Mason  wrote  from  the  Convention :  "  When  I  first  came  here  (where  on 
pecuniary  considerations  I  would  not  serve  for  a  thousand  pounds  a  day),  judg- 
ing from  casual  conversations  with  gentlemen  from  the  different  States,  I 
was  very  apprehensive  that,  soured  and  disgusted  with  the  unexpected  evils 
we  had  experienced  from  the  democratical  principles  of  our  government,  we 
should  be  apt  to  run  into  the  opposite  extreme,  of  which  I  think  there  is 
still  some  danger,  though  I  have  the  pleasure  to  find  in  the  convention  some  S 
men  of  fine  republican  principles." 


1776.  25 

an  enumeration  of  specific  objects ;  in  a  State,  by  an  ex- 
clusion of  specific  objects ;  the  action  of  Federal  powers 
similar  to  the  action  of  such  powers  in  a  nation  ;  Federal 
suffrage  in  each  State  such  as  the  State  chooses  for  itself ; 
the  regulation  of  commerce,  interstate  and  international ; 
revenue  from  its  own  resources  of  taxation ;  the  decision 
of  war  and  peace ;  a  mode  of  amendment ;  the  addition 
of  new  States ;  the  right  to  prescribe  the  conditions  under 
which  a  State  may  confer  citizenship  ;  a  judiciary  for  ques- 
tions in  law  and  equity  arising  under  the  Constitution ;  citi- 
zenship in  one  State  entitled  to  the  rights  and  privileges 
of  citizenship  in  other  States ;  and  the  political  influence 
of  a  State  in  the  conduct  of  common  interests,  growing 
with  its  growth,  and  diminishing  with  its  decline,  through 
representation  in  one  branch  of  a  Legislature  proportioned 
to  population,  equity  to  numbers  giving  them  due  weight ; 
and  equity  to  States,  confining  a  State  to  an  equal  voice  in 
the  other  branch  of  the  Legislature.  The  plan,  on  paper, 
was  as  near  perfection  as  any  federal  government  (the  best 
of  all)  can  be ;  none  ever  united  so  much  strength  with  so 
much  liberty.  But  Quis  custodietf  was  instantly  asked 
by  those  whose  belief  in  a  limited  government  was  not  a 
speculation,  but  a  religion.  A  minority  of  States  with  a 
majority  of  population  found  a  check  in  the  instrument,  a 
majority  of  States  with  a  minority  of  population  equally 
found  a  check  ;  but  where  was  the  check  to  a  majority  of 
States,  with  a  majority  of  population  ?  If  each  State  re- 
mained jealous  of  its  nationality  and  respecting  the  nation- 
ality of  the  others,  or  if  the  voter  held  federal  suffrage  a 
trust,  not  a  property  to  subserve  desire,  there  would  be  no 
danger,  but  neither  could  be  expected  of  human  nature. 
Still  less  could  it  be  expected  of  human  nature  that  a  man, 
no  matter  how  tenacious  of  a  limited  government,  would 
fight  his  own  State  to  secure  it  to  another  State.  The 
objection  would  have  prevented  the  establishment  of  the 
2 


26  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

Constitution,  had  not  its  advocates  offered  to  put  in  it  ex- 
plicitly by  amendment  (as  it  was  once  thought  was  done) 
the  doctrine  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence  which 
they  insisted  was  already  there  by  implication.  Both  ad- 
vocates and  opponents  understood  the  offer  to  mean  that 
limitation  had  the  same  right  to  be,  as  government  to  be, 
deriving  title  from  the  same  source,  expressed  in  the  same 
instrument,  and  vested  with  equal  right  of  self-defense.  As 
none  could  deny  that  authority,  from  the  nature  of  man, 
is  constantly  impinging  on  liberty,  the  issue  between  the 
advocates  and  opponents  of  ratification  was,  whether  the 
equal  rights  of  limitation  and  authority  were  to  be  found 
in  the  paper  as  it  read ;  the  advocates  insisting  that  they 
were,  and  the  opponents  contending  that  liberty  ought  not 
to  depend  upon  inference,  but  should  be  guarded  by  lan- 
guage not  susceptible  of  doubt,  nor  permitting  misinterpre- 
tations. If  a  limited  government  can  exist  (still  a  prob- 
lem), it  can  only  exist  by  men  being  willing  to  put  all  at 
hazard  to  maintain  limitation.*  If  it  is  not  worth  that 
price,  they  will  neither  keep  it,  nor  deserve  it.  Again 
and  again  the  kings  of  England  endeavored  to  escape 
from  the  restrictions  of  Magna  Charta ;  as  often,  they  were 
confronted  by  men  eager  to  die  for  it,  and  they  prudently 
desisted  and  reconfirmed  it.  Had  not  there  been  many  in 
England,  in  all  periods  of  its  history,  who  held  limitation 
as  sacred  as  government,  Englishmen  would  not  be  what 
they  now  are,  nor  England  what  it  is. 

*  A  small  piece  of  string  is  a  very  insignificant  matter,  but,  if  the  pud- 
ding-bag is  not  tied  with  one,  the  mixture  within  becomes  a  mass.  Limita- 
tion is  to  government  what  the  string  is  to  the  bag — it  helps  by  hindering. 


THE  FEDERAL  CONVENTION. 

ON  the  25th  of  May,  1787,  a  convention  met  at  Phila- 
delphia, and  proceeded  to  consider  the  subject  for  which  it 
had  assembled.  At  that  period  and  long  after,  States,  in- 
dependent communities,  masters  of  themselves,  entitled  to 
withdraw  the  delegation  of  their  sovereignty  from  the 
Union  then  existing,  were  supposed  to  be  there  represented. 
The  constant  assertion  of  such  a  right  in  the  Convention, 
and  its  action  in  providing  that  nine  States  might  make  a 
Union  separate  from  the  other  four,  would  seem  to  have 
embodied  the  belief  then,  and  to  have  justified  it  later. 
Respect  for  a  contrary  opinion,  now  dominant,  requires 
that  the  reasoning  which  has  corrected  the  earlier  miscon- 
ception of  the  political  rights  of  communities,  should  be  set 
forth  in  its  own  language ;  the  subtilty  of  the  argument 
might  escape  in  any  attempt  to  condense  it : 

"Our  States  have  neither  more  nor  less  power  than 
that  reserved  to  them  in  the  Union  by  the  Constitution, 
no  one  of  them  having  ever  been  a  State  out  of  the  Union. 
The  original  ones  passed  into  the  Union  even  before  they 
cast  off  their  British  colonial  dependence.  The  new  ones 
came  into  the  Union  from  a  condition  of  dependence,  ex- 
cept Texas,  and  even  Texas  in  its  temporary  independence 
was  never  designated  a  State.  The  new  ones  only  took 
the  designation  of  State  on  coming  into  the  Union,  while 
the  name  was  first  adopted  by  the  old  ones  by  and  in  the 
Declaration  of  Independence.  The  '  United  Colonies ' 
were  declared  to  be  free  and  independent  States,  but  even 


28  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

then  the  object  plainly  was  not  to  declare  their  independ- 
ence of  one  another  or  of  the  Union,  but  directly  the  con- 
trary, as  their  mutual  pledge  and  their  mutual  action  before, 
at  the  time,  and  afterward  abundantly  show.  The  express 
plighting  of  faith  by  each  and  all  of  the  original  thirteen 
in  the  Articles  of  Confederation,  two  years  later,  that  the 
Union  shall  be  perpetual,  is  most  conclusive.  The  States 
have  their  status  in  the  Union,  and  they  have  no  other 
legal  status.  Originally  some  dependent  colonies  made  the 
Union,  and  in  turn  the  Union  threw  off  their  dependence 
for  them  and  made  them  States,  such  as  they  are.  Not 
one  of  them  had  a  State  Constitution  independent  of  the 
Union." 

The  assertion,  in  defiance  of  their  denial,  maintained 
by  war,  that  the  colonies  were,  as  Great  Britain  claimed 
them  to  be,  dependencies,  is  a  fitting  preface  to  as  much 
missta'tement  of  history  as  was  ever  compressed  into  so  few 
lines.  In  1775  the  colonies  proclaimed  to  the  world  that 
they  had  not  raised  armies  with  the  ambitious  design  of 
separating  from  Great  Britain  and  establishing  independent 
States,  but  to  repel  aggressions  on  their  rights.  In  Jan- 
uary, 1776,  New  Hampshire  had  its  self-constituted  system ; 
in  March,  South  Carolina ;  in  June,  Virginia — the  govern- 
ments of  each  in  full  and  harmonious  action.  In  July  the 
colonies  announced  to  the  world  that  they  were  free  and 
independent  States.  The  cause  is  too  patent  for  miscon- 
ception or  misstatement,  and  the  men  of  1776  understood 
too  well  what  they  meant,  and  how  to  express  their  mean- 
ing, for  their  words  or  actions  to  need  or  to  admit  of  in- 
terpretation. After  and  not  till  after  the  Declaration  did 
they  attempt  to  organize  a  Union,  and  their  delegates  were 
instructed  to  do  the  one  and  to  attempt  the  other.  On  the 
1st  of  March,  1781,  a  Union  for  the  first  time  existed ;  its 
Congress  met  the  next  day.  A  union  is  a  corporation,  of 
which  communities  are  the  corporators ;  a  community  is  a 


THE  FEDERAL   CONVENTION.  29 

corporation,  of  which  human  beings  are  the  corporators. 
The  second  of  the  Articles  of  Confederation,  through  the 
acceptance  of  which  only  a  Union  existed,  is  explicit : 
"  Every  State  retains  its  sovereignty,  freedom,  and  inde- 
pendence, and  every  power,  jurisdiction,  and  right  which 
is  not  by  this  Confederation  expressly  delegated  to  the 
United  States  in  Congress  assembled."  Then  there  must 
have  been  States  mutually  recognized  as  sovereign,  and  in- 
dependent of  each  other ;  whence,  else,  that  portion  of  juris- 
diction, right,  and  power  contributed  to  a  common  fund  ? 
Two  years  after  a  Union  had  been  in  full  action,  Great 
Britain  was  required  to  and  did  acknowledge,  not  a  Union, 
but  the  independence  of  each  State  separately,  name  by 
name,  in  the  treaty  of  peace.  The  "  perpetual  Union  " 
was  dissolved  in  a  few  years  by  the  exercise  of  such  sover- 
eignty as  made  it.  A  new  Union  ("  perpetual "  dropped) 
was  established  by  an  exercise  of  the  sovereignty  of  the 
States  separately,  its  Constitution  carefully  disclaiming 
any  right  in  any  State  or  number  of  States  over  another, 
or  any  duty  not  self-imposed,  of  one  State  to  another. 
Rhode  Island  and  North  Carolina  were  out  of  the  existing 
Union  when  its  Constitution  was  the  government  of  eleven 
States.  What  was  their  status  ?  New  York  and  another 
State  did  not  ratify  until  a  new  Union  existed ;  what  was 
their  status  before  ratification  ?  Finally,  what  was  the 
status  of  those  communities  which  had  proclaimed  them- 
selves States,  before  the  Articles  of  Confederation  made  a 
Union  ?  To  Great  Britain  they  were  rebel  colonies ;  what 
were  they  to  each  other  ?  If  more  facts  than  these  are 
necessary  to  demonstrate  the  absurdity  of  a  Union  making 
States,  instead  of  States  making  a  Union,  the  debates  in 
the  Federal  Convention  will  supply  them.  To  appreciate 
those  debates,  the  relative  strength  of  the  States  must  be 
kept  in  mind.  Virginia  was  the  most  populous  by  one 
third,  but  half  the  population  was  negro  slaves ;  Massachu- 


30  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

setts  was  the  most  powerful,  having  nearly  four  hundred 
thousand  inhabitants,  almost  exclusively  white.  Pennsyl- 
vania followed  her  closely  in  numbers,  wealth,  and  the 
characteristics  of  race.  The  three  contained  forty-two 
ninetieths  of  the  population  of  the  United  States.  So  far 
in  every  Congress  they  each  had  but  a  single  vote,  and 
were  naturally  and  reasonably  desirous  of  greater  weight 
in  a  new  system,  if  one  could  be  obtained,  or  in  some 
modification  of  that  existing,  which  would  effect  their 
object.  There  was  no  settled  indisposition  on  the  part  of 
the  smaller  States  to  concede  to  them  an  increase  of  influ- 
ence. How,  and  how  much,  were  cardinal  points  which 
had  to  be  settled  before  the  machinery  of  a  government 
could  gain  close  attention  ? 

Business  was  opened  by  the  submission  of  "  the  Vir- 
ginia plan,"  which  was  made  the  basis  of  debate ;  those  of 
Pinckney,  more  coincident  with  that  adopted  than  any 
other,  of  Hamilton,  and  of  Patterson,  need  not  be  detailed. 
They  were  not  without  influence  upon  individuals  and 
committees,  for  it  is  apparent  that  in  this,  as  in  all  other 
conventions  and  legislative  bodies,  much  of  the  heaviest 
work  was  done  by  members  who  made  few  speeches,  and 
in  committees  which  have  left  no  record  of  their  labors 
but  their  reports. 

YIEGINIA    PLAN. 

1.  Resolved,  That  the  Articles  of  Confederation  ought  to  be  so 
corrected  and  enlarged  as  to  accomplish  the  objects  proposed  by  their 
institution,  namely,  common  defense,  security  of  liberty,  and  general 
welfare. 

2.  Resolved,  Therefore,  that  the  rights  of  suffrage  in  the  national 
Legislature  ought  to  be  proportioned  to  the  quotas  of  contribution, 
or  to  the  number  of  free  inhabitants,  according  as  the  one  or  the  other 
rule  may  seem  best  in  different  cases. 

3.  Resolved,  That  the  national  Legislature  ought  to  consist  of  two 
branches. 

4.  Resolved,  That  the  members  of  the  first  branch  of  the  national 


THE  FEDERAL   CONVENTION.  31 

Legislature  ought  to  be  elected  by  the  people  of  the  several  States 

every for  the  term  of ,  to  be  of  the  age  of years  at 

least ;  to  receive  liberal  stipends  by  which  they  may  be  compensated 
for  the  devotion  of  their  time  to  the  public  service,  to  be  ineligible  to 
any  office  established  by  a  particular  State  or  under  the  authority  of 
the  United  States  except  those  peculiarly  belonging  to  the  functions 
of  the  first  branch  during  the  term  of  service  and  for  the  space  of 

after  its  expiration ;  to  be  incapable  of  re-election  for  the  space 

of after  the  expiration  of  their  term  of  service,  and  to  be  subject 

to  recall. 

5.  Resolved,  That  the  members  of  the  second  branch  of  the  national 
Legislature  ought  to  be  elected  by  those  of  the  first  out  of  a  proper 
number  of  persons  nominated  by  the  individual-Legislatures ;  to  be  of 

the  age  of years,  at  least  to  hold  their  offices  for  a  term  sufficient 

to  insure  their  independency,  to  receive  liberal  stipends,  by  which 
they  may  be  compensated  for  the  devotion  of  their  time  to  the  public 
service  ;  and  to  be  ineligible  to  any  office  established  by  a  particular 
State,  or  under  the  authority  of  the  United  States  except  those 
peculiarly  belonging  to  the  functions  of  the  second  branch  during 

the  term  of  service  and  for  the  space  of  after  the  expiration 

thereof. 

6.  Resolved,  That  each  branch  ought  to  possess  the  right  of  origi- 
nating acts ;  that  the  national  Legislature  ought  to  be  empowered  to 
enjoy  the  legislative  rights  vested  in  Congress  by  the  Confederation, 
and,  moreover,  to  legislate  in  all  cases  to  which  the  separate  States  are 
incompetent,  or  in  which  the  harmony  of  the  United  States  may  be 
interrupted  by  the  exercises  of  individual  legislation;  to  negative  all 
laws  passed  by  the  several  States  contravening  in  the  opinion  of  the 
national  Legislature  the  Articles  of  Union,  or  any  treaty  subsisting 
under  the  authority  of  the  Union;  and  to  call  forth  the  force  of  the 
Union  against  any  member  of  the  Union  failing  to  fulfill  its  duty  under 
the  articles  thereof. 

7.  Resolved,  That  a  national  Executive  be  instituted,  to  be  chosen 

by  the  national  Legislature  for  the  term  of ;  to  receive  punctually 

at  stated  times  a  fixed  compensation  for  the  services  rendered,  in 
which  no  increase  or  diminution  shall  be  made  so  as  to  affect  the 
magistracy  existing  at  the  time  of  increase  or  diminution,  and  to  be 
ineligible  a  second  time ;  and,  that,  besides  a  general  authority  to  ex- 
ecute the  national,  it  ought  to  enjoy  the  executive  rights  vested  in 
Congress  by  the  Confederation. 

8.  Resolved,  That  the  Executive  and  a  convenient  number  of  the 


32  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

national  judiciary  ought  to  compose  a  council  of  revision,  with 
authority  to  examine  every  act  of  the  national  Legislature  before  it 
shall  operate  and  every  act  of  a  particular  Legislature  before  a  nega- 
tive thereon  shall  be  final ;  and  that  the  dissent  of  the  said  council 
shall  amount  to  a  rejection  unless  the  act  of  the  national  Legislature 
shall  be  again  passed,  or  that  of  a  particular  Legislature  be  again 
negatived  by of  the  members  of  each  branch. 

9.  Resolved,  That  a  national  judiciary  be  established ;  to  consist 
of  one  or  more  supreme  tribunals;    to  be  chosen  by  the  national 
Legislature ;  to  hold  their  offices  during  good  behavior ;  to  receive 
punctually  at  stated  times  fixed  compensation  for  their  services,  in 
which  no  increase  or  diminution  shall  be  made  so  as  to  affect  the 
persons  actually  in  office  at  the  time  of  such  increase  or  diminution. 
That  the  jurisdiction  of  the  inferior  tribunal  shall  be  to  hear  and  de- 
termine in  the  first  instance  and  of  the  superior  tribunal  to  hear  and 
determine  in  the  dernier  ressort  all  piracies  and  felonies  on  the  high- 
seas,  captures  from  an  enemy,  cases  in  which  foreigners  or  citizens  of 
other  States  applying  to  such  jurisdiction  may  be  interested,  or  which 
respect  the  collection  of  the  national  revenue,  impeachments  of  any 
national  officers,  and  questions  which  may  involve  the  national  peace 
and  harmony. 

10.  Resolved,  That  provision  ought  to  be  made  for  the  admission 
of  States  lawfully  arising  within  the  limits  of  the  United  States, 
whether  from  a  voluntary  junction  of  territory,  or  otherwise,  with 
the  consent  of  a  number  of  voices  in  the  national  Legislature  less  than 
the  whole. 

11.  Resolved,  That  a  republican  government  and  the  territory  of 
each  State  except  in  the  instance  of  a  voluntary  junction  of  govern- 
ment and  territory  ought  to  be  guaranteed  by  the  United  States  to 
each  State. 

12.  Resolved,  That  provision  ought  to  be  made  for  the  continuance 
of  Congress  and  their  authorities  and  privileges  until  a  given  day  after 
the  reform  of  the  Articles  of  Union  shall  be  adopted,  and  for  the  com- 
pletion of  all  their  engagements. 

13.  Resolved,  That  provision  ought  to  be  made  for  the  amend- 
ment of  the  Articles  of  Union  whenever  it  shall  seem  necessary; 
and  that  the  assent  of  the  national  Legislature  ought  not  to  be  re- 
quired thereto. 

14.  Resolved,  That  the  legislative,  executive,  and  judiciary  powers, 
within  the  several  States,  ought  to  be  bound  by  oath  to  support  the 
Articles  of  Union. 


THE  FEDERAL   CONVENTION.  33 

15.  Resolved,  That  the  amendments  which  shall  be  offered  to  the 
Confederation  by  the  Convention  ought,  at  a  proper  time  or  times 
after  the  approbation  of  Congress,  to  be  submitted  to  an  assembly  or 
assemblies  of  representatives  recommended  by  the  several  Legis- 
latures to  be  expressly  chosen  by  the  people  to  consider  and  decide 
thereon. 

No  sooner  were  the  Virginia  resolutions  before  the 
House,  than  Kandolph,  who  had  introduced  them,  moved 
that  the  consideration  of  the  first  be  postponed,  and  that 
in  its  place  three  new  propositions  be  debated  : 

1.  That  a  Union  of  States,  merely  federal,  will  not  accomplish  the 
objects  proposed  by  the  Articles  of  Confederation,  namely,  common 
defense,  security  of  liberty,  and  general  welfare. 

2.  That  no  treaty,  or  treaties,  among  the  whole  or  part  of  the 
States  as  individual  sovereignties,  would  be  sufficient. 

3.  That  a  national  Government  ought  to  be  established,  consisting 
of  a  supreme  Legislature,  executive,  and  judiciary. 

Gouverneur  Morris  (Pennsylvania),  who  had  suggested 
the  supersedure  of  the  first  resolution  of  the  Virginia  plan 
by  the  new  propositions,  recalled  to  the  Convention  the  dis- 
tinction between  a  federal  and  a  national  supreme  govern- 
ment :  the  former  being  a  mere  compact,  resting  on  the 
good  faith  of  the  parties;  the  latter  having  a  complete 
and  compulsive  operation.  The  Convention  refused  to 
consider  the  first  two,  and  adopted  the  latter.  Then,  turn- 
ing to  the  Virginia  plan,  it  postponed  the  second  resolu- 
tion, and  carried  the  third,  and  so  much  of  the  fourth  as 
made  a  popular  vote  applicable  to  the  elections  for  the  first 
branch  of  a  contemplated  Legislature.  Upon  the  fifth  reso- 
lution the  smaller  Northern  States  stopped.  If  not  un- 
willing to  give  the  larger  States  additional  power,  because 
additional  power  was  equitable,  when  the  larger  States 
sought  at  once  to  be  States  and  the  Union,  enabled  to  ex- 
act and  to  refuse  good  faith,  they  saw  clearly  the  intended 
dominion,  a  domination  of  the  most  offensive  kind,  of 


34  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

State  over  State.  Therefore,  they  said,  States  in  a  Union 
is  an  idea  not  only  familiar,  but  intelligible.  States  in  a 
nation,  States  in  a  State,  is  a  contradiction  in  terms.  You 
want  a  nation ;  we  do  not,  but  we  will  gratify  you.  Open 
the  map,  divide  the  territory  into  thirteen  districts  as  equal 
as  possible,  then  your  scheme  is  feasible  and  acceptable, 
for  a  nation  has  counties,  a  Union  has  States.  Choose.  To 
Wilson,  who  was  perpetually  urging,  "  We  come  here  to 
make  a  government  for  men,  not  for  imaginary  beings — 
States,"  they  said,  "  Why,  then,  should  there  be  a  Penn- 
sylvania ? "  To  Madison  and  Randolph,  "  A  Virginia 
would  be  an  anomaly."  To  King  and  Gorham,  "  The 
Commonwealth  of  Massachusetts  will  be  an  imperium  in 
imperial  Either  their  proposition  was  too  fair  to  be 
gainsaid,  or  their  reasoning  too  just  to  be  refuted,  for 
the  word  "  national,"  as  characterizing  the  proposed  sys- 
tem, was  dropped  without  debate  and  with  universal  as- 
sent, and  is  nowhere  to  be  found  in  the  finished  work 
of  the  Convention.  Hamilton  had  indirectly,  though 
undesignedly,  contributed  to  a  result  so  opposite  to  his 
views.  His  intellect  was  too  clear  not  to  see  that  a  Union 
and  a  nation  were  things  as  opposite  as  black  and  white. 
He  was  too  fearless  to  conceal  his  convictions,  and  there- 
fore proposed  the  abolition  of  States. 

"By  an  abolition  of  the  States,  he  meant  that  no 
boundary  could  be  drawn  between  the  national  and  the 
State  Legislatures ;  that  the  former  must,  therefore,  have 
indefinite  authority.  If  it  were  limited  at  all,  the  rivalship 
of  the  States  must  gradually  subvert  it.  Even  as  corpora- 
tions, the  extent  of  some  of  them,  as  Virginia,  Massachu- 
setts, etc.,  would  be  formidable.  As  States,  he  thought 
they  ought  to  be  abolished."  Wilson  did  not  wish  that 
fate  for  Pennsylvania,  nor  King  for  Massachusetts,  nor 
Madison  for  Virginia,  nor  Butler  for  South  Carolina  ;  and, 
brought  squarely  up  to  decide  whether  they  would  retain 


THE  FEDERAL   CONVENTION.  35 

States  and  maintain  the  federal  principle,  or  extinguish 
the  States,  and  essay  the  national  principle,  their  choice 
was  made  at  once.  Why  they  who  were  willing  to  form 
units  of  a  nation  as  men,  if  the  States  were  fused  into  a 
mass,  and  the  mass  divided  into  counties,  were  unwilling 
to  form  a  Union,  statehood  retained,  except  upon  a  fed- 
eral basis,  resulted  from  their  minds  being  as  incapable  of 
conceiving  divided  sovereignty  as  of  a  thing  in  two  places 
at  once.  Each  State,  at  that  time,  had  all  the  characteris- 
tics of  a  nation — interests,  habits,  an  association  of  ideas, 
belief  of,  and  pride  in,  its  nationality,  and  a  self-constituted 
political  system,  adjusting  rights  among  its  people,  and 
relations  with  the  other  States.  Fusion  into  a  nation  had 
its  advantages  and  disadvantages  ;  confederation  had  its 
advantages  and  disadvantages,  but  the  plan  submitted  ap- 
peared to  distribute  the  advantages  both  of  a  nation  and  of 
a  Union  to  some  States,  and  the  disadvantages  of  both  to 
the  others,  to  give  to  some  all  the  rights  of  conquest  and 
to  deny  to  the  others  the  right  of  legal  resistance.  In  a 
Union  the  minority  of  a  State  not  only  does  not  count  for, 
but  counts  against,  the  opinion  it  holds.  If  a  State  has  a 
million  of  voters,  an  excess  of  five  hundred  on  one  side 
carries  the  political  power  of  a  million,  and  will  balance  an 
excess  of  five  hundred  thousand  in  another  million.  That 
is  the  disadvantage  of  the  federal  plan,  which  the  smaller 
States  were  willing  to  risk,  if  the  benefit  of  the  federal 
plan  accompanied  it,  the  right  of  judgment  upon  a  breach 
of  faith,  and  of  action  upon  the  judgment,  or  they  would 
be  satisfied  with  the  absorption  of  statehood,  because  then 
man  would  count  for  man,  and,  if  an  issue  passed  from 
words  to  blows,  could  fight  as  he  thought. 

Their  resolve  was  expressed  in  language  not  to  be  mis- 
understood. Ellsworth  was  sure  "  that,  to  the  eastward, 
Massachusetts  was  the  only  State  that  would  listen  to  a 
proposition  for  excluding  the  States  as  equal  political  soci- 


36  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

eties,  from  an  equal  vote  in  both  branches ;  the  others 
would  risk  every  consequence  rather  than  part  with  so 
dear  a  right."  Bedford  said :  "  The  large  States  dare  not 
dissolve  the  Confederation.  If  they  do,  the  small  ones 
will  find  some  foreign  ally  of  more  honor  and  good 
faith  to  take  them  by  the  hand."  Patterson  :  "  New  Jer- 
sey would  never  confederate  upon  the  plan  before  the  com- 
mittee ;  she  would  be  swallowed  up  first."  Luther  Martin : 
"  No  modifications  will  reconcile  the  smaller  States  to  any 
diminution  of  their  equal  sovereignty."  .New  York  was 
suspected  (unjustly,  no  doubt)  of  arming  in  view  of  possi- 
ble contingencies.  At  this  junction,  Sherman  interposed : 
"  We  are  now  at  a  full  stop ;  nobody,  I  suppose,  means  that 
we  shall  break  up,  without  doing  something ;  a  committee 
is  likely  to  hit  upon  some  expedient."  As  the  Convention, 
without  dissent,  agreed  with  Gorham,  "that  the  States, 
as  now  confederated,  have,  no  doubt,  a  right  to  refuse  to  be 
consolidated,  or  to  be  formed  into  any  new  system,"  a 
committee  was  appointed.  It  reported,  July  5th,  a  com- 
promise, "  That  in  the  second  branch  each  State  shah1  have 
an  equal  vote."  On  the  16th  that  part  of  the  report  was 
carried  by  the  vote  of  five  States  to  four.  Massachusetts, 
being  divided,  did  not  count ;  New  York,  not  present,  was 
sure  to  be  added  to  the  majority ;  and  New  Hampshire,  not 
yet  represented,  was  equally  to  be  relied  on.  The  next 
day,  Gouverneur  Morris  moved  a  reconsideration,  which 
was  not  seconded,  and  the  nice  question  of  an  equitable  di- 
vision of  political  power  among  the  States,  which  had  so 
long  hampered  the  Convention,  was  at  rest.  The  wisdom 
of  the  decision  became  every  day  more  apparent,  until  the 
equal  vote  of  the  States  in  the  Senate  was  spontaneously 
excepted  from  the  power  of  amendment.  Wilson  and 
Madison  were  not  only  disappointed,  but  bitterly  dissatis- 
fied, and  did  not  attempt  to  conceal  their  feelings.  Wilson 
urged  the  injustice  of  a  minority  of  men  ruling  a  ma- 


THE  FEDERAL   CONVENTION.  37 

jority  ;  and  did  not  yield  to  the  distinction  between  a  ma- 
jority not  ruling  and  being  ruled,  the  distinction  between 
a  limited  and  an  unlimited  democracy,  to  which  Ellsworth 
drew  his  attention.  Earlier  in  the  debate  he  had  been 
equally  inattentive  to  distinctions,  until  Johnson  was  forced 
to  point  out  to  him  that  "controversy  must  be  endless 
while  gentlemen  differ  in  their  grounds  of  argument,  those 
on  one  side  considering  the  States  as  districts  of  people 
composing  one  political  society ;  those  on  the  other  con- 
sidering them  as  so  many  political  societies.  The  fact  is, 
that  the  States  do  exist  as  political  societies."  Johnson's 
claim  of  "  the  fact "  was  not  disputed ;  there  were  men 
in  the  Convention,  as  out  of  it,  who  thought  that  one  po- 
litical society  only  would  have  been  better  adopted  origi- 
nally, but  none  dared  to  affirm  that  it  had  been  adopted. 

"Wilson,  the  earliest  of  those  who  have  contended  that 
United  States  does  not  mean  States  united,  and  that  Union 
does  mean  nation,  was  a  man  of  great  capacity.  He  had  a 
fixed  idea,  proof  against  facts,  and  even  his  own  inconsist- 
ency. During  the  belief  in  witchcraft,  "  possessed  "  was  the 
word  used  to  express  a  demon  influence  beyond  escape  when 
once  accepted.  He  was  "  possessed  "  by  the  idea  that  the 
States  were  or  should  be  considered  politically  as  imaginary 
beings,  numbers,  jure  divino  rulers,  the  realities.  He  never 
attempted  proof,  nor  disputed  disproof  of  his  theory,  but 
could  never  long  escape  its  mastery  of  his  mind.  In  the 
later  days  of  the  Convention,  he  seemed,  judging  from  his 
language,  to  be  fully  conscious  of  the  fact  that  States  were 
striving  to  agree  upon  the  conditions  precedent  to  a  new 
Union.  He  had  heard  knotty  questions  referred  to  com- 
mittees that  bargains  eo  nomine  might  be  made,  he  could 
not  fail  to  have  heard  the  universal  admission  that  only 
through  the  consent  of  States  was  a  Union  attainable,  and 
he  had  not  heard  a  claim  that  any  State  owed  to  another 
State,  or  to  all  the  other  States,  any  duty  not  arising  from 


38  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

compact,  and  not  owed  by  one  and  all  to  it ;  yet  in  the  Con- 
vention of  Pennsylvania  (the  first  to  meet)  he  could  say : 
"  I  know  no  bargains  made  in  the  Federal  Convention. 
The  proposed  government  does  not  rest  on  contract ;  the 
idea  of  a  government  founded  on  contract  destroys  the 
means  of  improvement."  As  he  was  the  only  member 
in  the  Convention  of  his  State  who  had  sat  in  the  Conven- 
tion of  the  States,  and  as  the  debates  and  action  in  that 
body  were  still  a  secret,  his  assertion  could  not  be  chal- 
lenged.* 

If  any  suppose  that  a  sense  of  a  right  to  unity  existed 
at  that  time,  the  record  will  undeceive  them.  Nothing 
in  the  debates  arrests  attention  more  than  the  absence  of 
that  which  is  now  strong,  the  sentiment  of  a  Union.  Gor- 
ham  said  that  "  the  Eastern  States  had  no  motive  for  union 
but  a  commercial  one.  They  were  able  to  protect  them- 
selves, were  not  afraid  of  external  danger,  and  did  not 
need  the  aid  of  the  Southern  States."  Butler :  "  The  inter- 
ests of  the  Eastern  and  Southern  States  were  as  different 
as  those  of  Russia  and  Turkey."  Gouverneur  Morris: 
"  Such  distinction  is  fictitious  or  real ;  if  fictitious,  let  us 
dismiss  it,  and  proceed  with  due  confidence ;  if  it  be  real, 
instead  of  attempting  to  blend  incompatible  things,  let  us 
at  once  take  a  friendly  leave  of  each  other."  Ellsworth : 

*  Wilson  may  not  have  been  conscious  of  falsehood ;  a  mind  to  which  a 
Commonwealth  of  Massachusetts  and  a  Commonwealth  of  Pennsylvania 
could  at  any  time  have  appeared  properly  held  fictions  of  the  imagination  as 
a  mermaid,  or  a  centaur,  may  have  held  all  that  passed  in  the  Federal 
Convention  equally  properly  an  illusion  of  the  senses.  Or,  he  may  have 
believed  that  "  people  have  a  right  to  private  truth  from  their  neighbors, 
and  to  economic  truth  from  their  families,  so  as  not  to  be  abused  by  their 
wives,  children,  and  servants,  but  have  no  right  to  political  truth ;  that  the 
people  may  as  well  all  pretend  to  be  lords  of  manors,  or  possessed  of  great 
estates,  as  to  have  the  truth  told  them  in  matters  of  government."  In  either 
or  any  view,  his  ought  now,  of  all  names,  to  be  the  most  revered,  for  Story, 
Webster,  Lincoln,  and  the  lesser  lights,  have  done  no  more  than  reiterate  his 
assertions,  accept  his  premises,  and  repeat  his  language. 


THE  FEDERAL   CONVENTION.  39 

"  Under  a  national  government  he  should  participate  in  the 
national  security,  but  that  was  all.  He  turned  his  eyes, 
therefore,  for  the  preservation  of  his  rights,  to  the  State 
governments."  Wilson :  "  If  the  Confederacy  should  be 
dissolved,  he  hoped  a  majority,  nay,  a  minority  of  States, 
would  unite  for  safety.  He  was  anxious  for  uniting  the 
States  under  one  government.  He  knew  that  there  were 
respectable  men  who  preferred  three  confederacies,  united 
by  offensive  and  defensive  alliances.  Many  things  may  be 
plausibly  said,  some  things  may  be  justly  said,  in  favor  of 
such  a  project.  He  could  not  concur  in  it,  but  nothing 
could  be  so  pernicious  as  bad  first  principles." 

The  delegates  always  spoke  as  business  men,  occupied 
upon  a  business  matter,  conscious  that  in  this  world  noth- 
ing is  given,  and  that  everything,  in  some  way  or  other, 
must  be  paid  for.  They  knew  that  a  partnership  of  the 
States  for  external  defense,  the  protection  of  person  and 
property  from  internal  aggressions,  and  the  care  and  con- 
duct of  interests  which  they  had  in  common,  was  as  desir- 
able as  it  would  be  beneficial.  To  equalize  the  contribu- 
tion of  each  State  to  a  common  fund  was  a  subject  upon 
which  they  differed  widely,  compromised,  agreed,  and 
wrote  their  agreement  in  (as  they  supposed)  plain  English. 
From  the  opening  of  the  session  to  the  close,  no  State  made 
a  claim  of  right  to  have,  or  to  be,  in  a  Union.  Such  a 
claim  would  have  been  preposterous  in  the  face  of  the  fact 
that  the  Convention  was  arranging  to  cut  loose  from  the 
Articles  of  Confederation;  because  under  those  articles, 
Rhode  Island,  which  had  refused  to  join  the  Convention, 
as  well  as  every  other  State,  had  the  power  to  defeat  any 
amendment.  Kor  does  it  appear  from  any  utterance  that 
the  purpose  of  the  Convention  was  considered  revolution- 
ary. The  right  of  each  State  to  alter  a  form  of  govern- 
ment, or  make  a  new  one,  was  held  settled  international 
law  between  the  States.  The  foundation  of  the  new  sys- 


40  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

tern  laid — and  to  lay  it  had  occupied  nearly  one  third 
of  the  time  the  Convention  sat — the  superstructure  was 
erected  more  rapidly,  perhaps  too  rapidly ;  a  little  of  the 
antecedent  tenacity  of  Madison  would  have  been  fortunate. 
With  the  political  knowledge  then  diffused,  a  government 
was  certain  to  be  composed,  as  it  was,  of  a  Legislature,  a 
judiciary,  and  an  Executive,  the  system  of  each  State. 

The  character  of  an  Executive  gave  the  Convention 
much  trouble,  and  exhausted  much  time.  Upon  its  nature, 
its  functions,  its  power,  the  manner  and  the  agency  of 
election,  opinions  were  widely  divergent.  As  no  advan- 
tage to  any  State  was  involved  in  any  of  the  several 
modes  suggested,  received,  reconsidered,  rejected,  restored, 
or  modified,  there  was  no  heat  in  the  discussion,  and  that 
plan  which  was  finally  adopted  was  only  claimed  to  be  less 
open  to  objections  than  any  other.  The  manner  of  elec- 
tion has  been  modified  by  amendment,  and  the  agency 
apparently,  but  not  fundamentally,  superseded  in  practice. 
Although,  now,  the  elector  only  registers  the  decision  of  a 
party  convention,  his  office  may,  in  contingencies  not  diffi- 
cult to  imagine,  become  of  vital  importance.  Foreign  in- 
fluence upon  the  Executive  and  the  Legislature  was  an 
object  of  dread  at  that  period.  With  our  experience,  it 
now  seems  to  have  been  an  apprehension  almost  silly.  That 
foreign  influence  has  affected  the  United  States  disastrously 
is  true,  but  its  action  has  not  been  upon  officials,  but  upon 
masses.  An  English  habit  of  political  thought  has  per- 
meated many  of  the  States,  eating  out,  as  a  corrosive, 
American  ideas ;  and  the  habit  of  thought  which  may  be 
excellent  for  England,  is,  or  perhaps  more  properly  was, 
unsuited  to  the  United  States,  because  the  basis  of  govern- 
ment in  the  two  differs.* 

*  The  punishment  for  stealing  the  labor  of  British  writers.     That  part 
of  the  population  of  the  Union  which  reads  most,  thinks  least  as  Ameri- 


THE  FEDERAL   CONVENTION.  41 

"  From  causes  which  might  he  traced  in  the  history  and  develop- 
ment of  English  society  and  government,  the  general  habit  and  prac- 
tice of  the  English  mind  is  compromise.  No  idea  is  carried  out  to 
more  than  a  small  part  of  its  legitimate  consequences.  Neither  in 
the  generality  of  our  speculative  thinkers,  nor  in  the  practice  of  the 
nation,  are  the  principles  which  are  professed  ever  thoroughly  acted 
upon. 

"  Something  always  stops  the  application  half-way.  This  national 
habit  has  consequences  of  very  various  character,  of  which  the  fol- 
lowing is  one  :  It  is  natural  to  minds  governed  by  habit  (which  is  the 
character  of  the  English  more  than  any  other  civilized  people)  that 
their  tastes  and  inclinations  become  accommodated  to  their  habitual 
practice ;  and  as  in  England  no  principle  is  ever  fully  carried  out,  dis- 
cordance between  principle  and  practice  has  come  to  be  regarded  not 
only  as  the  natural  but  as  the  desirable  state.  This  is  not  an  epigram 
or  a  paradox,  but  a  sober  description  of  the  tone  of  sentiment  com- 
monly found  in  Englishmen.  They  never  feel  themselves  safe  unless 
they  are  living  under  the  shadow  of  some  conventional  thing — some 
agreement  to  say  one  thing  and  mean  another.  The  English  are  fond 
of  boasting  that  they  do  not  regard  the  theory  but  only  the  practice 
of  institutions ;  but  their  boast  stops  short  of  the  truth.  They  actu- 
ally prefer  that  their  theory  should  be  at  variance  with  their  practice. 
If  any  one  proposed  to  them  to  convert  their  practice  into  a  theory, 
he  would  be  scouted.  It  appears  to  them  to  be  unnatural  and  un- 
safe to  do  the  thing  they  profess  or  profess  the  thing  they  do.  A 
theory  which  purports  to  be  the  very  thing  intended  to  be  acted  on 
fills  them  with  alarm.  It  seems  to  carry  with  it  a  boundless  extent 
of  unforeseen  consequences." — J.  S.  Mill. 

The  English  are  a  great  people — great  because,  no  mat- 
ter into  how  many  sects  and  classes,  or  by  what  opinions 
divided,  all  worship  courage,  and  "  are  jealous  of  any  at- 
tempt to  exercise  power  over  them  not  sanctioned  by  long 
usage  and  their  own  opinion  of  right,  and  fond  of  resisting 
authority  when  it  steps  over  prescribed  limits."  This  char- 
acteristic of  Englishmen  was  the  characteristic  of  the  colo- 
nists. Their  quarrel  with  Great  Britain  was  upon  rights, 
and  rights  depended  upon  words.  A  claim  to  extend  or 
vary  in  the  slightest  degree  the  originally  received  meaning 


42  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

of  words  is  a  claim  to  sport  with  rights.  The  first-named 
characteristic  of  Englishmen  has  made  gradual  but  steady 
growth  among  the  descendants  of  the  colonists,  and  must 
soon  predominate  in  all,  for  if  one  player  may  be  allowed  to 
slip  a  card  with  praise  and  profit,  all  must,  in  self-defense, 
learn  to  be  sharpers.  The  names  now  most  revered  are 
those  of  men  who  have  sought  and  found  escape  from  the 
ideas  of  1776,  and  from  the  intention  of  the  ideas  of  1787, 
and  from  the  literal  meaning  of  the  words  in  which  those 
ideas  were  conveyed ;  while  the  names  of  those  who  held 
that  they  were  "  the  very  things  to  be  acted  on  "  are  pass- 
ing into  oblivion,  if  not  into  obloquy. 

The  next  question  of  some  difficulty  was  the  ratio  of 
representation  in  the  first  branch.  Population  had  been 
settled  as  the  basis  of  it,  but  what  constituted  population  ? 
Two  of  the  Southern  States  insisted  that  their  slaves  were 
population.  Some  of  the  other  States  contended  that  they 
were  merely  property.  Mason,  though  Virginia  would 
gain  by  treating  them  as  population,  held  that  it  would 
be  unfair  to  rate  them  as  equal  to  white  men.  Gorham 
settled  the  contention.  The  Congress  had  rated  them  for 
the  purposes  of  taxation  as  three  for  five,  and  that  seemed 
to  him  an  equally  fair  proportion  for  the  purpose  of  repre- 
sentation. When  Massachusetts  threw  her  weight  into  one 
of  balanced  scales,  the  result  was  not  doubtful,  and  the  com- 
promise she  advocated  was  adopted. 

The  next  sharp  discussion  was  upon  the  taxation  of  ex- 
ports, which  was  claimed  and  opposed  with  equal  perti- 
nacity, and  was  finally  excluded  by  a  bargain  between 
some  of  the  Eastern  and  some  of  the  Southern  States, 
which  embraced  the  importation  of  slaves,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  advantages  to  the  interests  connected  with  navigation, 
on  the  other.  Virginia,  Maryland,  and  Pennsylvania  were 
eager  to  have  the  importation  of  slaves  immediately  pro- 
hibited, through  the  power  of  the  Federal  Government  to 


THE  FEDERAL    CONVENTION.  43 

regulate  commerce.  Agreeable  as  that  might  be  to  such 
States  as  had  a  surplus  of  slaves,  of  whom  the  price  would 
be  enhanced,  South  Carolina  and  Georgia  insisted  upon  an 
exception  to  the  general  power. 

The  bargain  as  consummated  provided  that  slaves  might 
be  imported  until  1808,  that  a  duty  might  be  imposed  on 
the  importation,  that  exports  should  not  be  taxed,  and  that 
navigation  acts  might  be  passed  by  a  majority.  Upon  the 
importation  of  slaves,  Virginia  and  Pennsylvania  waxed 
warm,  not  merely  discussing  the  point  in  issue,  but  the 
moral  and  economical  effects  of  slavery.  South  Carolina 
and  Georgia  were  firm,  and  not  irritable.  They  saw,  or 
thought  they  saw,  that  their  interest  required  such  a  supply 
of  labor,  and  with  the  practice  of  the  world,  up  to  that 
period,  favoring  their  views,  would  not  accept  the  judg- 
ment of  some  other  States  as  superior  to  their  own.  They 
offered,  however,  to  absolve  the  other  States  from  any  ob- 
ligation to  suppress  insurrections,  if  scruple  might  thereby 
be  appeased. 

Connecticut  settled  the  dispute.  Ellsworth  said :  "  Let 
the  States  import  what  they  please.  The  morality  and 
wisdom  of  slavery  are  considerations  for  the  States  them- 
selves. The  old  Confederation  had  not  meddled  with  this 
point,  and  I  can  not  see  any  greater  necessity  for  bringing 
it  within  the  policy  of  the  new  one."  Sherman  reminded 
the  Convention  that  "  the  States  were  now  in  the  posses- 
sion of  that  right,  and,  as  the  public  good  does  not  require 
it  to  be  taken  from  them,  it  is  best  to  leave  the  matter  as 
we  find  it."  The  next  question,  How  many  States  must 
ratify  before  the  proposed  system  could  become  a  govern- 
ment ?  was  settled  without  much  discussion.  Seven,  eight, 
nine,  ten,  and  thirteen  were  suggested ;  nine  found  favor, 
none  claiming  that  any  State  owed  to  the  others  ratifica- 
tion as  a  matter  of  comity  even,  much  less  of  right.  Wil- 
son would  have  been  satisfied  with  the  assent  of  seven; 


44  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

and  King,  to  prevent  the  possibility  of  misinterpretation, 
moved,  and  the  motion  was  carried  by  nine  States  to  one, 
that  the  words,  "  between  the  said  States,"  be  added,  after 
"  the  ratifications  of  nine  States  shall  be  sufficient  for  the 
organizing  this  Constitution,"  so  as  to  confine  the  operation 
of  the  Government  to  the  States  ratifying  it.  Such  was 
the  bargain  which  the  people  of  each  State — the  then  rec- 
ognized source  of  power — was  invited  to  accept.  Under  it, 
besides  the  common  profit  of  a  more  efficient  General  Gov- 
ernment, Massachusetts,  Pennsylvania,  and  Virginia  would 
gain  power ;  New  Hampshire,  New  York,  Maryland,  and 
Delaware  would  lose  power;  Connecticut,  New  Jersey, 
and  North  Carolina  would  lose  power,  and  gain  commer- 
cially ;  Rhode  Island,  South  Carolina,  and  Georgia  would 
lose  a  little  more  than  any  of  the  others. 

Hamilton  and  Madison  have  been  termed  the  architects 
of  the  Constitution.  Upon  that  point  Hamilton  shall  speak 
for  himself :  "  He  had  been  restrained  from  entering  into 
the  discussions  by  his  dislike  of  the  scheme  of  government 
in  general,  but  he  meant  to  support  the  plan  to  be  recom- 
mended, as  better  than  nothing."  Madison  had  been  over-  - 
ruled  upon  the  principal  points  he  favored.  To  those  two, 
however,  the  Convention  is  due ;  and,  in  addition,  the  very 
able  advocacy  of  a  compact  which  disappointed  them,  and 
the  ratification  of  it  by  their  respective  States,  absolutely, 
through  their  personal  exertions.  Though  all  the  States 
aided  in  building,  Connecticut  was  the  architect.  Her 
delegates  were  pre-eminently  reasoners  and  debaters.  They 
kept  the  Convention  to  the  basis  of  facts,  to  its  purpose, 
trade,  to  the  certainty  that  no  State  would  take  glass  beads 
for  money,  and  that  all  must  give  to  get. 

The  Convention  would  seem  to  have  made  a  mistake 
in  not  providing  for  the  erection  of  tribunals  pro  re  nata 
to  pass  upon  any  issue  of  good  faith  between  States — good 
faith  having  always  been  understood  to  be  essential  to  the 


THE  FEDERAL   CONVENTION.  45 

peace,  if  not  to  the  continued  existence,  of  any  Federal 
system.  In  the  plan  of  Confederation  prepared  by  Dray- 
ton,  in  1778,  the  necessity  was  appreciated,  and  a  method 
exhibited.  The  omission  appears  more  remarkable,  as  the 
two  latest,  and  comparatively  recent,  civil  convulsions  in 
England  had  turned  on  that  very  point  of  good  faith,  and 
had  demonstrated  the  necessity  of  an  arbitrator  between 
the  States  upon  such  a  subject.  Ship-money  was  an  un- 
doubted prerogative  of  the  crown,  but  for  a  special  pur- 
pose; the  use  of  it  for  general  taxation  was  one  of  the 
offenses  of  Charles  I.  The  dispensing  power  was  an  un- 
doubted prerogative  of  the  king ;  the  use  of  it  to  circum- 
vent law  was  the  offense  of  James  II.  The  use  of  power 
allowed  for  certain  purposes  by  a  Constitution,  for  purposes 
not  allowed  by  that  Constitution,  is  a  similar  offense  of  a 
State  against  a  State ;  for  the  right  of  any  control  at  all, 
being  authorized  upon  certain  subjects  only,  the  desire  of 
control  upon  other  subjects,  is  latent  hostility,  and  the  at- 
tempt to  exercise  control  upon  them  through  the  Federal 
organism,  avowed  hostility.  It  is  a  claim  to  have  all  the 
rights  peace  has  given,  with  all  the  rights  war  can  give. 

Had  the  Convention  been  asked  why  it  had  not  added 
such  tribunals  to  those  provided,  it  would  have  answered : 
For  all  questions  arising  under  the  written  paper,  tribunals 
exist ;  for  questions  arising  outside  the  written  paper,  like 
that  between  Great  Britain  and  the  colonies,  the  States 
have  announced  a  rule  of  decision  which  this  body  has  no 
jurisdiction  to  revise.  As  men  thought  at  the  time,  the 
answer  would  have  been  held  conclusive ;  but  were  it  per- 
mitted to  men  to  be  as  wise  for  the  future  as  for  the  pres- 
ent, the  Convention  would  have  considered  that  fifty  years 
later  the  belief  of  their  day  might  be  the  heresy  of  poster- 
ity, and  have  supplied  an  umpire  for  that  contingency.  The 
Convention  was  made  up  of  men — Hamilton,  Wilson,  Mor- 
ris, Reed,  and  some  others  not  so  outspoken — who  thought  a 


46  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

government  "  an  impossible  government "  unless  unlimited 
power  was  placed  by  any  system  in  the  central  organism ; 
of  Patterson,  Bedford,  Luther  Martin,  Lansing,  and  some 
others,  who  believed  a  government  an  impossible  govern- 
ment unless  unlimited  negative  power  was  in  any  system  left 
in  a  State ;  and  of  men  outnumbering  both,  who  believed 
a  system  practical  and  excellent  which  limited  the  General 
Government,  the  State  governments,  and  the  source  of  all 
power,  the  population  of  a  State,  and  they  succeeded  in 
persuading  the  others  to  allow  the  experiment  to  be  tried. 
Their  reasoning,  as  it  may  be  perceived  in  the  debates, 
was  this :  In  projecting  a  system  of  government,  especially 
one  in  which  liberty  is  an  object  of  desire  by  the  gov- 
erned, the  point  of  departure  from  which  the  calcula- 
tion of  probabilities  starts,  is  the  fact  of  human  nature, 
that  "every  human  being  is  born  with  a  Pope  in  the 
belly,"  *  and  will  not  deny  himself  the  luxury  of  self- 
will,  unless  reason  points  out  danger,  or  some  power  threat- 
ens with  punishment.  In  a  monarchy,  or  in  an  aristocracy, 
those  who  exercise  power  may  feel  a  sense  of  and  a  fear 
of  personal  responsibility,  they  may  suffer  mediately  or 
directly.  In  a  democracy  a  voter  exercises  power,  and, 
as  he  has  no  accountability  for  its  use,  is  freed  from  fear ; 
while  if  evil  results  from  his  action,  and  that  of  those  who 
thought  as  he  thought,  and  did  as  he  did,  his  agency  is  so 
infinitesimal  that  he  can  not  have  a  sense  of  responsibility. 
Therefore,  in  a  democracy  only  such  subjects  ought  to  be 
submitted  to  suffrage  in  which  all,  so  far  as  the  condition 
of  humanity  permits,  have  a  common  interest.  If  this 
were  true  of  a  single  democracy,  a  fortiori,  it  must  be 
true  of  conjoined  democracies ;  for  if  there  be  association 
restraints  upon  a  man  in  his  own  democracy,  they  are  not 
operative  upon  him  for  another  democracy. 

*  The  phrase  dates  from  the  controversy  between  Charles  I  and  Parlia- 
ment.— Harleian  Miscellanies. 


THE  FEDERAL    CONVENTION.  47 

So  reasoning,  the  Convention  did  what  it  intended  to 
do,  supposed  it  had  done,  and  said  that  it  had  done,  in  its 
report  to  Congress — "fully  and  effectually  vested  in  the 
General  Government  of  the  Union  the  power  of  making 
war,  peace,  and  treaties ;  levying  money,  regulating  com- 
merce, and  the  corresponding  executive  legislative  and  judi- 
cial functions."  Had  it  imagined  that  in  the  future  politics 
in  the  Union  could  turn  upon  amending  or  not  amending  the 
Constitution  by  majorities,  or  even  by  pluralities — for  such 
has  been  the  claim  and  effect  of  construction — some  method 
of  arbitrating  that  claim  would  have  been  inserted,*  or, 
more  probably,  the  States  would  have  retained  the  veto 
power  of  the  Articles  of  Confederation ;  for  amendment  is 
very  strictly  guarded.  It  is  all  that  the  mutual  jealousy 
and  fear  of  the  small  and  of  the  large  States  would  allow : 
these  would  not  consent  that  amendments  should  be  pro- 
posed by  fewer  than  two  thirds  of  both  Houses,  practically 
two  thirds  of  the  population  of  the  Union ;  nor  those,  that 
they  should  be  accepted  by  fewer  than  three  fourths  of  the 
States.  If  every  other  clause  of  the  Constitution  failed  to 
show  that  a  Rhinocracy  was  not  intended,  the  amendment 
clause  would  suffice.  At  that  period  it  was  hoped  by 
many,  if  not  believed  by  all,  that  the  United  States  had 
solved  the  problem  of  ages ;  that  they  had  in  their  system 
distinguished  so  broadly  between  a  right  of  management 
and  a  right  of  rule,  and  had  marked  so  clearly  the  duty  of 
a  citizen  of  one  State  to  the  citizens  of  other  States,  that 
the  average  intelligence  and  honesty  of  men  could  not  err 
therein.  But  a  system,  the  exponent  of  the  political  edu- 
cation of  those  who  make  it,  can  not  retain  its  character- 

*  The  value  of  arbitration  in  such  cases  is  not  so  much  that  any  opinion 
shall  prevail,  as  that  the  point  of  honor  shall  be  saved.  The  most  dangerous 
disputes  are  on  the  point  of  honor,  for  then  compromise  is  inapplicable.  The 
Electoral  Commission  saved  the  point  of  honor  between  two  political  parties, 
and  was  only  meant  for  that  purpose. 


4:8  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

istics,  if  the  political  education  of  those  who  subsequently 
administer  it  is  dissimilar.  Then  the  execution  will  be  at 
variance  with  the  design.  In  many  of  the  States  of  the 
Union  the  political  education  of  the  masses  has  for  two 
generations  been  carefully  confined  to  one  line  in  the  Dec- 
laration of  Independence,  and  one  line  in  the  preamble  of 
the  Constitution,  both  misrepresented  by  the  leaders,  and 
misunderstood  by  their  followers.  The  result  is,  that 
within  less  than  a  century  the  Constitution  has  become 
exactly  what  they  who  framed  it,  and  they  who  accepted 
it,  neither  understood  it  to  be,  nor  meant  it  to  be — a  Gov- 
ernment of  numbers,  by  numbers,  for  numbers,  instead  of 
a  Government  of  States,  by  States,  for  States.  In  politics, 
mankind  seems  destined  to  tread  in  a  circle,  from  absolut- 
ism to  limitation,  from  limitation  to  absolutism. 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  MASSACHUSETTS. 

SIXTY-FIVE  delegates  had  been  appointed  to  the  Fed- 
eral Convention,  of  whom  ten  had  not  appeared,  having 
declined  the  duty,  or  resigned  the  office.  Thirty-nine 
attested  that  the  Constitution  had  been  adopted  by  the 
unanimous  vote  of  the  States  present.  Had  Yates  and 
Lansing  been  at  their  posts,  the  unanimous  consent  would 
not  have  heralded  its  consideration  ;  sixteen  declined  to 
give  even  such  a  limited  sanction.  Their  motives  were 
various.  Some  held  that  the  Convention  had  exceeded  its 
powers,  and  that  they  had  no  right  to  assent  to  more  than 
their  delegation  of  power  warranted ;  others,  that  there 
were  defects  in  the  plan,  and  that  acceptance  or  rejection, 
in  the  least  degree,  belonged  exclusively  to  their  constit- 
uents ;  others,  that  signing  would  bind  them,  in  honor,  to 
an  advocacy  which  duty  forbade.  The  form  of  attestation 
had  been  devised  by  Gouverneur  Morris,  to  disarm  the 
scruples  known  to  exist,  and  Dr.  Franklin  was  selected  to 
move  its  adoption ;  which  he  did,  in  some  happy  phrases, 
marked  by  that  sense  of  the  relation  of  values  which  had 
distinguished  his  life,  public  and  private  : 

"  There  are  some  parts  of  the  Constitution  which  I  do 
not,  at  present,  approve,  but  I  am  not  sure  that  I  shall 
never  approve  them.  The  older  I  grow,  the  more  apt  I 
am  to  doubt  my  own  judgment  and  to  respect  the  judg- 
ment of  others.  I  sign  this  Constitution  with  all  its  faults, 
if  there  are  such,  because  I  think  a  general  government 
3 


50  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

* 

necessary  for  us,  and  because  there  is  no  form  of  govern- 
ment but  what  may  be  a  blessing  to  the  people,  if  well 
administered.  I  believe  further,  that  this  government  is 
likely  to  be  well  administered  for  a  course  of  years,  and 
can  only  end  in  despotism,  as  other  forms  have  done  before 
it,  when  the  people  shall  become  so  corrupted  as  to  need 
despotic  government,  being  incapable  of  any  other.  I 
doubt  if  any  other  convention  may  be  able  to  make  a 
better  Constitution ;  for  when  you  assemble  a  number  of 
men  to  have  the  advantage  of  their  joint  wisdom,  you 
inevitably  assemble  with  those  men,  all  their  prejudices, 
their  passions,  their  errors  of  opinion,  their  local  interests, 
and  their  selfish  views.  It  therefore  astonishes  me  to  find 
this  system  approaching  so  near  perfection  as  it  does ;  and 
I  think  it  will  astonish  our  enemies,  who  are  waiting  to 
hear  that  our  councils  are  confounded,  and  that  our 
States  are  on  the  point  of  separation,  only  to  meet  here- 
after for  the  purpose  of  cutting  one  another's  throats. 
I  consent  to  this  Constitution,  because  I  expect  no  better, 
and  because  I  am  not  sure  that  it  is  not  the  best.  The 
opinion  I  have  of  its  errors  I  sacrifice  to  the  public 
good.  I  have  never  whispered  a  syllable  of  them 
abroad.  Within  these  walls  they  were  born,  here  they 
shall  die.  If  every  one  of  us,  in  returning  to  his  constit- 
uents, were  to  report  the  objections  he  has  to  it,  and  en- 
deavor to  gain  partisans  in  support  of  them,  we  might 
prevent  its  being  generally  received,  and  thereby  lose  all 
the  salutary  effects  and  great  advantages  resulting  natu- 
rally in  our  favor  among  foreign  nations,  as  well  as  among 
ourselves,  from  a  real  or  apparent  unanimity.  Much  of 
the  strength  and  efficiency  of  any  government  depends  on 
opinion ;  on  the  general  opinion  of  the  goodness  of  the 
government,  as  well  as  of  the  wisdom  and  integrity  of  the 
governors." 

If  the  Constitution  was  to  take  effect  upon  its  adoption 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  MASSACHUSETTS.         51 

by  the  Convention,  the  reasoning  of  Franklin  would  have 
been  incontrovertible,  and  a  sense  of  any  defect  would 
have  been  properly  confined  to  subsequent  efforts  for 
amendments  in  the  mode  it  permitted ;  but  if  it  was  to  be 
judged  by  others,  whether  they  were  not  entitled  to  all  the 
information  they  could  get,  was  a  very  different  question, 
and  a  very  nice  and  difficult  question  of  political  ethics. 
If  a  man  commissions  another  to  buy  him  a  horse,  the 
balancing  in  the  mind  of  the  agent  of  the  merits  and  de- 
merits of  the  animal  need  not  be  communicated ;  but  if  he 
asks  that  the  purchase  be  recommended,  he  expects  that 
defects  will  be  disclosed,  as  well  as  qualities  extolled.  But 
is  the  rule  which  would  govern,  in  such  a  case  of  private 
trust,  applicable  in  its  full  extent  to  a  public  trust?  Is 
there  not  an  element  in  one  which  can.  not  exist  in  the 
other — the  solus  populi  of  the  considering  State  ?  Upon 
this  point  of  political  morality  a  long  and  acrimonious 
debate  occurred  in  the  Convention  of  New  York  between 
Hamilton  and  Lansing.  Unfortunately,  it  is  not  reported, 
for  any  conclusions  of  a  mind  so  fertile  as  that  of  Hamilton 
would  be  of  inestimable  value.  The  charge  of  Lansing 
was  :  "  You  think  this  Constitution  very  defective ;  so  do 
I.  I  state  my  objections ;  you  conceal  yours,  and  only 
utter  praise.  You  are  insincere  to  those  who  favor,  and 
unjust  to  those  who  oppose  this  instrument."  The  answer 
of  Hamilton  probably  embraced  the  entire  range  of  politi- 
cal duty  and  morality,  and,  if  so,  left  certainly  no  point 
untouched.  He  must  have  discriminated  with  the  nicest 
skill,  between  differing  duties  under  differing  circum- 
stances, and  asserted  the  right  of  judgment  upon  proba- 
bilities. If,  from  what  he  could  gather,  he  had  become 
satisfied  that  nine  States  would  ratify,  that  conviction 
would  dictate  one  course ;  if  he  had  not,  another  line  of 
action  might  be  proper,  and  the  geographical  position  and 
relative  importance  of  probable  ratifying  and  non-ratifying 


52  SEVEN  CONVENTION'S. 

States  must  be  an  element  of  consideration  and  judgment ; 
or,  if  the  choice  lay,  not  between  what  he  thought  good, 
but  what  he  thought  possible,  the  possible  should  be  com- 
mended exclusively  ;  finally,  if  there  was  only  an  option  be- 
tween bad  and  worse,  good  sense  would  forbid  him  to  in- 
veigh against  the  bad.  Whatever  his  reasoning,  it  convinced 
the  body  he  addressed.  A  similar  attack  was  made  in  the 
Virginia  Convention  upon  Randolph,  who,  refusing  to  sign, 
urged  and  voted  for  ratification.  His  answer  was  frank  and 
full :  "  I  refused  to  sign,  because  I  saw  grave  defects  in  the 
Constitution.  I  felt  that  it  was  my  duty  then ;  I  still  think 
it  was.  My  opinion  as  to  the  existence  of  those  defects  has 
not  changed.  But  eight  States  have  ratified.  A  Union 
must  be  formed.  It  is  better  for  Virginia  to  be  in  that 
Union,  in  spite  of  defects  in  the  Constitution,  than  to  be 
out  of  it  in  consequence  of  them.  For  every  other  act  of 
my  life  I  appeal  to  the  mercy  of  God ;  for  this,  I  am  con- 
tent to  rely  on  his  justice."  Debates  in  the  conventions 
of  five  States  are  reported,  how  fully  or  fairly  it  is  im- 
possible now  to  say.  If  Johnson,  reporting  Parliament, 
took  care  "  that  the  Whig  dogs  should  not  have  the  best  of 
it,"  lesser  men,  if  they  had  prejudices  (and  who  is  without 
them  ?),  can  not  be  hoped  to  have  been  perfectly  impartial. 
In  his  notes  of  the  debates  in  the  Federal  Convention,  in 
spite  of  his  claim  to  complete  accuracy,  it  is  certain  that 
the  hearing  of  Madison  was  more  acute  for  what  he  wished 
said,  than  for  what  he  wished  unsaid,  and,  if  contemporane- 
ous documents  may  be  trusted,  he  did  not  quite  hear  all 
that  was  said.  Enough  (perhaps  all  that  is  necessary)  is 
preserved,  to  display  the  general  sense  of  men  upon  some 
points,  and  their  differences  upon  others,  and  to  testify  to 
the  intelligence  of  the  delegates  to  those  conventions,  and 
of  the  constituencies  which  appointed  them.  Nothing 
can  convey  a  better  idea  of  the  political  interest  and  ac- 
tivity, than  a  remark  of  a  delegate  in  the  Convention  of 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  MASSACHUSETTS.         53 

Massachusetts.  That  body  was  very  large,  there  being  on 
the  average  a  representative  for  each  thousand  souls: 
"  When  this  Constitution  was  published,  my  town  met  to 
examine  it ;  we  studied  it  for  seven  hours ;  then  we  all 
agreed  that  it  would  not  do."  Massachusetts  was  the 
pivotal  State.  If  she  had  not  ratified,  it  is  certain  that 
Virginia  and  New  York  would  have  followed  her  example ; 
New  Hampshire  most  probably  would  not  have  ratified ; 
North  Carolina  did  not,  and  Rhode  Island  could  not  be 
counted  on.  Either  a  second  Convention  must  have  met, 
perhaps,  under  less  happy  auspices,  or  the  States  might 
have  separated,  some  gravitating  to  Massachusetts,  some  to 
Virginia,  and  some  to  Pennsylvania.  Therefore  the  de- 
bate in  her  Convention  is  of  primary  importance.  It  is 
marked  by  moderation  in  tone,  calmness  even  in  perti- 
nacity, and  respect  for  opposition.  The  first  question 
mooted  was  the  biennial  representation  to  the  House. 
Habit  has  great  power.  The  delegates  to  the  Congress  of 
the  Confederation  were  elected  for  one  year,  were  subject 
to  recall,  and  compelled  to  rotation.  A  change  in  that 
respect  not  unnaturally  "excited  suspicion,  and  demanded 
justification.  Fisher  Ames  sought  to  disarm  the  one,  and 
supply  the  other:  "I  consider  frequent  elections  one  of 
the  first  securities  of  popular  liberty,  in  which  its  essence 
may  be  supposed  to  reside.  How  shall  we  make  the  best 
use  of  this  instrument  ?  A  delegation  of  power  for  a 
single  day  would  defeat  the  design  of  representation ;  an 
election  for  a  term  of  years  would  be  repugnant  to  it. 
The  period  must  be  so  long  that  the  representative  may 
understand  the  interest  of  the  people,  yet  so  limited  that 
his  fidelity  may  be  secured  by  a  dependence  on  their  ap- 
probation. Because  annual  elections  are  safe,  it  does  not 
follow  that  biennial  are  dangerous.  Both  may  be  good. 
Besides,  the  term,  being  fixed  by  the  Constitution,  is  not 
subject  to  repeal.  We  are  sure  it  is  the  worst  of  the  case. 


54  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

Upon  its  own  merits,  however,  it  meets  my  entire  appro- 
bation. First,  from  the  extent  of  territory  to  be  governed, 
as  large  as  that  of  Borne  in  the  zenith  of  its  power ;  next, 
from  the  objects  of  legislation,  if  few,  national ;  two  years 
will  be  necessary  to  enable  a  man  to  judge  of  the  trade  and 
interest  of  the  State  he  never  saw ;  lastly,  for  the  more 
perfect  security  of  our  liberty,  for  faction  and  enthusiasm 
are  the  instruments  by  which  popular  governments  have 
been  destroyed.  The  people  always  mean  right,  and,  if 
time  is  allowed  for  reflection  and  information,  always  do 
right.  Biennial  elections  are  a  security  for  the  sober,  sec- 
ond thought.  A  member  chosen  for  two  years  may  feel 
some  independence.  The  factions  of  the  day  will  expire 
before  his  term."  The  astuteness  of  the  "  plain  men,"  who 
questioned  the  propriety  of  the  change,  is  not  less  notice- 
able than  that  of  the  more  educated  class.  If  the  territory 
is  so  extensive,  and  the  interests  so  complicated,  a  member 
can  only  be  competent  from  thorough  previous  study.  "We 
shall  elect  men  who  know,  not  men  who  have  to  learn.  If 
the  objects  of  legislation  are  few,  little  time  will  be  neces- 
sary ;  if  they  are  national,  a  common  feeling  will  make 
them  easy.  As  for  faction,  that  is  as  probable  of  a  second 
as  of  a  first  year.  The  arguments  of  Ames  and  others 
prevailed,  and  experience  has  justified  their  conclusions, 
but  not  for  the  reasons  they  gave.  A  member  who  has 
served  one  term,  is  worth,  as  a  public  man,  twice  as  much 
as  a  successor  of  equal  ability.  By  that  time,  he  has  be- 
gun to  know  the  House,  and  the  House  to  know  him.  The 
clause  which  gives  to  the  Congress  the  power  to  regulate 
the  time,  place,  and  manner  of  elections  was  vigorously 
attacked  and  not  very  vigorously  defended.  The  defense 
was  twofold:  That  a  State  might  neglect  or  refuse  to 
make  the  necessary  regulations,  and  thus,  no  representatives 
being  elected,  the  General  Government  would  be  dissolved ; 
that  it  would  operate  as  a  check  upon  the  Federal  Senate, 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  MASSACHUSETTS.         55 

and  its  constituents,  the  State  Legislatures,  and  in  case  of 
the  invasion  of  a  State,  act,  when  its  Legislature  might  be 
powerless.  Secondly,  the  improbability  that  the  power 
would  be  abused.  To  the  former,  the  rejoinder  was,  why 
not  add,  "  if  a  State  shall  neglect  or  refuse"  ?  that  will  pre- 
vent prevarication.  To  the  latter,  which  had  been  warmly 
urged  by  a  clergyman,  you  preach  human  depravity  in  the 
pulpit,  and  human  infallibility  on  this  floor.  The  clause 
had  passed  in  the  Federal  Convention  with  little  discussion 
and  no  dissent,  but  in  the  State  Conventions  was  viewed 
by  many  as  a  source  of  probable  injustice,  and  possible  col- 
lision. An  exclusive  Federal  regulation  would  have  been 
consistent  with  the  scope  of  a  scheme,  which  aimed  to 
separate  as  distinctly  as  possible  the  functions  of  the  gen- 
eral and  State  governments.  Against  that,  no  argument 
could  be  urged,  which  could  not  be  urged  against  any  other 
delegation  of  power,  but,  if  it  was  desirable  that  a  State 
originally  should  exercise  it,  a  subsequent  intervention 
would  necessarily  be  partisan.  There  may  be  good  rea- 
sons for  the  clause,  but  the  fanciful  ones  asserted  in  the 
Convention,  and  the  equally  fanciful  idea  of  Madison,  that 
there  would  be  a  continuous  inherent  hostility  between  the 
Federal  and  the  State  Legislatures,  have  little  weight  in 
themselves  and  have  found  no  warrant  in  experience.  In 
all  constitutional  governments,  and  pre-eminently  in  a  fed- 
eral republic,  discretion  as  to  rights  ought  to  be  excluded 
to  the  very  limits  of  possibility,  for  liberty  consists  less  in 
what  a  man  has,  than  in  what  none  can  take  from  him. 
To  the  objection  that  slaves  were  made  an  element  of  rep- 
resentation, King  answered  :  "  The  principle  of  this  Consti- 
tution is  that  taxation  and  representation  go  hand  in  hand. 
The  apportionment  was  the  language  of  all  America." 
He,  with  others,  contended  that,  in  the  bargain,  the  advan- 
tage in  that  respect  was  with  the  Northern  States.  Upon 
slavery  itself,  the  opposition  insisted  that  the  Constitution 


56  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

pledged  them  to  it,  and  to  the  slave-trade  besides ;  for 
under  the  Confederation,  as  all  admitted,  the  connection 
was  between  States,  not  between  the  people  of  the  States ; 
whereas,  under  the  plan  submitted,  there  would  be  not  only 
a  constitutional  government,  but  a  constitutional  people, 
and  if  the  people  of  Massachusetts  became  a  part  of  that 
people,  they  would  be  as  fully  guarantors  of  property  in 
slaves  as  of  any  other  species  of  property.  General  Heath 
answered :  "  I  apprehend  it  is  not  in  our  power  to  do  any- 
thing for  or  against  those  who  are  in  slavery  in  the  South- 
ern States.  I  detest  the  idea  of  slavery.  It  is  generally 
detested  by  the  people  of  this  Commonwealth,  and  I  ar- 
dently hope  that  the  time  will  soon  come  when  our  South- 
ern brethren  will  view  it  as  we  do,  and  put  a  stop  to  it, 
but  we  have  no  right  to  compel  them.  Two  questions 
naturally  arise,  if  we  ratify  the  Constitution.  Shall  we  do 
anything  by  our  acts  to  hold  the  blacks  in  slavery  ?  Shall 
we  be  partakers  in  other  men's  sins  ?  Surely  not,  for  in 
nothing  do  we  voluntarily  encourage  the  slavery  of  our 
fellow-men."  Others  dilated  upon  the  fact  that  a  power 
over  the  slave-trade,  not  before  possessed,  was  acquired. 
It  is  impossible  to  suppose  that  the  Convention  did  not 
know  of  the  bargain  by  which  the  carrying  States,  with- 
out giving  up  anything  they  had,  got  a  great  deal  they  had 
not,  a  limitable  slave-trade  being  one  of  its  conditions.  The 
next  ground  of  attack  was  the  tenure  of  the  Senate,  which 
Ames  thus  vindicated :  "It  is  necessary  to  premise  that 
no  argument  against  the  new  plan  has  made  a  deeper  im- 
pression than  that  it  will  produce  a  consolidation  of  the 
States.  This  is  an  effect  all  good  men  will  deprecate.  The 
State  governments  are  essential  parts  of  this  system,  and 
the  defense  of  this  article  is  drawn  from  its  tendency  to 
their  preservation.  The  senators  represent  the  sovereignty 
of  the  States ;  in  the  other  House  individuals  are  repre- 
sented. The  Senate  may  not  originate  bills.  It  need  not 


THE  CONVENTION   OF  MASSACHUSETTS.         57 

be  said  that  they  are  principally  to  direct  the  affairs  of  war 
and  treaties.  They  are  in  the  quality  of  embassadors  of 
the  States,  and  it  will  not  be  denied  that  some  permanency 
in  office  is  necessary  to  the  discharge  of  their  duties.  If 
they  were  chosen  yearly,  how  could  they  perform  their 
trust  ?  If  they  were  brought  by  that  means  more  immedi- 
ately under  the  influence  of  the  people,  they  will  represent 
the  State  Legislature  less,  and  become  the  representatives 
of  the  people.  The  absurdity  of  this,  and  its  repugnancy 
to  the  federal  principle  of  the  Constitution,  will  appear 
more  fully,  by  supposing  that  senators  are  to  be  chosen  by 
the  people  at  large,  which,  if  there  is  any  force  in  the 
objection  to  this  article,  would  be  proper.  But  whom  in 
that  case  would  they  represent  ?  Not  the  Legislatures  of  the 
States,  but  the  people.  This  would  totally  obliterate  the 
federal  feature  of  the  Constitution.  What  would  become 
of  the  State  governments,  and  on  whom  would  devolve 
the  duty  of  defending  them  from  the  encroachments  of 
the  Federal  Government  ?  A  consolidation  of  the  States 
would  ensue,  which,  it  is  conceded,  would  subvert  the  new 
Constitution,  and  against  which  this  article,  so  much  con- 
demned, is  our  best  security.  Too  much  provision  can  not 
be  made  against  a  consolidation.  The  State  governments 
represent  the  wishes,  the  feelings,  and  local  interests  of  the 
people.  They  are  the  safeguards  and  ornament  of  the  Con- 
stitution, they  will  protract  the  period  of  our  liberties,  they 
will  afford  a  shelter  against  the  abuse  of  power,  and  will 
be  the  natural  avengers  of  our  violated  rights.  This  article 
secures  the  excellence  of  the  Constitution,  and  affords  just 
ground  to  believe  that  it  will  be  in  practice,  what  it  is  in 
theory,  a  federal  republic."  The  argument  of  Ames 
must  have  compelled  general  conviction,  for  that  objection 
was  never  again  seriously  pressed.  So  far,  the  opposing 
forces  had  skirmished ;  battle  was  joined  upon  the  taxa- 
tion and  judiciary  clauses.  The  former,  it  was  objected, 


58  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

is  "a  very  good  and  valid  conveyance  of  all  the  property 
in  the  United  States,  to  certain  uses  indeed,  but  those 
capable  of  any  construction  the  trustees  may  think  proper 
to  make,  and  they  are  not  amenable  to  any  tribunal."  The 
general  answer  was :  Government  must  have  all  necessary 
power,  the  quantum  can  not  be  fixed,  it  must  depend  upon 
the  exigency  which  calls  for  its  exercise.  It  may  be 
abused,  that  possibility  is  inseparable  from  all  governments. 
Somebody  must  be  trusted.  Parsons  added  that  there 
was  a  perfect  remedy  against  misgovernment  within  the 
Constitution.  "  The  people  have  it  in  their  power  effectu- 
ally to  resist  usurpation  without  being  driven  to  an  appeal 
to  arms.  An  act  of  usurpation  is  not  obligatory,  it  is  not 
law,  and  any  man  may  be  justified  in  his  resistance.  Let 
him  be  considered  a  criminal  by  the  General  Government, 
yet  only  his  fellow-citizens  can  convict  him ;  they  are  his 
jury,  and  if  they  pronounce  him  innocent,  not  all  the 
power  of  Congress  can  hurt  him,  and  innocent  they  cer- 
tainly will  pronounce  him,  if  the  supposed  law  he  resisted 
was  an  act  of  usurpation."  It  is  curious  to  see  the  claim 
of  Calhoun  forty  years  later,  anticipated  by  one  of  the 
greatest  judicial  minds  Massachusetts  ever  produced.  The 
rejoinders  were :  "  Faction  is  the  vehicle  of  all  transactions 
in  public  life.  This  truth  all  know,  and  also  that  the  prev- 
alent faction  is  the  body.  Is  it  contended  that  the  prev- 
alent body  must  always  be  right,  and  that  the  true  patriots 
will  always  outnumber  the  base  and  the  selfish  ?  Then  it 
must  follow  that  no  public  measure  ever  was  wrong,  for  it 
must  have  been  passed  by  a  majority,  and  no  power  there- 
fore ever  was  or  ever  can  be  abused.  But  if  we  know  that 
power  can  be  and '  has  been  abused,  why  should  we  expect 
more  from  Congress  than  from  the  myriads  of  public 
bodies  which  have  preceded  it  and  have  abused  power  ?  A 
sovereign  power  within  a  sovereign  power  is  not  conceiv- 
able by  the  mind.  Congress  ought  to  have  supreme  power 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  MASSACHUSETTS.         59 

over  all  matters  within  its  jurisdiction,  but  that  jurisdiction 
ought  to  be  so  distinctly  bounded  that  every  one  may 
know  the  utmost  limits  of  it.  Where  is  the  Bill  of  Rights 
which  shall  say  toCongress,  '  Thus  far  shalt  thou  go  and  no 
farther '  ? "  *  The  objections  to  the  judiciary  may  properly 
be  omitted,  as  amendments  justified  and  obviated  them. 

The  contest  nearing  a  close,  Ames  called  on  those  who 
stood  forth  in  1775,  to  stand  forth  now,  to  throw  aside  all 
interested,  and  party  views,  and  have  one  purse,  one  heart 
for  the  whole,  and  to  consider  that  as  it  was  necessary  then, 
so  it  is  necessary  now,  to  unite — or  die  we  must.  The 
appeal  brought  to  the  floor  one  "  who  would  not  have 
troubled  the  Convention,  if  they  who  were  on  the  stage  in 
1775  had  not  been  called  on.  I  was  one  of  them,  a  mem- 
ber of  the  court  all  the  time ;  if  any  body  had  proposed 
such  a  Constitution  as  this,  it  would  have  been  thrown 
away ;  it  would  not  have  been  looked  at.  We  did  not  con- 
tend with  Great  Britain  for  a  threepenny  duty  on  tea,  but 
upon  a  right  to  tax  us,  and  bind  us  in  all  cases  whatsoever. 
Does  not  this  Constitution  do  the  same  ? " 

Debate  exhausted,  and  a  decisive  vote  imminent,  it 
was  apparent  that  the  Constitution  would  be  rejected.f 
But  there  had  been  a  great  deal  of  neighborly  outside  dis- 
cussion among  the  delegates,  and  they  were  possessed  of 
each  other's  reasonings  and  feelings  as  we  could  not  be,  if 
the  report  was  as  full,  as  it  is  meager.  Both  sides  ear- 
nestly desired  a  Union.  One  side  was  so  eager  for  it,  as 
not  to  stickle  at  any  price ;  the  other  side  would  only  pay 

*  A  Bill  of  Rights  can  not  exclude  the  success  of  aggression,  but  it  does 
exclude  the  consecration  of  its  success.  Posterity  will  reverse  the  judgment 
of  former  generations. 

f  King  wrote  to  Madison  that  in  the  face  of  a  majorjjy  supposed  of  from 
eight  to  twelve,  a  division  upon  any  point  had  not  been  ventured.  Another 
correspondent  informed  him  that,  through  the  proposal  of  amendments  (to 
be  recommended  only)  a  majority  of  from  fifteen  to  twenty  could  be  secured 
for  ratification. 


60  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

so  much.  Those  who  favored  ratification  could  not  lose 
by  paying  less  for  what  they  wanted,  and,  if  they  pledged 
themselves  to  amendments  embodying  the  views  and 
obviating  the  objections  of  the  others,  must  not  all  be 
satisfied  ?  Hancock  was  selected  to  offer  the  compromise, 
which  he  did  with  equal  skill  and  courtesy:  "My  situa- 
tion has  not  permitted  me  to  enter  into  the  debates  of  the 
Convention.  It  appears  to  me,  from  what  has  been  ad- 
vanced in  them,  that  it  is  necessary  to  adopt  the  form  of 
government  proposed,  but  observing  a  diversity  of  senti- 
ment among  the  gentlemen  of  the  Convention,  I  have 
frequently  conversed  with  them  on  the  subject,  and  from 
those  conversations  I  am  induced  to  inquire  whether  the 
introduction  of  some  amendments  would  not  be  attended 
with  the  happiest  consequences.  I  am  unable,  if  my 
abilities  would  permit,  to  go  more  largely  into  the  subject, 
and  I  rely  on  the  candor  of  the  Convention  to  bear  me 
witness  that  my  wishes  for  a  good  Constitution  are  sincere. 
I  submit  a  proposition  to  your  consideration,  with  the 
desire  and  hope  that  it  may  tend  to  promote  a  spirit  of 
union."  The  proposed  amendments  read,  Samuel  Adams 
moved  that  they  be  taken  into  consideration:  "I  have 
had  my  doubts  of  this  Constitution.  I  could  not  digest 
every  part  of  it  as  easily  as  some  gentlemen.  This  is  my 
misfortune,  not  my  fault ;  other  gentlemen  have  had  their 
doubts.  I  have  observed  the  sentiments  of  men  as  far  as 
Virginia,  and  from  newspapers,  and  in  the  conventions,  I 
find  the  same  doubts,  but  in  my  opinion  the  proposition 
submitted  will  have  a  tendency  to  remove  such  doubts  and 
to  conciliate  the  minds  of  the  Convention,  and  of  the 
people  out-of-doors."  Bowdoin,  one  of  the  strongest  advo- 
cates of  ratification,  expressed  his  "  hearty  approbation  of 
the  propositions  of  his  Excellency,  as  they  would  have  a 
tendency  to  relieve  the  fears  and  quiet  the  apprehensions 
of  some  very  worthy  and  respectable  people."  A  motion 


THE  CONVENTION   OF  MASSACHUSETTS.         61 

for  a  committee  of  two  from  each  county,  to  consider  the 
amendments  proposed,  and  any  others  that  might  be  sug- 
gested, and  report  thereon,  was  carried  unanimously.  The 
amendments  reported  met  universal  favor.  Adams  ad- 
mitted that  the  first  article  was  "  a  summary  of  a  Bill  of 
Eights,  and  consonant  with  the  second  of  the  Articles  of 
Confederation."  Dr.  Jarvis,  a  zealous  and  most  powerful 
supporter  of  ratification,  termed  it  a  "positive  security  of 
what  is  not  expressly  delegated,  leaving  nothing  to  the  un- 
certainty of  conjecture,  or  the  refinements  of  implication, 
an  express  reservation  of  what  is  nearest  and  most  agree- 
able to  the  people."  The  end,  however,  was  not  yet 
reached.  Upon  the  point  whether  ratification  should  be 
conditional  upon  the  acceptance  of  the  amendments,  or 
absolute  with  a  recommendation  of  them,  the  unanimity 
was  dissolved,  the  contest  was  renewed,  and  the  issue  was 
again  doubtful.  The  opposition  claimed  that  the  power  of 
the  Convention  only  extended  to  ratification  or  rejection, 
Conditional  ratification  was  legitimate,  but  the  mere  pro- 
posal of  amendments  was  not  contemplated  in  their  ap- 
pointment, nor  embraced  in  their  duties.  Dr.  Jarvis  an- 
swered: "Under  what  authority  are  we  acting,  from 
Congress,  from  the  Federal  Convention,  from  the  State 
Legislature  ?  From  neither,  from  the  people  of  Massa- 
chusetts as  their  immediate  representatives  to  execute  the 
most  important  trust  it  is  possible  to  receive.  Are  not  the 
people  of  Massachusetts,  assembled  by  their  delegates,  at 
liberty  to  resolve  in  what  form  that  trust  shall  be  executed  ? 
To  what  tribunal  are  we  amenable  ?  Only  to  God  and 
our  own  consciences.  It  appears  to  me  that  a  conditional 
ratification  is  equivalent  to  a  total  rejection.  As  so  many 
other  States  have  received  the  Constitution  as  it  is,  how 
can  it  be  made  to  appear  that  they  will  not  adhere  to  their 
resolution,  and  should  they  be  as  warmly  and  pertinaciously 
attached  to  their  opinions,  as  we  might  be  to  ours,  a  long 


62  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

and  painful  interval  might  elapse  before  we  should  have 
the  benefit  of  a  Federal  Constitution.  Will  the  States 
which  have  recently  adopted,  consent  to  call  a  new  con- 
vention at  the  request  of  this  State  ?  If  nine  should  ratify, 
are  we  going  to  expose  this  Commonwealth  to  the  disa- 
greeable alternative  of  being  forced  into  compliance,  or  of 
remaining  in  opposition  ?  Why  these  amendments  should 
not  be  adopted  I  can  not  conceive.  They  are  general,  not 
local,  not  calculated  for  the  particular  interest  of  this  State, 
but  with  indiscriminate  justice,  comprehend  the  circum- 
stances of  the  man  on  the  banks  of  the  Savannah  and  on 
the  margin  of  the  Kennebec.  The  remaining  seven  States 
will  have  our  example  before  them.  There  is  a  high  prob- 
ability that  they,  at  least  some  of  them,  will  take  our  con- 
duct as  a  precedent,  perhaps  they  will  assume  the  same 
mode  of  procedure."  Ames  summed  up  with  his  usual 
ability :  "  Almost  every  one  who  has  appeared  against  the 
Constitution,  has  declared  that  he  approves  it  with  the 
amendments.  One  distinguished  for  his  zealous  oppo- 
sition would  hold  up  both  hands  for  it,  if  they  could  be 
adopted.  I  admire  this  candid  way  of  discussing  the  sub- 
ject, and  shall  endeavor  to  treat  it  with  equal  care  and 
fairness.  The  nature  of  the  debate  is  totally  shifted.  The 
inquiry  now  is,  as  to  the  degree  of  probability,  that  the 
amendments  will  be  incorporated  in  the  Constitution. 
What,  in  any  future  thing,  do  we  devise  more  than  the 
probable  ?  What  more  is  another  Constitution  ?  All  agree 
that  we  must  have  one.  If  we  ratify,  and  a  union  is 
formed,  nine  States  only  have  to  agree ;  if  we  do  not,  and 
a  union  is  not  formed,  thirteen  States  have  to  be  satisfied. 
Either  in  a  union  the  amendments  will  be  accepted,  or  they 
will  not.  If  we  believe  that  they  will,  we  ought  to  be 
unanimous  for  ratification  ;  if  we  believe  that  they  will 
not  command  the  assent  of  enough  States,  this  State  ought 
to  submit,  for  one  eighth  or  one  tenth  of  the  people  ought 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  MASSACHUSETTS.         63 

not  to  dictate  to  the  whole."  The  mass  of  opponents  were 
not  convinced,  and  were  angry.  They  felt  that  a  little  of 
the  pia  fraus  had  been  used,  that  the  offer  of  amend- 
ments, not  of  the  possibility,  or  probability  of  amend- 
ments, averted  a  vote  of  rejection.  Their  mood  is  discern- 
ible in  the  report,  though  discreetly  veiled,  but  their 
bitterness  at  those  who,  over  the  narrow  bridge  of  proba- 
bility, were  about  to  pass  from  one  camp  to  another, 
is  less  dimly  seen.  When  all  who  wished  to  be  heard, 
had  been  gratified,  Hancock  rose  to  put  the  question. 
He  prefaced  it  with  a  short  address,  of  which  the  close  is 
perfect  in  temper  and  pertinency :  "  Let  the  question 
be  decided  as  it  may,  there  can  be  no  cause  for  triumph 
on  one  side,  or  chagrin  on  the  other.  Should  there  be  a 
great  division,  every  good  man,  every  man  who  loves  his 
country,  so  far  from  exhibiting  extraordinary  marks  of  joy, 
will  sincerely  lament  the  want  of  unanimity,  and  strenu- 
ously endeavor  to  cultivate  a  spirit  of  conciliation  both  in 
the  Convention  and  at  home.  The  people  of  this  Common- 
wealth are  a  people  of  great  intelligence  in  public  business. 
They  know  that  we  have  none  of  us  an  interest  separate 
from  theirs,  that  it  must  be  our  happiness  to  conduce  to 
theirs,  and  that  we  must  all  rise  or  fall  together.  They 
will,  therefore,  never  forsake  the  first  principle  of  society, 
that  of  being  governed  by  the  voice  of  the  majority. 
Should  the  proposed  form  of  government  be  rejected, 
they  will  zealously  attempt  another.  Should  it,  by  the 
vote  now  to  be  taken,  be  ratified,  they  will  quietly  acqui- 
esce, and,  where  they  see  want  of  perfection  in  it,  endeavor 
in  a  constitutional  way  to  have  it  amended."  The  re- 
port upon  which  the  vote  was  to  be  taken  can  not  be 
omitted  : 

"  Commonwealth  of  Massachusetts  in  convention  of 
the  delegates  of  the  people  of  the  Commonwealth  of 
Massachusetts,  1788. 


64:  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

"The  Convention  having  impartially  discussed,  and 
fully  considered,  the  Constitution  for  the  United  States  of 
America,  reported  to  Congress  by  the  convention  of  dele- 
gates from  the  United  States  of  America,  and  submitted  to 
us  by  a  resolution  of  the  General  Court  of  the  said  Com- 
monwealth, passed  the  twenty-fifth  day  of  October  last 
past,  and  acknowledging  with  grateful  hearts  the  goodness 
of  the  Supreme  Ruler  of  the  Universe  in  affording  the 
people  of  the  United  States  an  opportunity  deliberately 
and  peacefully,  without  fraud  or  surprise,  of  entering  into 
an  explicit  and  solemn  compact  with  each  other,  by  assent- 
ing to  and  ratifying  a  new  Constitution,  in  order  to  form  a 
more  perfect  union,  establish  justice,  insure  domestic  tran- 
quillity, provide  for  the  common  defense,  promote  the  gen- 
eral welfare,  and  secure  the  blessings  of  liberty  to  them- 
selves and  their  posterity,  do,  in  the  name  and  behalf  of 
the  people  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Massachusetts,  assent 
to  and  ratify  the  said  Constitution  for  the  United  States. 
And,  as  it  is  the  opinion  of  this  Convention  that  certain 
amendments  and  alterations  in  the  said  Constitution  would 
remove  the  fears  and  quiet  the  apprehensions  of  many  of 
the  good  people  of  the  Commonwealth,  and  more  effectu- 
ally guard  against  an  undue  administration  of  the  Federal 
Government,  the  Convention  do  recommend  that  the  fol- 
lowing alterations  and  provisions  be  introduced  into  the 
said  Constitution : 

"  1.  That  it  be  explicitly  declared  that  all  powers  not 
expressly  delegated  by  the  aforesaid  Constitution  are  re- 
served to  the  several  States  to  be  by  them  exercised. 

"2.  That  there  shall  be  one  representative  to  every 
thirty  thousand,  according  to  the  census  mentioned  in  the 
Constitution,  until  the  whole  number  of  representatives 
amounts  to  two  hundred. 

"  3.  That  Congress  do  not  exercise  the  powers  vested  in 
them  by  the  fourth  section  of  the  first  article,  but  in  cases 


THE  CONVENTION   OF  MASSACHUSETTS.         65 

where  a  State  shall  neglect  or  refuse  to  make  the  regula- 
tions therein  mentioned,  or  shall  make  regulations  subver- 
sive of  the  rights  of  the  people  to  a  free  and  equal  repre- 
sentation in  Congress  agreeably  to  the  Constitution. 

"  4.  That  Congress  do  not  lay  direct  taxes,  but  when  the 
moneys  arising  from  the  impost  and  excise  are  insufficient 
for  the  public  exigencies,  nor  then,  until  Congress  shall 
have  first  made  a  requisition  upon  the  States  to  assess, 
levy,  and  pay  their  respective  proportions  of  such  requisi- 
tions agreeably  to  the  census  fixed  by  the  Constitution,  in 
such  way  and  manner  as  the  Legislatures  of  the  States  may 
think  best ;  and  in  such  case,  if  any  State  shall  neglect  or 
refuse  to  pay  its  proportion  pursuant  to  such  requisition, 
then  Congress  may  assess  and  levy  such  State's  proportion, 
together  with  interest  thereon,  at  the  rate  of  six  per  cent 
per  annum,  from  the  time  of  payment  prescribed  in  such 
requisitions. 

"  5.  That  Congress  create  no  company  with  exclusive 
advantages  of  commerce. 

"6.  That  no  person  shall  be  tried  for  any  crime  by 
which  he  may  incur  an  infamous  punishment  or  loss  of 
life,  until  he  be  first  indicted  by  a  grand  jury,  except  in 
such  cases  as  may  arise  in  the  government,  and  the  regula- 
tion of  the  land  and  naval  forces. 

"  7.  The  Supreme  Judicial  Federal  Court  shall  have  no 
jurisdiction  of  causes  between  the  citizens  of  different 
States,  unless  the  matter  in  dispute,  whether  it  concern  the 
realty  or  the  personalty,  be  of  the  value  of  three  thousand 
dollars  at  the  least ;  nor  shall  the  Federal  judicial  powers 
extend  to  any  action  between  citizens  of  different  States, 
when  the  matter  in  dispute,  whether  it  concern  the  realty 
or  the  personalty,  is  not  of  the  value  of  fifteen  hundred 
dollars  at  the  least. 

"  8.  In  civil  actions  between  citizens  of  different  States, 
every  issue  of  fact  arising  in  actions  at  common  law  shall 


66  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

be  tried  by  a  jury  if  the  parties  or  either  of  them  re- 
quest it. 

"  9.  Congress  shall  at  no  time  consent  that  any  person 
holding  an  office  of  trust  or  profit  under  the  United  States 
shall  accept  of  a  title  of  nobility  or  any  other  title  and 
office  from  any  king,  prince,  or  foreign  state. 

"  And  the  Convention  do  in  the  name  and  in  the  behalf 
of  the  people  of  this  Commonwealth  enjoin  it  upon  their 
representatives  in  Congress,  at  all  times,  until  the  altera- 
tions and  provisions  aforesaid  have  been  considered  agree- 
ably to  the  fifth  article  of  the  said  Constitution,  to  exert  all 
their  influence  and  use  all  reasonable  and  legal  methods  to 
obtain,  a  ratification  of  the  said  alterations  and  provisions 
in  such  manner  as  is  provided  in  this  said  article." 

The  pledges  of  the  Convention  were  not  kept.  When 
the  amendments  were  submitted  to  the  States,  the  vote  of 
Massachusetts  was  not  given  for  them.  They  became  part 
of  the  charter  of  government  by  the  vote  of  States  which 
had  accepted  the  ideas  of  Massachusetts,  and  followed  her 
example.  The  piety  of  the  Commonwealth  must  have 
obtained,  for  its  respectability,  a  divine  dispensation  from 
good  faith. 

The  count  showed  187  yeas,  168  nays.  The  shifting  of 
ten  votes  had  been  sufficient.  The  statistics  of  the  votes 
are  curious,  interesting,  and  perhaps  instructive.  The 
delegates  from  some  counties  voted  almost  unanimously 
yea;  from  others,  with  the  same  degree  of  unanimity, 
nay.  The  officers  of  the  late  war,  by  about  three  to  two, 
voted  nay;  the  clergy,  by  about  five  to  one,  voted 
yea.  The  bench,  the  bar,  and  the  trading  and  commercial 
classes,  almost  to  a  man,  voted  yea.  The  yeomanry  as  a 
class  voted  nay.  Why  the  yeomanry  were  so  determined 
in  opposition  is  a  question  easily  answered.  They  had 
suffered  and  fought  for  seven  years  to  establish  a  fact,  and 
a  political  principle.  The  fact,  that  Massachusetts  was  a 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  MASSACHUSETTS.         67 

community,  and,  as  such,  entitled  to  say  what  were  her 
rights  and  maintain  them ;  the  principle,  that  the  obligation 
of  governor  and  governed  is  reciprocal  and  the  right  of 
judgment  equal — those  things  they  had  looked  for  in  the 
Constitution,  and  had  not  found  them,  or,  if  there,  not  so 
distinctly  stated  as  to  defy  denial.  The  first  amendment 
they  thought  supplied  the  deficiency,  but  they  would  not 
trust  amendment  to  any  contingency.  The  reiterated 
assurances  of  a  set  of  checks  and  balances,  within  the  sys- 
tem did  not  impose  upon  them  for  a  moment.  They  knew 
that  the  electors,  not  the  elected  (whether  State  Legislature, 
Congress,  or  a  President),  were  the  real  depositories  of 
power.  That  power  was  what  they  wanted  defined  and 
bounded.  They  knew  that  unless  there  was  a  check  upon 
that,  "  constitutional  government  is  but  solemn  trifling, 
all  trusts  in  a  Constitution  being  grounded  on  the  assur- 
ance not  that  the  depositories  of  power  will  not,  but  that 
they  can  not,  misemploy  their  power."  They  understood 
liberty  to  be,  as  Fisher  Ames  defined  it,  "  due  restraint 
upon  the  liberties  of  others."  Such  due  restraint  they 
knew  was  necessary  to  keep  them  from  injustice  to  others, 
and  others  from  injustice  to  them.  They  did  not  propose 
to  change  masters,  and  to  give  to  a  Union  the  right  they 
had  denied  to  Great  Britain.  In  every  other  convention 
men  of  trained  abilities  were  pitted  against  each  other.  In 
that  of  Massachusetts  all  her  disciplined  intellect,  famil- 
iarity with  debate,  wealth,  and  high  social  position  were 
on  one  side ;  on  the  other,  the  laborers  in  peace,  and  the 
rank  and  file  in  war.  Whoever  appreciates  political  in- 
sight, must  see,  from  the  scanty  record,  that  her  yeomanry 
were  indeed  "  a  people  of  great  light." 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  VIRGINIA,  1788. 

THE  report  of  debate  in  the  Convention  of  Virginia, 
which  exceeds  six  hundred  pages,  discloses  three  great  cur- 
rents of  opinion :  One,  that  the  Constitution  was  accepta- 
ble upon  its  merits ;  one,  that  it  was  not,  but  indispensable ; 
and  one,  that  it  would  be,  if  amended,  though  not  until 
amended.  The  former  was  in  a  minority ;  even  with  the 
addition  of  the  second  a  majority  was  doubtful,  and,  if  tra- 
dition may  be  trusted,  only  in  the  closing  days  of  the  Con- 
vention were  the  few  votes  necessary  to  ratification  secured  j 
and  then  only  by  an  abandonment  of  the  pretensions  which 
at  the  outset  had  characterized  its  advocates.  The  amenity  so 
conspicuous  in  the  Convention  of  Massachusetts  is  less  ap- 
parent in  the  Convention  of  Virginia  ;  but  the  circumstances 
were  not  the  same.  Massachusetts  had  a  question  almost 
abstract  to  resolve;  if  she  rejected,  a  preponderance  of 
strength  and  wealth  would  have  responded  to  her  decision. 
If  Virginia  rejected,  the  only  ally  to  be  counted  on  was 
North  Carolina.  The  issue,  therefore,  was  no  longer  sim- 
ple ;  the  dangers  of  disunion,  as  well  as  the  merits  of  an 
instrument,  had  to  be  weighed,  and  the  friends  of  adoption, 
standing  on  vantage-ground,  were  little  disposed  to  concili- 
ation. The  question  forces  itself  upon  the  mind,  why  men 
almost  universally  satisfied  with  the  structure  of  the  pro- 
posed government,  content  with  the  apportionment  of  in. 
fluence  among  the  States,  craving  a  Union,  and  possessing 
the  same  objects  of  political  desire,  divided  into  parties, 
almost  hostile.  The  discord  can  not  be  accounted  for  merely 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  VIRGINIA,  1788.          69 

as  a  recurrence  of  the  historical  fact  that  in  religion  and  in 
politics  men  who  agree  upon  ninety-nine  out  of  one  hundred 
points,  are  sometimes  dogmatical,  indeed  fanatical,  upon  the 
single  point,  and,  paradoxical  as  it  sounds,  are  the  farther 
apart  the  nearer  they  are  together,  because,  the  less  that  is 
to  be  yielded,  the  more  each  thinks  that  the  other  ought  to 
give  way.  There  were  two  causes,  one  of  which  lies  on 
the  surface,  and  one  which  will  appear  in  this  debate.  Un- 
fortunately, the  Federalists,  early,  as  can  be  seen  in  the  let- 
ters of  the  very  moderate  Madison,  arrogated  to  themselves 
a  monopoly  of  Unionism  and  patriotism  ;  and  if  they  did 
not  distinctly  designate  themselves,  as  Cicero  did  his  party, 
the  Good,  came  dangerously  near  the  thought,  and  its  ex- 
pression. As  human  nature  is  constituted,  they  could 
scarcely  do  otherwise,  under  their  intense  conviction  that 
then  was  the  golden  moment,  that  the  opportunity  lost 
could  never  be  regained,  that  the  rejection  of  the  Constitu- 
tion must  be  followed  by  anarchy,  and  anarchy  by  inter- 
state wars,  to  a  common  destruction.  The  anti-Federal- 
ists, principally  consisting  of  the  less  timid  classes  in  each 
State,  held  such  fears  to  be  preposterous.  They  knew  that 
there  was  then  a  Union,  and  they  believed  that  it  would  con- 
tinue to  exist,  that  it  must  exist,  because  its  advantages 
were  palpable  to  every  man  and  every  State.  They  did 
not  believe  that  it  could  depend  upon  any  one  special  set 
of  words,  but  upon  a  sense  of  its  benefit,  or,  if  it  could, 
that  the  Constitution  was  that  special  set  of  words,  and  they 
felt  that  the  assumption  of  a  lack  of  patriotism,  or  Union- 
ism, in  an  opposition  to  any  proposed  Constitution,  was  an 
affront ;  that  the  reason  Mason  gave  in  the  Federal  Conven- 
tion for  refusing  his  signature — "  I  will  not  say  take  this, 
or  nothing" — was  their  reason,  and  while  they  were  satisfied 
to  vest  in  a  Federal  Government  every  power  necessary  to 
a  Union,  they  were  determined  to  have  nothing  but  a 
Union,  and  resolved  that  every  expression  in  the  Constitu- 


70  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

tion  should  be  so  precise  and  clear,  that  a  possibility  of 
doubt,  or  pretext  for  quarrel,  should  be  excluded.  When 
Mr.  Lincoln  said  that  "  the  human  mind  can  not  reach  to 
the  audacity  of  denying  any  right  plainly  written  in  the 
Constitution,"  he  spoke  the  praise,  although  the  epitaph,  of 
the  policy  which  sought  to  have  every  right  and  power 
plainly  written.*  Possibly  it  is  a  matter  of  regret  that  the 
criticism  of  the  anti-Federalists  had  not  been  more  minute 
and  searching,  and  their  emendation  more  thorough.  War, 
and  the  change  of  the  principle  of  government  from  con- 
sent to  force,  might  have  been  averted.  With  such  parties 
existing,  the  debate  in  the  Virginia  Convention  opened. 
Among  the  debaters  were  men  whose  names  are  inseparable 
from  the  history  of  the  United  States — Madison,  Henry, 
Marshall,  Monroe.  With  these  were  associated  others,  per- 
haps not  inferior  in  mental  power,  if  less  fortunate  in  op- 
portunities for  displaying  it.  The  preamble  and  first  article 
having  been  read  in  the  Committee  on  the  Whole,  Nicholas 
rose  to  commend  it.  He  reviewed  the  plan  of  representa- 
tion in  its  different  characteristics ;  the  qualification  of  elect- 
ors, of  those  they  might  elect,  the  number,  tenure  of  office, 
and  powers  of  the  latter ;  and,  lastly,  the  security  of  the 
people.  The  qualification  of  electors  for  the  general  and 
State  Legislatures  was  the  same ;  a  reasonable  provision, 
as  the  qualifications  of  electors  varied  in  the  States.  The 
qualifications  of  the  elected  were  age  and  residence  ;  one, 
requisite  for  maturity  of  judgment,  the  other  for  an  identity 
of  interest  with  a  State.  The  term  of  office,  neither  too 
long  nor  too  short,  conciliated  duty  to  the  Union,  with  re- 
sponsibilty  to  constituents  for  intelligent  and  faithful  serv- 
ice. The  number  had  to  be  fixed  arbitrarily  at  first,  but 

*  The  right  not  only  plainly  written  in,  but  the  Constitution  itself  is, 
freedom  from  control  the  rule,  control  the  exception,  the  characteristic  of 
governments  based  on  consent :  in  those  not  so  based,  control  is  the  rule, 
freedom  from  control  the  exception. 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  VIRGINIA,   1788.  71 

upon  the  disclosures  of  a  census  would  be  altered  to  exact- 
ness. So  far  as  the  security  of  the  people  might  be  in- 
volved, the  House  had  a  greater  weight  in  the  system  than 
the  Commons  in  that  of  England.  The  Commons  had 
overmatched  greater  powers  than  the  House  would  have  to 
encounter,  and  their  responsibility  to  constituents  was  less. 
This  power  so  vested  can  not  be  abused,  for  experience 
has  proved  that  men  can  trust  those  whose  rights  are  identi- 
cal with  their  own.  Still  more,  the  people  being  possessed 
of  the  supreme  power,  can  change  the  Government  when 
they  please.  The  power  to  regulate  the  time,  manner,  and 
place  of  elections  for  Federal  officers  in  the  House,  he 
deemed  to  be  indispensable ;  without  it  there  could  be  no 
security  for  the  General  Government  against  the  hostility  of 
State  Legislatures.  If  a  State  Legislature,  by  accident  or 
design,  failed  to  regulate,  the  inaction  would  eventuaUy 
put  an  end  to  the  Union.  Again,  there  might  otherwise 
be  as  many  different  periods  of  election  as  States ;  there- 
fore, without  a  power  in  the  Federal  Government  to  pre- 
scribe uniformity,  a  full  House  might  be  unattainable. 
Henry  inquired  of  the  delegates  to  the  late  Federal  Con- 
vention what  was  the  purpose  of  that  body ;  what  did  it 
mean  by  "  We  the  people  "  instead  of  "  We,  the  States  ?  " 
Did  it  design  a  great  consolidated  government  ?  Randolph 
seized  the  opportunity  to  deny  vacillation.  He  had  re- 
fused to  sign  because  he  thought  amendments  necessary. 
Had  this  Convention  met  at  an  earlier  date,  he  should  have 
thought  them  a  condition  of  acceptance.  Now  it  was  too 
late ;  the  hope  of  subsequent  amendments  was  all  that  was 
left  to  him.  The  objection  to  "  We,  the  people,"  was  the 
least  and  most  trivial  of  all  possible  objections ;  it  carried 
its  answer  with  it.  Should  not  the  people  be  consulted 
upon  the  construction  of  a  government  by  which  they  were 
to  be  bound  ? 

Mason  claimed  that  direct  taxation,  before  requisition 


72  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

made  and  refused,  in  which  case  it  would  be  proper,  sub- 
verted every  principle  hitherto  maintained,  and  would  make 
the  system  a  consolidated  Government.  The  plan  he  had 
hoped  for,  was  one  which  would  draw  a  line  between  the 
General  Government  and  the  State  governments  so  distinct 
as  to  prevent  that  clashing  of  interests  and  powers,  which 
must  otherwise  end  in  the  destruction  of  one  or  the  other. 

Pendleton  admitted  that  a  consolidated  government — 
"  one  with  sole,  exclusive,  and  unlimited  power,  executive, 
legislative,  and  judicial — would  be  inadmissible;  bnt  the 
Constitution  was  neither  such,  nor  could  by  any  possibility 
be  made  such.  It  only  extended  to  the  general  purposes 
of  a  Union,  and  did  not  intermeddle  with  the  local  par- 
ticular affairs  of  the  States.  The  Federal  Government  de- 
pends upon  the  existence  of  the  State  governments ;  with- 
out those,  to  continue  the  existence  of  Congress,  and 
preserve  order  and  peace  within  their  boundaries,  it  must 
be  destroyed.  Fault  has  been  found  with  the  expression, 
'  "We,  the  people.'  If  the  objection  means  that  a  union 
ought  not  to  be  of  the  people,  but  of  the  governments  of 
the  States,  the  choice  of  words  is  very  happy.  What  have 
the  State  governments  to  do  with  the  Constitution  ?  If 
they  were  to  determine  upon  acceptance,  the  people  would 
not  be  the  judges  of  the  terms  on  which  it  was  adopted. 
Direct  taxation  encounters  objection.  A  government  must 
be  supported  ;  for  support  it  must  have  its  own  revenue. 
If  it  had  to  depend  upon  requisitions,  precious  time  might 
be  lost  between  its  necessities,  and  possibilities  of  supply 
through  the  action  of  the  State  governments.  Requisitions 
might  be  neglected,  even  refused ;  collision  might  ensue, 
and  the  Union  be  dissolved." 

Henry  rejoined :  "  The  fate  of  America  is  involved  in 
my  question.  Whether  this  plan  is  a  confederation  of 
States,  or  a  consolidation  of  States,  turns  upon  that  little 
'  We,  the  people.'  The  inquiry  is  not  how  trade  may  be 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  VIRGINIA,   1788.  73 

increased,  or  a  great  and  powerful  people  may  be  formed, 
but  how  liberty — which  ought  to  be  the  direct  end  of  gov- 
ernment— may  be  secured.  Unfortunately,  nothing  will 
preserve  it  but  force.  To  give  up  the  means  to  preserve 
it  will  be  ruin.  My  great  objection  to  this  government  is, 
that  it  does  not  leave  us  the  means  of  defending  our  rights. 
It  is  said  that  it  is  not  safe  to  reject  it.  "Why  not  ?  It  is 
said  that  there  is  a  plain  way  of  getting  amendments.  Am 
I  mad,  or  are  my  countrymen  mad?  Six  tenths  of  the 
people  of  four  States,  not  one  twentieth  of  the  American 
people,  can  deny  the  most  necessary  alteration.  The  gen- 
tleman who  presides  (Pendleton)  tells  us  that  to  prevent 
abuses  in  our  governments  we  will  assemble  in  convention, 
recall  our  delegated  powers,  and  punish  our  servants  for 
abusing  their  trust.  There  would  be  fine  times  if,  to  pun- 
ish tyrants,  it  were  sufficient  to  assemble  the  people !  The 
arms  will  be  gone,  and  neither  an  aristocratic  nor  a  demo- 
cratic spirit  be  left.  In  what  nation  was  a  revolution  ever 
heard  of,  compassed  by  those  without  any  power  at  all 
against  those  with  power  ?  There  will  be  a  standing  army. 
How  can  that  be  punished  ?  Will  your  mace-bearer  be  a 
match  for  a  disciplined  regiment  ?  What  will  be  the  situa- 
tion ?  Power  of  direct  taxation  unbounded  and  unlimited, 
power  of  exclusive  legislation  over  ten  miles  square,  and 
over  all  places  purchased  for  the  erection  of  forts,  maga- 
zines, arsenals,  and  dock-yards  is  conceded.  What  resist- 
ance could  be  made?  The  attempt  would  be  madness; 
the  country  would  be  in  the  hands  of  enemies,  their  garri- 
sons in  its  strongholds.  Even  the  disciph'ne  of  the  militia 
is  to  be  alienated.  Will  the  oppressor  let  go  the  oppressed  ? 
Was  there  ever  such  an  instance  ?  Can  the  annals  of  man- 
kind exhibit  one  single  example  when  rulers,  overcharged 
with  power,  let  the  oppressed  go  upon  their  most  urgent 
entreaty  ?  Sometimes  the  oppressed  have  got  loose  by  one 
of  those  bloody  struggles  which  desolate  a  country ;  but  a 
4 


74:  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

willing  relinquishment  of  power  is  one  of  those  things  of 
which  human  nature  never  was,  nor  ever  will  be,  capable. 
The  first  consideration  should  be  liberty;  the  second, 
union.  Are  not  the  means  confounded  with  the  end  in 
this  government  ?  There  is  no  responsibility,  no  punish- 
ment for  the  grossest  maladministration,  for  the  most  out- 
rageous violation  of  immunities.  By  what  law  can  aggres- 
sions be  punished  ?  None  is  visible.  The  preservation  of 
liberty  depends  upon  the  chance  of  men  being  virtuous 
enough  to  punish  themselves." 

Randolph  pressed  the  consideration  of  safety :  "  Were 
I  convinced  that  our  accession  was  not  necessary  to  preserve 
this  Union,  I  would  not  accede  without  previous  amend- 
ments, but  I  am  satisfied  that  it  will  be  lost  if  we  reject. 
The  Union  is  necessary  to  the  safety  of  Virginia,  and  in- 
dispensable to  her  happiness.  I  confess  that  it  is  impru- 
dent for  one  nation  to  form  an  alliance  with  another  whose 
situation  and  construction  of  government  are  dissimilar; 
but  can  Virginia  exist  without  the  Union  ?  She  can  not, 
as  I  will  prove."  He  detailed  the  reasons  for  his  belief  that 
she  would  not  be  capable  of  defense  against  the  bordering 
States,  if  they  should  be  hostile,  and  that  they  would  be 
hostile,  he  justly  inferred  from  human  nature. 

Madison  was  "  pained  to  hear  continual  distortion  of  the 
natural  construction  of  language.  It  was  enough  for  any 
human  production  to  bear  a  fair  discussion.  If  powers  be 
necessary,  apparent  danger  is  not  a  sufficient  reason  against 
conceding  them.  Since  the  general  civilization  of  mankind 
there  had  been  more  instances  of  the  abridgment  of  the 
freedom  of  the  people  by  the  gradual  and  silent  encroach- 
ments of  those  in  power  than  by  violent  and  sudden  usur- 
pation. The  history  of  ancient  and  modern  republics 
showed  their  destruction  to  have  resulted  from  turbulence, 
violence,  and  the  trampling  of  the  rights  of  a  minority  by 
a  majority.  On  consideration  of  the  peculiar  situation  of 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  VIRGINIA,    1788.          75 

the  United  States,  and  the  causes  of  the  diversity  of  senti- 
ment which  pervaded  their  inhabitants,  there  is  great  dan- 
ger that  the  same  causes  may  terminate  in  the  same  fatal 
effects  they  had  produced  in  other  republics.  That  danger 
ought  to  be  wisely  guarded  against,  and  perhaps  in  the 
progress  of  this  discussion  it  might  appear  that  the  only 
possible  remedy  for  those  evils,  and  the  means  of  protect- 
ing and  preserving  the  principles  of  republicanism,  would 
be  found  in  that  system  which  is  declaimed  against  as  the 
parent  of  despotism.  The  principal  question  is,  whether 
the  proposed  government  be  federal  or  consolidated.  It 
is  of  a  mixed  nature,  in  a  manner  unprecedented.  There 
is  not  an  express  example  in  the  experience  of  the  world. 
It  stands  by  itself.  In  some  respects  it  is  of  a  federal 
nature,  in  others  of  a  consolidated  nature.  In  the  manner 
in  which  the  Constitution  is  investigated,  ratified,  and  made 
the  act  of  the  people  of  America,  it  is  not  completely  con- 
solidated nor  entirely  federal.  Who  are  the  parties  to  it  ? 
The  people,  but  not  the  people  as  composing  one  great 
body,  but  the  people  as  composing  thirteen  sovereignties. 
No  State  is  bound  by  it  without  its  own  consent.  Should 
all  the  States  adopt  it,  it  will  be  a  government  established 
by  the  thirteen  States  of  America,  not  through  the  inter- 
vention of  Legislatures,  but  by  the  people  at  large.  In  this 
respect,  the  distinction  between  the  existing  and  proposed 
system  is  very  material ;  that  was  created  by  the  dependent, 
derivative  power  of  the  Legislatures  of  the  States,  this  will 
be  by  the  superior  power  of  the  people.  This  same  idea  is 
in  some  degree  attended  to  in  the  provision  for  alterations. 
A  majority  of  the  States  can  not  introduce  amendments, 
nor  are  all  required  for  that  purpose.  Three  fourths  must 
concur.  In  this  there  is  a  departure  from  the  federal  idea. 
The  members  of  the  House  of  Representatives  are  to  be 
chosen  by  the  people  at  large,  in  proportion  to  the  numbers 
in  the  respective  districts.  The  Senate  is  elected  by  the 


76  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

States  in  their  equal  and  political  capacity.  Had  the  gov- 
ernment been  completely  consolidated,  the  Senate  would 
have  been  elected  by  the  people  in  their  individual  capacity. 
Thus  it  is  of  a  complicated  nature,  and  the  complication 
may  be  hoped  to  exclude  the  evils  of  an  absolute  consoli- 
dated government,  as  well  as  those  of  a  mere  confederacy. 
If  Virginia  were  separated,  her  power  and  authority  would 
extend  to  all  cases ;  if  all  powers  were  vested  in  the  General 
Government,  it  would  be  a  consolidated  government ;  but 
the  powers  of  the  General  Government  are  enumerated.  It 
has  legislative  powers  on  defined  and  limited  objects,  be- 
yond which  it  can  not  extend  its  jurisdiction.  If  any  of 
those  powers  be  necessary,  inconvenient  though  they  be, 
Virginia  must  submit  to  receive  them,  or  to  lose  the  Union. 
Direct  taxation  will  probably  be  unnecessary  for  the  general 
purposes  of  government,  but  in  case  of  war  every  resource 
must  be  at  its  command." 

Corbin  considered  Madison's  definition  of  the  proposed 
government  exact,  and  its  appropriate  designation,  "  a  repre- 
sentative federal  republic,  as  contradistinguished  from  a 
confederacy.  It  placed  the  remedy  for  disorder  in  the 
hands  that  felt  it,  not  as  the  other,  in  the  hands  that  caused 
it.  The  evils  justly  complained  of  in  popular  governments 
— faction,  dissension,  and  the  consequent  subjection  of  the 
minority  to  the  caprice  and  arbitrary  decision  of  the  ma- 
jority— will  be  excluded  by  the  Constitution,  for  faction 
must  be  less  when  the  interest  of  a  nation  is  entirely  con- 
centrated, than  when  it  is  entirely  diversified.  This  gov- 
ernment, which  will  make  us  one  people,  which  will  have 
a  tendency  to  assimilate  our  situations,  and  which  is  so  ad- 
mirably calculated  to  produce  harmony  and  unanimity,  can 
not  possibly  admit  of  an  oppressive  combination  by  one 
part  of  the  Union  against  the  other.  Therefore,  what  end 
will  be  answered  by  an  attempt  to  obtain  previous  amend- 
ments ?  Will  the  States  that  have  adopted  rescind  their 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  VIRGINIA,   1788.  77 

resolutions  ?  Had  we  adopted,  would  we  recede  to  please 
the  caprice  of  another  State  ?  Must  there  not  be  another 
Federal  Convention  ?  Must  there  not  be  another  conven- 
tion in  every  State?  If  our  conditions  are  rejected,  we 
must  be  excluded  from  the  Union,  or  other  conventions 
must  be  called,  eternally  revolving  and  devising  expedients 
without  coming  to  a  final  decision.  Let  us  go  hand  in 
hand  with  Massachusetts,  adopt  and  propose  amendments." 
Henry  resumed :  "  We  are  told  that  this  government,  taken 
collectively,  is  without  example ;  that  it  is  national  in  this 
part,  federal  in  that;  in  the  brain  it  is  national,  in  the 
stamina  federal;  some  limbs  are  federal,  some  national; 
it  is  federal  in  conferring  powers,  it  is  national  in  retain- 
ing them;  it  is  not  to  be  supported  by  the  States,  the 
pockets  of  individuals  are  to  be  searched  for  its  mainte- 
nance. What  signifies  the  most  curious  anatomical  de- 
scription of  it  in  its  creation  ?  To  all  the  common  purposes 
of  legislation  it  is  a  great  consolidation  of  government,  but, 
when  it  works  sorely  on  our  necks,  we  may  have  the  con- 
solation of  knowing  that  it  is  a  mixed  government,  and  of 
saying  that  it  was  federal  in  its  origin.  Is  it  not  absurd  to 
adopt  this  system,  and  to  rely  upon  its  being  afterward 
amended  ?  Is  the  rage  for  novelty  so  great,  that  you  are 
first  to  sign  and  seal,  and  then  retract  ?  You  are  to  bind 
yourself  hand  and  foot,  for  what  ?  To  be  unbound.  You 
are  to  go  into  a  dungeon,  for  what  ?  To  come  out.  Is  there 
no  danger,  when  you  go  in,  that  the  bolt  of  federal  author- 
ity will  shut  you  in  ? "  Lee  answered :  "  This  new  system 
shows,  in  stronger  terms  than  words  could  declare,  that  the 
liberties  of  the  people  are  secured.  Its  principle  is,  that 
all  powers  are  in  the  people,  and  that  rulers  have  no  pow- 
ers but  what  are  enumerated  in  that  paper.  When  a  ques- 
tion arises  with  respect  to  the  legality  of  any  power  as- 
sumed or  exercised  by  the  Congress,  it  is  plainly  on  the  side 
of  the  governed.  Is  it  enumerated  in  the  Constitution? 


T8  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

If  it  be,  it  is  legal  and  just ;  if  otherwise,  arbitrary  and  un- 
constitutional." Monroe  stated  distinctly  the  ground  upon 
which  many  who  recognized  the  superiority  of  the  Consti- 
tution in  most  respects  to  the  confederation,  and  were  de- 
sirous to  adopt  it,  felt  compelled  to  insist  upon  a  previous 
amendment:  "Power  is  divided  between  the  State  and 
Federal  Governments.  It  is  distributed  in  the  Federal 
Government,  for  better  administration,  between  three 
branches ;  there  is  little  danger  of  either  being  subverted 
by  the  others,  but,  if  the  Federal  Government  and  a  State 
differ  as  to  the  boundaries  of  power,  there  is  very  great 
danger  that  their  coalition,  for  they  will  naturally  coalesce, 
may  subvert  the  rights  of  the  people.  Where  is  the  secu- 
rity for  rights  ?  where  is  a  check  within  the  system  ?  I  can 
not  see  any.  There  ought  to  be  a  third  distinct  branch,  to 
maintain  an  equilibrium."  Though  no  immediate  answers 
were  made  to  Monroe,  two  were  incidentally  attempted  in 
the  course  of  debate.  Madison  found  a  solution  of  the 
difficulty  in  the  virtue  of  the  people :  "  If  they  were  not 
virtuous  enough,  and  intelligent  enough,  to  elect  men  of 
virtue  and  intelligence,  no  theoretic  checks  or  forms  of 
government  could  insure."  The  experience  of  the  world 
is  directly  opposite.  The  nature  of  a  government  may 
make  bad  men  better,  or  good  men  less  good.  If  the  ap- 
plication be  narrowed  to  republican  governments,  or,  still 
more,  restricted  to  the  United  States,  the  statement  is  just 
as  untenable.  If  a  theory  of  government  is,  that  rights  and 
duties  are  reciprocal  and  coextensive,  the  character  of  men 
will  be  higher  than  if  it  fails  in  that  respect.  If  the  theory 
of  a  government  admits  of  a  penalty  for  disregard  of  duty, 
each  succeeding  generation  will  become  more  and  more 
self-controlled.  If  there  be  no  penalty,  each  succeeding 
generation  will  become  less  and  less  self-restrained.  Mar- 
shall supposed  the  solution  to  be  found  in  the  independ- 
ence of  the  judges.  But  he,  like  Madison,  evaded  the 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  VIRGINIA,   1788.  79 

question.  Independence  is  not  impartiality.  The  appoint- 
ing power  necessarily  has  a  bias,  it  selects  for  a  judge  a 
man  known  to  have  the  same  bias.  It  can  not  be  other- 
wise, whenever  the  construction  of  a  constitution  is  the 
basis  of  parties.  A  Protestant  would  not  be  willing  to 
submit  the  points  on  which  he  differs  from  the  Church  of 
Rome  to  the  decision  of  the  College  of  Cardinals,  eminent 
as  that  body  may  be ;  nor  would  a  Koman  Catholic,  to  the 
Bench  of  Bishops  in  England,  or  to  a  synod  of  Presby- 
terian divines,  strong  as  might  be  the  intellect,  pure  the 
nature,  and  just  the  intention  of  the  bishops  and  divines. 
What  makes  the  impossibility  of  freedom  from  bias  in  a 
Federal  judiciary  more  striking  is,  that  nominally  Federal 
officials  are  the  parties  appointing,  but  the  real  party  is  the 
political  will  of  some  of  the  States.  The  question  of 
Monroe — "  What  prevents  a  coalition,  and  with  a  coalition, 
what  becomes  of  rights  ? " — remains  unanswered. 

Marshall  followed :  "  The  supporters  of  the  Constitution 
idolize  democracy.  They  admire  the  system,  because  they 
think  it  establishes  a  well-regulated  democracy.  What  are 
the  favorite  maxims  of  a  democracy  ?  Strict  observance 
of  justice  and  public  faith,  from  which  no  mischief  or  mis- 
fortune ought  to  deter,  and  a  steady  adherence  to  virtue. 
The  friends  of  the  Constitution  are  as  tenacious  of  liberty 
as  its  enemies.  They  desire  no  power  in  the  Government 
to  endanger  it,  only  such  as  will  protect  and  preserve  it. 
What  are  the  objects  of  the  national  Government  ?  To 
protect  the  United  States  in  war,  and  to  promote  the  gen- 
eral welfare.  It  must  have  powers  commensurate  with  its 
objects,  and  the  right  of  direct  taxation  is  so  essential,  that 
without  it  the  plan  may  as  well  be  rejected.  It  is  said 
that  there  are  no  checks  ;  what  has  become  of  the  Amer- 
ican spirit  ?  In  that  source,  upon  oppression,  will  be  found 
the  check  and  control.  In  this  country  there  is  no  exclu- 
sive personal  stock  of  interest.  The  interest  of  the  com- 


80  SEVEN  CONVENTION'S. 

munity  is  blended  and  inseparably  connected  with  that  of 
the  individual.  When  he  promotes  his  own,  he  promotes 
that  of  the  community  ;  when  he  consults  the  common 
good,  he  consults  his  own.  Such  checks  abound.  Is  it  an 
absurdity  to  adopt  before  amendment;  is  the  object  of 
adoption,  solely  amendment ;  is  it  not,  besides,  safety,  pro- 
tection from  faction  ?  If,  on  trying  the  system,  amendment 
shall  be  found  necessary,  what  restrains  amendment  ?  The 
Government  is  not  supported  by  force,  it  depends  on  our 
free-will.  When  experience  shows  us  any  inconvenience, 
we  can  correct  it ;  but  until  we  have  experience  on  the 
subject,  amendments,  as  well  as  the  Constitution,  are  to 
try.  There  is  such  a  diversity  in 'human  minds,  that  it 
is  impossible  we  should  concur  in  one  system  until  we 
try  it." 

In  the  remarks  of  Marshall  there  is  a  statement  which 
may  have  been  justified  by  personal  knowledge,  but  of 
which  neither  proof  nor  probability  can  be  found  in  any 
recorded  utterance.  To  him,  in  the  Virginia,  as  to  Wilson, 
in  the  Federal  Convention,  peculiar  information  on  the 
matter  seems  to  have  been  conveyed :  "  There  are  in  this 
State  and  in  every  State  many  who  are  decided  enemies  of 
the  Union.  Reflect  on  the  probable  conduct  of  such  men. 
What  will  they  do  ?  They  will  bring  in  amendments 
which  are  local  in  their  nature,  which  they  know  will  not 
be  accepted.  Disunion  will  be  their  object.  This  will  be 
attained  by  the  proposal  of  unreasonable  amendments." 

Mason  and  Henry  were  strenuous  opponents  of  uncon- 
ditional ratification ;  both  were  among  the  foremost  men  of 
their  time,  long  in  public  life,  and  from  official  positions 
brought  in  contact  with  numbers.  Mason's  testimony  on 
the  point  is  explicit  and  full :  "  Foreigners  would  suppose, 
from  the  declamation  about  the  Union,  that  there  was  a 
great  dislike  in  America  to  any  General  Government.  I 
have  never  in  my  whole  life  heard  one  single  man  deny 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  VIRGINIA,   1788.  81 

the  propriety  and  necessity  of  a  Union.  This  necessity  is 
deeply  impressed  upon  the  American  mind.  There  can  be 
no  danger  of  any  object  being  lost,  when  the  mind  of  every 
man  in  the  country  is  strongly  attached  to  it — to  the  bless- 
ings of  a  Union,  I  hope,  not  merely  to  the  name.  They 
who  are  loudest  in  praise  of  the  name,  are  not  more  at- 
tached to  the  reality  than  I.  The  security  of  our  liberty 
and  happiness  is  the  object  we  ought  to  have  in  view  in 
seeking  to  estabh'sh  a  Union.  If  we  endanger,  instead  of 
securing  those,  the  name  of  Union  is  a  trivial  consolation. 
We  ask  such  amendments  as  will  point  out  what  powers 
are  reserved  to  the  State  government,  and  clearly  discrimi- 
nate between  them,  and  those  given  to  the  General  Govern- 
ment, so  as  to  prevent  future  disputes  and  the  clashing  of 
interests.  Grant  us  amendments  to  that  end,  and  we  will 
cheerfully  with  our  hands  and  hearts  unite  with  those  who 
advocate  the  Constitution,  and  will  do  everything  we  can 
to  support  and  carry  it  into  execution." 

Henry  was  not  less  emphatic :  "  The  reality  of  Union, 
not  the  name,  is  the  object  which  most  merits  the  attention 
of  every  friend  of  his  country.  The  American  Union  is 
dear  to  every  man.  Every  man  with  three  grains  of  infor- 
mation must  think  and  know  that  Union  is  the  best  of  all 
things.  Let  it  be  shown  that  the  rights  of  the  Union  are 
secure,  and  we  consent." 

"Words  may  be  false,  but  facts  can  not  mislead.  No 
amendment  was  ever  sought  that  was  not  general,  and  no 
amendment  proposed  had  any  object  but  peace  and  liberty. 

Graysou  held  the  radical  defect  of  the  Constitution  to 
lie  in  the  opposition  of  its  component  parts.  "  There  are 
two  opinions  in  the  world  upon  the  construction  of  govern- 
ments— one  that  men  can  govern  themselves,  the  other  that 
they  can  not,  but  must  be  ruled  by  some  force  independent 
of  them.  I  believe  in  the  possibility  and  advantage  of 
self-government.  If  I  am  right,  a  system  should  be 


82  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

purely  federal ;  if  I  am  wrong,  a  system  should  be  a  com- 
plete consolidation,  in  which  case  the  object  to  be  sought 
was  a  yoke  as  light  as  possible.  The  proposed  plan  was 
too  strong  for  a  federal,  and  too  weak  for  a  consolidated 
government.  Republican  in  form,  it  was  founded  on  the 
principles  of  a  monarchy,  with  the  three  estates,  but  with- 
out the  inherent  checks  of  the  British  monarchy.  Its  ex- 
ecutive was  blended  with  legislative  functions,  contrary  to 
the  opinion  of  the  best  writers,  and,  fettered  in  some  parts, 
was  as  unlimited  in  others,  as  a  Roman  dictator.  Its  demo- 
cratic branch  was  marked  with  strong  features  of  aristoc- 
racy, and  its  aristocratic  branch  with  the  impurities  and 
imperfections  arising  from  inequality  of  representation  and 
want  of  responsibility.  The  Constitution  did  not  remove 
the  fatal  inconvenience  of  clashing  State  interests.  The 
members  of  Congress  from  Virginia  would  be  actuated  by 
the  interests  of  the  State ;  so  would  those  from  every  other 
State.  I  hope  my  fears  may  be  groundless,  but  I  believe, 
as  I  do  my  creed,  that  the  operation  of  the  system  will  be 
a  faction 'of  seven  States  to  oppress  the  rest  of  the  Union. 
It  may  be  said  that  we  are  represented.  Will  that  lessen 
our  misfortunes  ?  A  small  representation  gives  a  pretense 
to  injure  and  destroy.  The  British  would  have  been  glad 
to  take  us  into  the  Union,  like  Scotland,  giving  a  small 
representation.  The  Federal  Convention,  called  to  remedy 
the  defects  of  the  Confederation,  was  asked  for  bread,  and 
has  given  a  stone.  "What  was  the  defect  of  the  Confedera- 
tion? No  means  of  a  revenue.  Supply  that  defect  by 
giving  it  the  control  of  commerce,  and  as  other  defects  be- 
come apparent  apply,  by  a  mode  of  amendment,  the  remedy. 
Apportion  the  public  debts  so  as  to  throw  the  unpopular 
ones  on  the  back  lands,  call  only  for  requisitions  for  the 
interest  on  the  foreign  debt,  and  aid  them  by  loans.  Keep 
on  so,  till  the  American  character  is  marked  with  some 
certain  features ;  we  are  too  young  to  know  what  we  are 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  VIRGINIA,   1188.  S3 

fit  for.  The  continual  migration  of  people  from  Europe, 
and  the  settlement  of  new  countries  on  our  Western  front- 
ier, are  strong  arguments  against  making  new  experiments 
in  government  now.  In  framing  a  government,  the  genius 
and  disposition  of  a  people,  and  a  variety  of  other  circum- 
stances, ought  to  be  considered. 

But  we  are  told  that  unless  we  adopt  tliis  Constitution 
we  shall  be  disunited  and  ruined  forever,  that  we  shall  have 
wars  and  rumors  of  wars,  and  that  every  calamity  shall 
attend  us.  Pennsylvania  and  Maryland  are  to  fall  on  us 
from  the  North,  like  the  Goths  and  Yandals  of  old ;  the 
Algerines,  whose  flat-sided  vessels  never  come  farther  than 
Madeira,  are  to  fill  the  Chesapeake  with  mighty  fleets  to 
attack  us  on  the  front ;  on  the  rear  the  Indians  are  to  in- 
vade us  with  numerous  armies,  to  turn  our  cleared  lands 
into  hunting-grounds ;  and  the  Carolinians  from  the  South, 
mounted  on  alligators,  I  presume,  are  to  come  and  destroy 
our  corn-fields  and  eat  up  our  little  children.  These  dan- 
gers are  merely  imaginary,  and  ludicrous  in  the  extreme. 
Are  we  to  be  destroyed  by  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania  ? 
For  what  will  democratic  States  make  war?  How  long 
since  have  they  imbibed  a  hostile  spirit  ?  But  the  gener- 
ality is  to  attack  us.  Will  they  attack  us  after  violating 
their  faith  in  the  first  Union  ?  Will  they  not  violate  their 
faith  if  they  do  not  take  us  into  their  confederacy  ?  Have 
they  not  agreed  by  the  old  Confederation  that  the  Union 
shall  be  perpetual,  and  that  no  alteration  shall  take  place 
without  the  consent  of  Congress,  and  the  confirmation  by 
the  Legislatures  of  every  State  ?  I  can  not  think  there  is 
such  depravity  in  mankind  as  that,  after  violating  public 
faith  so  flagrantly,  they  should  also  make  war  on  us  for  not 
following  their  example.  We  are  told  that  we  ought  to 
take  measures,  which  otherwise  we  should  not,  for  fear  of 
disunion.  Disunion  is  impossible.  The  Eastern  States 
hold  the  fisheries,  which  are  their  corn-fields,  by  a  hair. 


84  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

They  have  a  dispute  with  the  British  Government  about 
their  limits  at  this  moment.  Is  not  a  general  and  strong 
government  necessary  to  their  interests  ?  If  ever  nations 
had  inducements  to  peace,  the  Eastern  States  now  have. 
New  York  and  Pennsylvania  anxiously  look  forward  to  the 
fur-trade.  How  can  they  obtain  it  but  by  union  ?  Can 
the  Western  posts  be  got  or  retained  without  union  ?  How 
are  the  little  States  inclined  2  They  are  not  likely  to  dis- 
unite. Their  weakness  will  prevent  them  from  quarreling. 
Are  not  the  inducements  to  union  strong,  with  the  British 
on  one  side  and  the  Spaniards  on  the  other?  Thank 
Heaven,  we  have  a  Carthage  of  our  own  ! " 

Grayson  protested  against  direct  taxation.  His  min4 
could  not  conceive  of  two  powers  equally  supreme  over 
one  object.  Madison  observed  "  that  requisitions  were  not 
only  an  awkward  and  roundabout  way  to  attain  a  desired 
result,  but  were  more  calculated  to  insure  inequality  and 
dissatisfaction  than  direct  taxation.  Men  will  pay  less 
grudgingly  if  certain  that  every  one  must  pay,  but  with 
the  possibility  that  some  may  escape  payment,  all  must  be 
reluctant.  The  experience  of  the  Ctfnf ederation  was  con- 
clusive against  them.  Besides,  in  case  of  war,  some  States 
would  be  more  exposed  to  its  evils  than  others ;  imports 
would  be  less  productive  and  expenses  increased,  and  the 
more  secure  any  State  was,  the  less  it  would  feel  the  exi- 
gency which  compelled  requisitions.  There  was  another 
consideration  which  might  be  operative  in  the  future.  As 
manufactures  increased,  the  revenue  from  imports  would 
diminish,  and  the  vacuum  must  be  filled  by  direct  taxa- 
tion. So  far  as  a  cession  of  power  was  involved,  there  was 
no  augmentation,  simply  a  change  necessary  to  the  efficacy 
of  a  power  already  vested  in  the  Confederation.  The  dif- 
ference was  not  in  a  theory  of  government,  but  in  the 
practice  of  government.  Taxation  to  the  same  extent, 
and  for  the  same  purposes,  was  authorized  by  both  sys- 


THE  CONVENTION  OF   VIRGINIA,   1788.  85 

terns,  but  one  made  a  State  the  tax-payer,  the  other  indi- 
viduals. The  first  had  proved  ineffectual,  the  latter  would 
be  adequate." 

Pendleton  had  "  studied  the  Constitution ;  not,  however, 
hoping  to  find  a  scheme  free  from  the  possibility  of  objec- 
tions. That  could  not  be  expected  of  a  human  effort.  He 
did  see  the  seeds  of  disunion  in  it,  though  in  the  future, 
not  the  immediate  operation  of  the  Government,  but  he 
trusted  to  the  power  of  amendment  to  extrude  those  agen- 
cies. He  could  not  see  any  difficulty  in  the  duality  of  gov- 
ernments, their  spheres  of  action  being  totally  different, 
one  embracing  interests  common  to  all  the  States,  the  other 
interests  peculiar  to  each  State.  They  ran  on  parallel  lines ; 
if  each  kept  to  its  own  sphere,  they  could  not  conflict. 
Direct  taxation  might  never  be  necessary,  but  it  might  be- 
come indispensable  to  the  safety  of  the  Union,  and  there- 
fore the  power  of  direct  taxation  ought  to  be  possessed  by 
the  General  Government.  He  desired  amendments  as  ear- 
nestly as  others,  but  Virginia  had  no  right  to  ask  the  adopt- 
ing States  to  accept  conditions ;  she  should  put  herself  in 
the  same  position  as  those  States ;  then  her  attitude  would 
be  conciliatory,  and  the  amendments  she  craved  would  be 
unmistakably  in  the  interest  of  all." 

Grayson  having  remarked  that  manufactures  were  the 
resource  of  a  redundant  population,  crowded  into  a  limited 
space ;  that  the  extent  and  fertility  of  the  territory  would 
for  many  years  attract  labor  almost  exclusively  to  agricult- 
ure ;  that  therefore  imports  must  be  more  productive,  and 
consequently  that  direct  taxation  could  not  be  necessary, 
and  its  exercise  might  become  a  source  of  friction ;  Madi- 
son admitted  that  "  imports  would  increase  until  population 
became  so  great  as  to  compel  a  recurrence  to  manufactures, 
but  the  unsettled  parts  of  America  would  be  inhabited  at 
no  distant  period.  In  twenty-five  years  the  population  in 
every  part  of  the  United  States  would  be  as  great  as  it 


86  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

then  was  in  the  settled  parts  ;  already,  wherever  there  was 
a  medium,  manufactories  were  beginning  to  be  established. 
In  preparing  a  government  for  futurity  it  should  be 
founded  on  principles  of  permanency,  not  on  conditions  of 
a  temporary  nature.  Direct  taxation  could  not  be  a  cause 
of  friction.  When  the  authority  of  the  General  Government 
was  exclusive,  no  question  could  arise ;  when  it  was  con- 
current, future  legislation  must  regulate  action.  It  was 
necessary,  however.  Men  have  to  pay  for  the  advantages 
of  government,  and  it  obviously  could  make  no  difference 
to  them  whether  they  pay  to  the  Federal  Government 
directly,  or  through  the  conduit  of  a  State ;  but,  to  the 
public  credit  of  the  Union,  the  difference  was  very  great 
whether  its  debts  were  to  be  paid  from  its  own  resources, 
or  whether  payment  depended  upon  the  compliance  of  thir- 
teen bodies.  No  one  would  lend  it  a  shilling  on  that  con- 
tingency." 

Henry  rejoined :  "  We  are  told  that  all  powers  not 
given,  are  retained.  Advert  to  the  history  of  England. 
Its  people  lived  without  a  declaration  of  rights  till  the  war 
in  the  time  of  Charles  I.  Power  and  privilege  then  de- 
pended upon  implication  and  logical  discussion.  Upon  the 
expulsion  of  the  Stuarts,  a  Bill  of  Eights  prescribed  to 
William  of  Orange  on  what  terms  he  should  reign,  and 
the  end  of  construction  and  implication  was  the  end  of 
revolutions.  Did  Scotland  enter  into  a  union  with  Eng- 
land and  trust  to  subsequent  amendments  ?  "No ;  all  the 
terms  of  the  bargain  were  settled  beforehand.  We  are 
told  that  our  safety  is  secured  by  representation.  Is  Vir- 
ginia represented  ?  Rhode  Island  and  Delaware  together, 
infinitely  inferior  in  extent  and  population,  have  double 
her  weight,  and  can  counteract  her  influence.  Representa- 
tion, therefore,  is  not  the  vital  principle  of  this  Govern- 
ment." He  inquired  why  the  States  were  not  to  pay  their 
own  agents,  why  the  salaries  were  not  fixed,  and  why  mem- 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  VIRGINIA,  1788.          87 

bers  of  Congress  should  be  permitted  to  abandon  an  office 
to  which  they  had  been  elected  by  their  constituents,  for 
one  to  which  they  had  not  been  designated.  "  If  incite- 
ment to  office  was  desirable,  the  provision  was  proper ;  if 
not,  it  should  be  corrected  by  an  amendment." 

Madison  developed  the  reasoning  of  the  Federal  Con- 
vention :  "  If  compensation  had  been  appointed  by  the 
State  governments,  the  Government  of  the  Union  would 
not  have  been  safe ;  at  least  its  existence  must  have  been 
precarious,  with  members  of  the  Congress  dependent  upon 
salaries  from  other  public  bodies  competent  to  withhold 
them.  The  salaries  had  not  been  fixed,  because  the  pur- 
chasing power  of  money  varies ;  and  if  they  had  become 
inadequate,  the  door  would  have  been  open  to  evils  from 
inadequacy,  which  reflection  must  suggest  as  probable. 
This  was  the  most  delicate  point  in  the  organization  of  a 
republican  government,  the  most  difficult  to  establish  on 
unexceptionable  grounds.  It  appeared  to  him  that  the 
Convention  had  fixed  on  the  most  eligible ;  the  Constitu- 
tion takes  the  medium  between  two  extremes,  and  perhaps 
with  respect  to  the  eligibility  of  representatives  to  office, 
with  more  wisdom  than  either  the  British  or  the  State 
governments.  They  can  fill  no  new  offices  created  by 
themselves,  nor  old  ones  of  which  they  have  increased  the 
salary.  If  they  were  excluded  altogether,  it  is  possible  that 
disadvantages  might  accrue  from  the  exclusion,  not  to 
mention  the  impolicy  and  injustice  of  denying  them  a  com- 
mon privilege.  They  will  not  relinquish  their  legislative, 
to  accept  other  offices.  They  will  more  probably  confer 
them  on  friends  or  connections.  If  this  be  an  incon- 
venience, it  is  incident  to  all  governments." 

Grayson  objected  to  the  right  of  the  Senate  to  propose 
or  concur  in  amendments  to  money  bills.  "  Practically  it 
was  equivalent  to  originating  them." 

Madison  answered  that,  in  his  view,  a  right  of  the  Sen- 


88  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

ate  to  originate  money  bills  was  unimportant,  and,  if  it  had 
been  given,  would  not  have  been  objectionable.  Its  power 
of  amendment  was  commendable.  "Without  that,  the 
slighest  exceptionable  feature  might  cause  the  rejection  of 
a  bill,  and  all  the  time  spent  and  labor  bestowed  would 
be  wasted.  As  an  alteration  can  not  conclude  the  House, 
no  harm  was  possible,  many  advantages  might  be  gained, 
and  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  States  be  better 
guarded. 

Mason  stated  an  amendment  which  ought  to  be  made 
in  that  clause  of  the  Constitution  which  confers  the  power 
to  arm  and  discipline  the  militia :  "  I  wish  an  express 
declaration  that  in  case  the  General  Government  shall  neg- 
lect to  arm  and  discipline  the  militia,  the  State  govern- 
ments may.  With  this  single  exception  I  would  agree  to 
this  part."  Madison  "  could  not  conceive  that,  by  giving 
that  power  to  the  General  Government,  the  Constitution 
had  taken  it  from  the  State  governments.  The  power  is 
concurrent,  not  exclusive.  Does  the  organization  of  the 
government  warrant  a  belief  that  the  power  will  be  abused  ? 
Can  that  be  supposed  of  a  government  of  a  federal  nature, 
consisting  of  many  coequal  sovereignties,  particularly  as  it 
has  one  branch  chosen  from  the  people  ? " 

Henry  observed :  "  If  you  give  too  little  power  to-day, 
you  may  give  more  to-morrow ;  but  if  you  give  too  much 
power  to-day,  you  can  not  retake  it  to-morrow ;  for  that 
purpose  to-morrow  will  never  come.  If  you  have  the  fate 
of  other  nations,  you  will  never  see  it.  It  is  assumed  that 
American  rulers  will  not  depart  from  their  duty.  It  is  a 
universal  principle,  in  all  ages  and  all  nations,  that  rulers 
have  been  actuated  by  private  interest ;  equally  so  will  they 
be  in  America.  In  a  sense  of  duty  you  will  not  find  a 
check.  If  the  power  of  arming  and  discipline  is  concur- 
rent, the  power  of  naming  officers  must  be  concurrent. 
To  admit  this  mutual  concurrence  will  carry  you  into  end- 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  VIRGINIA,   1788.  89 

less  absurdity,  the  Congress  with  nothing  exclusive  on  one 
hand,  nor  the  States  on  the  other." 

Nicholas  confuted  the  argument :  "  The  power  of  arm- 
ing and  disciplining  is  already  vested  in  the  State  govern- 
ments, and,  though  given  to  the  General  Government,  is 
not  given  exclusively,  because  in  every  instance  where  the 
Constitution  intends  that  the  General  Government  shall 
exercise  any  power  exclusively,  words  of  exclusion  are  par- 
ticularly inserted.  Consequently,  in  every  case  where  such 
words  of  exclusion  are  not  inserted,  power  is  concurrent, 
unless  it  is  impossible  that  the  power  should  be  exercised  by 
both  the  General  Government  and  the  State  governments. 
It  is  not  absurd  to  say  that  Virginia  may  arm  the  militia  if 
Congress  neglects  to  arm  them,  but  it  would  be  absurd  to 
say  that  Virginia  should  arm  them  after  Congress  had  done 
so,  or  to  say  that  Congress  should  appoint  the  officers  and 
train  the  militia  when  it  is  expressly  excepted  from  their 
powers." 

Marshall  closed :  "  Each  government  derives  its  powers 
from  the  people  ;  each  is  to  act  according  to  the  powers 
given  it.  The  State  governments  do  not  derive  powers 
from  the  General  Government ;  then,  must  not  every  power 
be  retained  which  is  not  parted  with  ?  If  a  power,  before 
in  the  State  Legislatures,  is  given  to  the  general  Legisla- 
ture, both  shall  exercise  it,  unless  there  be  an.  incompati- 
bility or  negative  words  precluding  the  State  governments. 
All  the  powers  which  the  States  possessed,  antecedent  to 
the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  of  which  they  are  not 
divested  by  any  grant  of,  or  by  any  restriction  from,  in  the 
Constitution,  they  must  necessarily  be  as  fully  possessed 
of  as  ever  they  had  been." 

Henry  was  not  yet  satisfied.  "  The  nations  which  had 
retained  their  liberty  were  comparatively  few.  America 
would  add  to  the  number  of  the  oppressed,  if  she  depended 
on  constructive  rights  and  argumentative  implication.  If 


90  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

rights  not  given  were  retained,  why  were  there  negative 
clauses  upon  some  of  the  powers  of  Congress  ?  Concurrent 
power  is  not  reducible  to  practice.  If  there  was  an  insur- 
rection in  Virginia  against  the  State,  and  an  insurrection 
in  another  State  against  the  General  Government,  the  call 
of  one  or  the  other  must  be  obeyed.  Of  which  ? "  Madison 
replied :  "  The  power  must  be  vested  in  Congress,  or  in  the 
State  governments,  or  there  must  be  a  division,  or  there 
must  be  a  concurrence.  If  in  the  State  governments, 
where  is  a  provision  for  the  general  defense  ?  If  it  must 
be  divided,  let  a  better  method  be  shown.  When  the 
militia  are  in  the  service  of  the  United  States,  the  United 
States  govern  them.  What  can  be  more  positive  than  that 
the  States  govern  them  when  not  ?  A  State  is  not  barred 
from  calling  forth  its  militia  to  suppress  insurrections  and 
domestic  violence;  and,  in  its  right  to  call  for  Federal 
aid,  it  has  a  supplementary  security." 

What  is  the  intent,  it  was  asked,  of  the  power  to  call 
forth  the  militia  to  execute  the  laws  of  the  United  States  ? 
Is  a  military  government  aimed  at  ?  The  answer  was,  the 
meaning  is  plain — if  the  civil  power  be  insufficient.  Why 
not  say  so  ?  was  the  rejoinder ;  we  are  all  agreed  upon  that 
point,  and,  when  the  expression  of  a  purpose  is  so  easy, 
why  leave  a  loop-hole  for  construction  ?  On  the  face  of 
the  instrument  there  is  nothing  to  exclude  the  danger  of  a 
future  claim  that  the  words  mean  exactly  what  they  say, 
and  no  more.  Madison  answered  by  recalling  "  a  remark 
which  had  fallen  from  a  gentleman  on  the  same  side  as 
himself,  and  which  deserved  to  be  attended  to.  If  we  be 
dissatisfied  with  this  national  Government,  and  choose  to 
renounce  it,  this  is  an  additional  safeguard  to  our  defense." 

Great  objection  was  made  to  the  exclusive  jurisdiction 
over  the  ten  miles  square.  Madison  thought  he  had  obvi- 
ated it,  by  the  suggestion  that  the  Federal  Government 
could  not  otherwise  be  guarded  from  the  undue  influence 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  VIRGINIA,   1788.  91 

of  some  State,  or  be  safe  in  its  deliberations,  and  secure 
from  insult.  He  pointed  out  that  there  must  be  a  cession 
of  the  land  by  a  State  or  States,  which  could  settle  the 
terms  of  cession,  and  make  such  stipulations  as  they 
pleased. 

Grayson  said :  "  There  are  no  objections  to  giving  all 
necessary  powers,  but  there  are  objections  to  giving  any 
unnecessary  powers.  Exclusive  jurisdiction  might  be  held 
to  nullify,  within  that  district,  provisions  of  the  Constitu- 
tion which  had  been  considered  sagacious.  Governmental 
and  police  powers  would  answer  all  the  ends  proposed  to 
be  attained.  No  check  could  be  found  in  terms  of  cession 
or  stipulations,  for  the  ten  miles  square  might  be  located 
in  a  Territory." 

"That  objection  fails,"  answered  Nicholas,  "for  the 
power  of  Congress  over  the  Territory  is  limited  to  making 
rules  and  regulations  for  its  disposal ;  the  grant  of  it  was 
for  the  benefit  of  all  the  States,  it  can  not  be  perverted  to 
the  prejudice  of  any."  Pendleton  argued  that  "  the  clause 
did  not  by  any  fair  construction  give  Congress  any  power 
to  impede  the  operation  of  any  part  of  the  Constitution,  or 
to  affect  the  rights  of  the  citizens  of  the  Union.  The 
jurisdiction  is  not  opposed  to  the  general  powers  of  the 
Federal  Legistature,  or  to  those  of  the  State  Legislatures. 
It  is  opposed  to  the  legislative  power  of  the  State  within 
which  the  ten  miles  square  are  situated.  It  does  not  go 
one  step  beyond  the  delegated  powers." 

Upon  almost  every  clause  of  the  Constitution,  as  it  was 
read,  one  point  was  raised,  or  one  question  reiterated. 
Where  is  the  distinct  acknowledgment  that  all  power  not 
conceded  is  retained  ?  Where  is  there  a  word  to  foreclose 
the  assertion  that  it  is  not  ?  At  this  time  you  believe  and 
say,  with  perfect  sincerity,  not  only  that  it  is,  but  that  the 
mind  can  not  conceive  that  it  is  not,  but  can  you  answer 
for  the  future  ?  In  every  other  system,  government  has 


92  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

every  power  not  expressly  excluded.  If,  hereafter,  men 
shall  contend  that  this  system  is  to  be  gauged  by  the  rules 
applicable  to  other  systems,  what,  so  far  as  reasoning  goes, 
is  to  confute  them  ?  You  construe  to-day,  why  shall  not 
others  construe  to-morrow  ?  "What  is  to  prevent  "  general 
welfare "  or  the  "  sweeping  clause "  being  held  in  the 
future,  absolute  surrenders  of  every  right,  and  an  investi- 
ture of  complete  sovereignty.  There  is  a  clause  in  the 
Articles  of  Confederation  reserving  to  each  State  every 
power,  jurisdiction,  and  right  not  expressly  delegated  to 
the  United  States.  That  clause  met  general  approval. 
"Why  was  it  not  inserted  in  the  Constitution  ?  Would  it 
have  consumed  too  much  paper?  "What  was  the  motive 
for  omitting  it,  or  what  could  be  the  objection  to  add- 
ing it  ? 

Mason  stated  that  he  was  the  more  pertinacious  upon 
this  point,  because  he  had  perceived  in  the  Federal  Conven- 
tion the  disposition,  and,  moreover,  the  intention,  on  the 
part  of  some,  to  extend  power  by  construction,  so  that  by 
slow,  gradual,  incessant  encroachments,  the  Constitution 
could  be  made,  not  what  it  purported  to  be,  or  was  then 
represented  to  be,  but  what  they  thought  it  should  have 
been. 

Madison,  unlike  some  great  men  of  his  party,  sincere 
in  advocacy  and  sanguine  in  hope,  demanded  an  explana- 
tion. Mason  answered,  "  The  fact  is  well  known  that  the 
disposition  was  not  merely  prevalent  in  the  Federal  Con- 
vention, but  that  it  exists  in  many  men  in  every  State  of 
the  Union,  among  whom  are  men  of  great  abilities  and 
high  character.  From  frequent  intercommunication  with 
Madison,  he  knew  that  such  were  not  his  sentiments,  and 
he  believed  that  they  were  not  entertained  by  any  delegate 
from  Virginia."  Madison  was  satisfied  with  the  disclaimer 
as  to  himself,  but  it  does  not  appear  that  he  denied  the 
accuracy  of  the  statement  as  to  others.  From  the  political 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  VIRGINIA,   1788.  93 

action  in  the  earlier  years  of  the  republic,  the  disposition 
might  have  been  then  so  inferred ;  but  from  this  debate  we 
learn  that  the  anti-Federalists  were  possessed  of  the  views 
and  objects  of  their  opponents.  It  is  now  easy  to  account 
for  the  intensely  bitter  party  spirit,  and  the  fierce  hatreds 
and  fatal  encounters  of  individuals.  Few  things  irritate 
men  more  than  the  sense  of  trickery,  intended  or  at- 
tempted. 

Nicholas  reasserted  what  his  side  had  frequently  as- 
serted :  "  The  sweeping  clause "  has  the  same  effect  and 
no  more  as  if  it  had  followed  each  delegation  of  power, 
and  was  bounded  as  a  summary  of  them.  The  "  general 
welfare"  was  united  to  the  particular  power  of  levying 
and  collecting  taxes,  etc.,  and  was  not  connected  with  any 
general  power  of  legislature.  The  question  had  been  put, 
why  negative  words  were  found  in  the  Constitution? 
They  created  exceptions  to  a  general  power ;  for  instance, 
under  the  power  to  regulate  commerce,  the  slave-trade 
might  at  once  have  been  prohibited,  but  for  the  exception. 
To  the  question,  How  is  the  extent  of  power  to  be  deter- 
mined ?  he  answered :  "  By  the  same  power,  which  in  all 
well-regulated  communities  determines  the  extent  of  legis- 
lative powers.  If  a  Legislature  exceeds  its  powers,  the 
judiciary  will  declare  the  excess  void,  or  the  people  will 
have  the  right  to  declare  it  void.  It  is  universally  agreed 
that  the  people  have  all  power ;  if  they  part  with  any,  is 
it  necessary  to  declare  that  they  retain  the  rest  ? " 

Mason  denounced  the  clause  which  admitted  a  slave- 
trade.  He  "  would  have  preferred  to  it  a  Union  excluding 
the  States  which  exacted  it.  Slavery  was  a  great  misfor- 
tune ;  only  one  could  be  greater — manumission."  Henry 
equally  deplored  slavery,  and  dreaded  manumission.  These 
sentiments  appear  to  be  contradictory,  but  they  are  not. 
An  abolitionist  in  a  slaveholding  community  is  such  from 
his  reason,  not  his  emotions.  His  aim  is  to  reconcile,  not 


94:  SEVEN   CONVENTIONS. 

to  antagonize,  the  present  and  the  future  with  the  past. 
He  recognizes  his  duty  to  the  master  as  a  fellow-citizen, 
to  the  slave  as  a  fellow- man.  Duty  to  the  master  was  held 
to  be  the  higher,  as  the  obligation  to  him  was  twofold, 
whence  his  consent  must  be  coaxed  or  bought.  Duty  to 
the  slave  was  held  to  consist  not  merely  in  freedom  from 
thrall,  but  in  betterment  of  existence.  Therefore  all  the 
early  abolitionists,  and  they  were  many,  considered  that 
abolition  and  colonization  must  go  hand  in  hand.  They 
believed  that  of  two  free  races,  inhabiting  the  same  coun- 
try, intermarriage  being  repugnant,  one  must  finally  be 
extirpated.  They  did  not  believe  that  intermarriage  was 
among  the  possibilities  of  the  future,  basing  their  opinion 
on  the  example  of  the  colonists,  who  shunned  that  relation 
with  the  Indians,  though  then  white  women  were  scarce, 
and  red  women  comely.  This  generation  is  either  better  or 
wiser,  but  as  the  learned,  the  pious,  the  liberal  Dr.  Arnold, 
not  many  years  since,  thought  the  difficulty  insuperable,  it 
may  be  indulgent  to  the  mistakes  of  its  ancestors. 

Madison  "would  conceive  the  clause  impolitic  if  it 
were  an  evil  which  could  be  excluded  without  encounter- 
ing greater  evils.  The  Southern  States  would  not  have 
entered  into  a  union  without  that  temporary  permission ; 
and  if  excluded,  the  consequences  might  have  been  dread- 
ful to  them  and  to  us.  "We  are  not  in  a  worse  situation 
than  before.  The  traffic  is  prohibited  by  our  laws,  and 
the  prohibition  may  be  continued.  The  Union  in  general 
is  not  worse  off,  for,  in  the  Confederation,  the  importation 
might  be  continued  forever,  while  now,  it  may  be  for- 
bidden after  twenty  years.  Great  as  the  evil  is,  a  dismem- 
berment of  the  Union  would  be  greater;  those  States, 
if  disunited,  might  solicit  and  receive  aid  from  foreign 
powers." 

Mason  claimed  "  that  a  separate  clause  in  the  Constitu- 
tion ought  to  settle  distinctly  the  status  of  property  in 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  VIRGINIA,   1788.  95 

slaves.  Any  species  of  property  exclusively  held  by  some 
of  the  States,  which  the  other  States  neither  wanted  nor 
would  want,  must  have  a  safeguard ;  for,  if  it  may  be  as- 
sumed that  men  may  be  trusted  to  govern  others,  when 
they  themselves  will  suffer  from  misgovernment,  it  does 
not  follow  that  they  are  capable  of  just  power  when  others 
only  bear  the  evils  of  injustice.  Federal  taxation  might 
be  so  used  as  to  destroy  the  value  of  slave-property.  The 
right  of  reclamation  of  the  fugitive  slave  was  of  little  im- 
portance ;  the  meaning  was  that  the  fugitive  should  not  be 
protected."  It  may  be  doubted  if  then  there  was  a  man  in 
the  United  States  who  conceived  that  "  delivering  "  was  a 
State  duty,  much  less  a  Federal  duty.  The  anti-Federal- 
ists at  least  understood  the  phrase  to  mean  that  in  every 
State,  process  of  law  for  the  recovery  of  property  should 
be  as  applicable  to  property  in  men,  as  to  property  in  things. 
When  the  political  idea  was  dominant  that  the  Federal 
Government  would  be  the  stronger  the  more  it  meddled, 
the  fugitive-slave  law  was  passed,  and  its  constitutionality 
was  affirmed  judicially,  upon  that  political  theory,  not  upon 
history  or  language. 

Madison  answered  that  the  Southern  States  most  affect- 
ed were  satisfied,  and  dreaded  no  danger  to  their  property. 
The  extent  to  which  the  General  Government  could  inter- 
meddle with  slavery  was  levying  a  tax  of  ten  dollars  a 
head  upon  importations,  and  prohibiting  the  slave-trade 
after  a  fixed  period. 

It  was  suggested  that  the  vice-presidency  was  a  useless 
office,  attended  with  possible  dangers,  besides  giving  some 
one  State  a  greater  representation  in  the  Senate. 

Madison  disclosed  the  reasoning  of  the  Federal  Con- 
vention on  the  subject.  Some  officer  was  necessary  to 
continue  the  Government  in  case  of  an  accident  to  the 
President ;  and  a  casting  vote,  in  case  of  a  tie,  was  a  desir- 
able legislative  expedient.  He  added  that,  as  the  Yice- 


96  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

President  would  probably  be  always  selected  from  one  of 
the  larger  States,  the  inequality,  which  was  excessively 
slight,  would  be  least  inequitable. 

Inquiry  made,  why  in  a  certain  contingency,  the  Presi- 
dent was  to  be  elected  in  the  House,  by  a  vote  of  States, 
Madison  answered  that  it  was  the  result  of  a  compromise 
between  the  larger  and  the  smaller  States. 

Pendleton  opened  the  debate  upon  the  judiciary  clause. 
His  opinions  carried  great  weight,  from  his  judicial  experi- 
ence. He  was  satisfied,  except  with  the  expression  "  law 
and  fact,"  which  he  admitted  to  be  unfortunate.  The 
authority  of  Congress  over  "  exceptions  and  regulations  " 
relieved  him,  however,  from  an  anxiety  he  should  other- 
wise feel. 

Mason  agreed  that  in  cases  affecting  diplomatic  agents, 
in  controversies  between  States,  between  citizens  of  the 
same  State  claiming  land  under  grants  from  different 
States,  and  in  admiralty  and  maritime  questions  exclusive 
Federal  jurisdiction  was  proper ;  and  equally  so,  with  some 
restrictions,  in  controversies  to  which  the  United  States 
were  parties.  In  disputes  between  a  State  and  citizens  of 
another  State,  a  foreign  state,  its  citizens  or  subjects,  Fed- 
eral jurisdiction  was  manifestly  improper.  He  objected  to 
the  word  "  arising,"  as  vague,  ambiguous,  and  inconsistent 
with  any  conception  of  limitation.  Anything  might  be 
said  to  arise  under  a  constitution. 

Henry  added :  "  There  never  seems  to  be  any  difficulty 
in  finding  apt  words  for  grants  of  power,  but,  for  the 
security  of  liberty,  language  is  apparently  only  capable  of 
ambiguity.  Are  the  judiciaries  and  citizens  of  all  the 
States  so  lost  to  shame  as  to  be  incapable  of  justice  ?  Is 
an  individual  to  summon  a  State  before  a  court,  especially 
a  foreigner  ?  Was  it  ever  heard  of  that  such  a  privilege 
should  be  given  a  foreigner?  "Was  war  to  enforce  the 
judgment  of  a  court  ?  Congress,  it  is  said,  may  be  trusted 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  VIRGINIA,   1788.  97 

to  make  such  exceptions  and  regulations  as  experience  will 
suggest.  It  is  not  the  business  of  representatives,  but  of  con- 
ventions, to  settle  the  basis  of  government.  "Why  can  not 
a  State  be  trusted  to  do  justice  between  a  citizen  and  an 
Englishman  or  Frenchman  ?  The  provision  is  disgraceful ; 
it  will  degrade  the  judiciary,  and  prostrate  the  Legislature 
of  Virginia." 

Madison  asked  the  committee  to  consider  the  difficulties 
in  organizing  a  government  for  the  United  States.  "  They 
who  prepared  the  paper  on  the  table  found  difficulties  not 
to  be  described.  Mutual  deference  and  conciliation  were 
absolutely  necessary.  It  was  settled,  when  no  party  was 
formed,  no  particular  propositions  made,  when  the  minds 
of  men  were  calm  and  dispassionate ;  yet  even  under  such 
circumstances  agreement  upon  a  general  system  was  very 
hard  to  be  attained.  The  judiciary  clause  claimed  the  in- 
dulgence of  a  fair  and  liberal  interpretation.  He  would 
not  deny  that  more  accurate  attention  might  place  in  it 
terms  which  would  remove  some  of  the  objections  which 
had  been  made ;  but  with  a  liberal  construction  there  was 
nothing  dangerous  nor  inadmissible.  Surely  it  was  not 
supposable  that  an  individual  could  drag  a  State  into 
court ;  the  only  operation  of  the  clause  will  be,  that  a 
State  must  sue  an  individual  in  a  Federal  court.  Perhaps 
disputes  between  citizens  of  different  States  had  better  have 
been  left  to  the  courts  of  the  States." 

Marshall  considered  this  part  of  the  plan  a  great  im- 
provement on  the  system  about  to  be  abandoned.  "  There 
are  tribunals  for  the  decision  of  controversies,  before  not 
at  all,  or  improperly  provided.  The  opposition  is  based 
upon  the  idea  that  the  Federal  courts  will  not  determine 
causes  with  the  same  fairness  and  impartiality  as  other 
courts.  "Why  not  ?  Why  do  we  trust  judges  ?  From 
their  appointment  and  independence  in  office.  Will  not 
the  judges  in  the  Federal  courts  be  chosen  with  as  much 
5 


98  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

wisdom  as  the  judges  in  the  State  courts  ?  Will  they  not 
be  equally,  if  not  more,  independent  ?  If  there  is  as  much 
wisdom  and  knowledge  in  the  United  States  as  in  any  one 
State,  will  not  that  wisdom  and  knowledge  be  exercised  in 
the  selection  of  judges  ?  Why  conclude  that  they  will  not 
decide  with  the  same  impartiality  and  candor  ?  It  is  said 
that  it  is  disgraceful  that  the  State  courts  shall  not  be 
trusted.  Does  the  Constitution  take  away  their  jurisdic- 
tion ?  It  is  necessary  that  the  Federal  courts  should  have 
cognizance  of  cases  arising  under  the  Constitution  and 
laws  of  the  United  States.  What  is  the  service  and  pur- 
pose of  a  judiciary,  but  to  execute  the  laws  in  a  peaceable, 
orderly  manner,  without  a  recurrence  to  force,  conflict, 
and  bloodshed.  To  what  quarter  can  you  look  for  protec- 
tion from  an  infringement  of  the  Constitution  if  power  is 
not  given  to  the  judiciary,  no  other  body  can  afford  such 
protection.  It  is  objected  that  Federal  officials  may  be 
secured  from  merited  punishment  by  Federal  courts. 
What  bars  the  injured  from  applying  for  redress  to  the 
State  courts  ?  It  is  objected  that  a  State  may  be  called  to 
the  bar  of  a  Federal  court.  The  intent  is  to  enable  a 
State  to  recover  claims  against  individuals  residing  in 
other  States.  It  is  said  that  it  would  be  partial  to  allow  a 
suit  by  a  State,  and  not  against  a  State.  It  is  necessary, 
and  can  not  be  avoided.  There  is  a  difficulty  in  making  a 
State  defendant,  which  does  not  prevent  its  being  plaintiff. 
Objection  is  made  to  suits  in  the  Federal  courts  by  the 
citizens  of  one  State  against  the  citizens  of  another.  Were 
I  to  contend  that  it  was  necessary  in  all  cases,  and  that  the 
Government  would  be  defective  without  it,  I  should  not 
use  my  own  judgment ;  but  is  not  the  objection  carried 
too  far  ?  What  can  they  get  more  than  justice  ?  It  has 
been  urged  that  we  ought  not  to  depend  upon  others  to 
rectify  defects  which  it  is  our  duty  to  remove.  Our  duty 
is  to  weigh  the  good  and  the  evil  before  we  decide.  If  we 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  VIRGINIA,   1788.  99 

be  convinced  that  the  good  greatly  preponderates,  though 
there  be  small  defects,  shall  we  give  up  the  good,  when  we 
can  remove  the  little  mischief  ? " 

Grayson  answered :  "  The  excellence  of  human  nature 
has  been  invariably  urged  in  all  countries  when  the  cession 
of  power  was  in  agitation.  It  seemed  to  be  the  basis  of 
all  the  arguments  on  one  side.  The  judiciary  clause  is  so 
vague  and  indefinite  in  expression  that  human  nature  can 
not  trace  the  extent  of  its  jurisdiction,  nor  ascertain  its 
limitation.  Between  the  Federal  and  the  State  courts  the 
line  should  be  so  distinctly  drawn  that  interference  will  be 
impossible,  otherwise  there  can  be  no  arbiter  but  the  sword. 
The  judiciary  itself  is  upon  as  corrupt  a  basis  as  the  act  of 
man  can  place  it.  The  salaries  may  be  increased.  That  a 
State  may  be  sued  by  or  sue  a  foreign  state  is  a  new  law 
of  nations.  Consent  must  be  had,  it  is  said.  The  foreign 
state  must  consent,  the  American  State  must  submit.  Is 
it  not  so  written  in  the  Constitution  ?  Congress,  we  are 
told,  will  eliminate  defects.  If  it  can  not  make  a  law 
against  the  Constitution,  neither  can  it  make  a  law  to 
abridge  the  Constitution,  and  the  judges  can  neither  extend 
nor  abridge  it." 

Randolph,  "though  he  could  not  concur  with  those 
who  thought  the  judiciary  clause  so  formidable,  must  admit 
that  the  words  used  to  define  jurisdiction  were  ambiguous 
in  some  parts,  and  unnecessarily  extensive  in  others.  '  What 
are  cases  in  law  and  equity,  arising  under  the  Constitution  ? 
"What  do  they  relate  to  ?  The  phraseology  is  very  ambigu- 
ous, and  can  carry  jurisdiction  to  an  indefinite  extent.'  He 
thought  that  the  intent  of  one  clause  was,  that  a  State 
might  be  sued  by  an  individual,  and  approved  of  it ;  any 
objection  which  might  be  obviated  by  honesty  had  with 
him  little  weight.  If  he  was  asked  why,  knowing  the 
Constitution  to  be  ambiguous,  he  would  vote  for  its  ratifi- 
cation, he  answered,  because  it  contains  within  itself  the 


100  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

means  of  removing  defects,  because  he  believed  that  any 
defects  would  be  removed,  and  because  he  believed  men 
capable  of  honesty,  even  under  temptation.  If  he  did  be- 
lieve that  all  power  not  expressly  retained,  was  parted  with, 
he  would  detest  the  system ;  therefore  he  proposed  that 
Virginia  should  ratify,  putting  in  the  form  of  ratification 
the  words  that  all  authority  not  given  is  retained  by  the 
people,  and  may  be  resumed  when  perverted  to  their  op- 
pression ;  and  that  no  right  can  be  canceled,  abridged,  or 
restrained  by  the  Congress  or  any  officer  of  the  United 
States.  Those  words  he  supposed  woiild  manifest  the 
principles  on  which  Virginia  adopted  the  Constitution,  and 
entitled  her  to  consider  the  exercise  of  a  power  not  dele- 
gated a  violation  of  it." 

Henry  replied :  "  He  saw  the  dangers  which  may  and 
must  arise  if  the  Constitution  was  accepted.  There  could 
be  no  reliance  on  it  for  rights  and  liberties.  There  will  be 
an  empire  of  men,  not  of  law.  Rights  and  liberties  would 
depend  upon  men.  Their  wisdom  and  integrity  may  pre- 
serve, their  ambitious  and  designing  views  may  destroy. 
Already  it  must  be  seen  that  the  friends  of  the  Constitu- 
tion do  not  agree  as  to  its  meaning.  A  Constitution  ought 
to  be  so  clear  as  to  be  comprehended  by  every  man."  Wy  the 
admitted  the  imperfections  of  the  plan  and  the  propriety 
of  amendments,  but  the  excellency  of  many  parts  could 
not  be  denied  by  its  warmest  opponents.  Experience,  the 
source  of  improvement  in  the  science  of  government,  could 
alone  develop  consequences.  He  proposed  ratification,  and 
the  recommendation  of  such  amendments  as  were  thought 
necessary.  "  They  certainly  must  be  obtained,  as  amend- 
ments were  desired  by  all  the  States,  and  had  been  pro- 
posed by  some."  Henry  urged  that  the  amendment,  to  the 
necessity  of  which  every  one  agreed,  "  that  all  power  not 
expressly  delegated  is  reserved,"  should  precede  ratification. 
"  To  talk  of  it  as  a  thing  subsequent,  and  not  an  inalienable 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  VIRGINIA,   1788.         101 

right,  is  to  leave  it  to  the  casual  opinion  of  the  Congress. 
They  will  not  reason  with  Virginia  about  the  effect  of  this 
Constitution,  they  will  not  take  the  opinion  of  this  Con- 
vention as  to  its  operation,  they  will  construe  it  as  they 
please.  Subsequent  amendments  stand  against  every  idea 
of  fortitude  and  manliness  in  a  State,  or  in  any  one.  Evils 
admitted  in  order  to  be  removed,  and  tyranny  submitted 
to,  in  order  to  be  excluded  by  subsequent  alteration,  were 
things  new  to  him." 

Madison  claimed  great  allowance  for  the  plan :  "  Its 
friends  have  never  denied  that  it  has  defects,  but  have 
claimed  that  the  defects  were  not  dangerous.  As  all  are 
agreed  that  it  has  defects,  it  will  be  easy  to  remedy  them 
by  the  healing  power  in  the  instrument  itself.  Other 
States  have  been  content  to  ratify,  and  rely  on  the  proba- 
bility of  amendments.  Why  should  not  Virginia  do  the 
same  ?  She  has  hitherto  always  spoken  with  respect  to  her 
sister  States,  and  has  been  listened  to  with  respect.  It  is 
neither  the  language  of  confidence  nor  respect  to  say  that 
she  does  not  believe  that  amendments  for  the  promotion  of 
the  common  liberty  and  general  interest  of  the  States  will 
be  consented  to  by  them." 

Innes  took  the  subtle  ground  that,  "  if  previous  amend- 
ments were  proposed,  the  people  would  not  have  had  an 
opportunity  of  expressing  their  views  upon  them  ;  whereas, 
upon  subsequent  amendments,  they  would  have  a  facility 
of  examination,  and  an  expression  of  judgment.  He  did 
not  apprehend  any  danger  from  the  dissimilarity  of  inter- 
est, North  and  South.  He  could  not  conceive  that  with 
the  brotherly  affection,  reciprocal  friendship,  and  mutual 
amity,  so  constantly  inculcated,  and  with  the  strongest 
reasons  of  self-interest  besides,  the  Northern  States  could 
be  so  blind  as  to  alienate  the  affections  of  the  Southern 
States,  and  adopt  measures  which  would  produce  discon- 
tent, and  terminate  in  the  dissolution  of  a  Union  so  neces- 


102  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

sary  to  the  happiness  of  all.  To  suppose  that  they  would 
act  contrary  to  such  principles  would  be  to  suppose  them 
not  only  destitute  of  honor  and  of  probity,  but  void  of 
reason ;  not  only  bad  men,  but  mad  men." 

It  is  apparent  that,  if  the  Federalists  had  profited  by 
the  example  of  Massachusetts,  had  at  once  admitted  de- 
fects, and  concurred  in  amendments,  their  object  would 
have  been  gained  with  little  loss  of  time  and  great  saving 
of  temper.  As  soon  as  they  yielded  what  they  should  have 
proffered,  the  Constitution  was  ratified  by  89  yeas  to  79 
nays.  What  would  have  happened,  if  they  had  continued 
obstinate,  may  be  learned  by  the  vote  upon  a  motion  to 
strike  out  one  of  the  proposed  amendments.  Although 
all  the  great  leaders  who  had  championed  ratification  spoke 
and  voted  for  the  motion,  it  was  defeated  by  a  majority  of 
twenty. 

The  form  of  a  ratification  drawn  up  by  a  committee 
exclusively  Federalist — Randolph,  Nicholas,  Madison,  Mar- 
shall, and  Corbin — contains  these  words :  "  The  powers 
granted  under  the  Constitution,  being  derived  from  the 
people  of  the  United  States,  may  be  resumed  by  them, 
whenever  the  same  shall  be  perverted  to  their  injury  or 
oppression,  and  every  power  not  granted  thereby  remains 
with  them  and  at  their  will."  As  soon  as  possible  after  the 
Constitution  became  the  Government  of  the  United  States, 
the  amendments  so  eagerly  desired  were  imbedded  in  it. 
The  ninth  and  tenth  meant  something  to  the  mind  of  that 
generation  ;  to  subsequent  generations  the  meaning  de- 
pended upon  degrees  of  latitude. 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  NEW  YOEK,  1788. 

IN  the  Convention  of  New  York,  after  the  prelimina- 
ries of  order  were  settled,  debate  was  opened  by  Living- 
ston (the  Chancellor).  He  directed  attention  to  the  fact 
that  throughout  the  United  States  one  language  was  spoken, 
one  religion  professed,  and  one  political  principle  recog- 
nized— that  all  power  is  derived  from  the  people.  "  It 
must  be  of  little  moment  to  the  people  how  much  of  that 
power  they  vest  in  a  State  government,  and  how  much  in 
the  councils  of  the  Union.  .  .  .  Our  situation  admits  of  a 
Union  and  our  distresses  point  out  its  necessity.  Our  ex- 
istence as  a  State  depends  on  a  strong  and  efficient  Federal 
Government.  The  State  has  great  natural  advantages  from 
its  valuable  and  abundant  staples,  the  situation  of  its  prin- 
cipal seaport,  from  the  command  of  the  commerce  of  New 
Jersey  by  the  river  discharging  in  its  bay,  from  the  facility 
of  intercourse  with  the  Eastern  States  by  the  Sound,  from 
the  Hudson  bearing  on  its  bosom  the  wealth  of  the  remote 
parts  of  the  State.  A  lasting  peace  affords  a  prospect .  of 
its  commanding  the  treasures  of  the  "West  by  the  improve- 
ment of  its  internal  navigation.  The  domestic  debt  of  the 
Union  is  light ;  the  back  lands  will  pay  the  foreign  debt, 
if  a  government  vigorous  enough  to  avail  of  that  resource 
is  adopted.  For  that  Government,  imports,  at  no  distant 
day,  will  be  sufficient,  and  taxation  will  only  be  needed  for 
internal  government.  But  the  State  has  disadvantages, 
in  the  detached  situation  of  its  parts,  particularly  Staten 
Island  and  Long  Island,  in  the  vicinity  of  States  which, 


104  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

in  case  of  disunion,  would  be  independent,  and  might  be 
hostile.  To  the  northeast,  Yermont,  a  State  with  a  brave 
and  hardy  people  whom  we  have  not  the  spirit  to  subdue 
nor  the  magnanimity  to  yield  to,  will  avail  of  the  weakness 
of  New  York.  On  the  northwest  there  are  the  British 
posts  and  hostile  savages.  In  case  of  domestic  war,  the 
Hudson,  intersecting  the  State,  weakens  it  by  the  difficulty 
of  bringing  one  part  to  support  the  other.  Consequently, 
our  wealth  and  our  weakness  equally  require  the  support 
of  a  Federal  Union.  A  Union  can  only  be  found  in  the 
existing  Confederation,  or  in  that  under  consideration; 
and  as  a  Union  can  only  be  founded  upon  the  consent  of 
the  States,  it  should  be  sought  when  that  consent  may  be 
expected.  The  powers  of  the  Confederation  were  very  simi- 
lar to  those  in  the  proposed  Constitution.  Why  had  they 
not  been  efficient?  Why  was  Yermont  an  independent 
State  ?  Why  have  new  States  been  rent  from  those  in  the 
West,  in  defiance  of  our  plighted  faith  ?  Why  are  the 
British  posts  within  the  limits  of  the  States  ?  Because  the 
Confederation  is  defective  in  principle  and  impeachable 
in  execution,  operating  on  States  in  their  political  capacity, 
not  upon  individuals.  The  powers  intended  to  be  vested 
in  the  Federal  head  have  been  impossible  of  execution,  on 
the  principle  of  a  league  of  States  totally  separate  and  in- 
dependent, therefore  the  form  of  government  must  be 
changed."  Lansing  said:  "We  ought  to  be  extremely 
cautious  how  we  establish  a  government  which  may  give 
distinct  interests  to  the  rulers  and  the  ruled.  The  objec- 
tions urged  against  the  Confederation  are,  that  it  affords 
no  defense  against  foreign  attack,  and  no  security  for  do- 
mestic tranquillity.  Both  might  be  compassed  if  Congress 
could  be  vested  with  power  to  raise  men  and  money,  its 
legislation  to  act  on  individuals,  after  requisitions  had  been 
made  and  not  complied  with.  This  proposed  Constitution 
I  suppose  to  be  a  new  experiment  in  politics.  A  Govern- 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  NEW  YORK,   1788.       105 

ment  so  organized  and  possessing  such  powers  will  un- 
avoidably terminate  in  depriving  us  of  civil  liberty.  Con- 
quest can  do  no  more  ;  that,  in  the  present  state  of  civiliza- 
tion, subjects  us  to  be  ruled  by  persons  in  whose  appointment 
we  have  no  agency.  I  am  content  to  risk  a  possible,  even 
a  probable  evil,  to  avoid  a  certain  one.  I  contemplate  the 
idea  of  disunion  with  pain,  but,  if  it  should  ensue,  what  is 
to  be  apprehended  ?  We  are  connected  both  by  interest 
and  affection  with  the  Eastern  States,  we  harbor  no  ani- 
mosities against  each  other,  we  have  no  interfering  terri- 
torial claims.  Our  manners  are  nearly  similar,  they  are 
daily  assimilating,  and  mutual  advantages  will  probably 
prompt  to  mutual  concessions  and  enable  us  to  form  a 
Union  with  them.  I  have  declared  that  a  consolidated 
government,  even  partaking  in  a  great  degree  of  republi- 
can principles,  which  had  in  its  object  the  control  of  the 
inhabitants  of  the  extensive  territory  of  the  United  States, 
could  not  preserve  the  essential  rights  and  liberties  of  the 
people.  Reflection  has  given  that  belief  greater  force, 
and,  as  the  representative  of  others,  my  duty  is  to  offer 
amendments  to  this  Constitution.  Any  amendment  which 
will  have  a  tendency  to  lessen  the  danger  of  the  invasion 
of  civil  liberty  by  the  General  Government  will  meet  my 
approbation,  while  none  which  in  the  remotest  degree 
originate  in  local  views  will  receive  my  concurrence."  The 
Chancellor  rejoined  that,  "  if  a  Federal  requisition  upon  a 
State  was  disregarded,  subsequent  Federal  action  upon 
individuals  must  be  a  source  of  eternal  disorder,  for  then 
there  would  be  a  body  of  Federal  officials  acting  in  a  State 
in  direct  opposition  to  the  declared  sense  of  its  Legislature." 
Melancthon  Smith  was  "willing  to  sacrifice  anything 
for  a  Union  except  the  liberties  of  his  country.  That  was 
the  point  to  be  debated.  As  for  alarm  from  the  inimical 
disposition  of  the  Eastern  States,  he  did  not  believe  in  the 
existence  of  such  feelings.  It  could  not  be  supposed  that 


106  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

those  States  would  war  on  us  for  exercising  the  rights  of 
free  men,  deliberating  and  judging  for  ourselves  on  a  sub- 
ject the  most  interesting  that  ever  came  before  any  assem- 
bly. If  war  with  our  neighbors  was  to  be  the  result  of  not 
acceding,  debate  was  useless.  "We  had  better  receive  their 
dictates,  if  we  were  unable  to  resist  them.  The  defects  of 
the  old  Confederation  needed  as  little  proof  as  the  necessity 
of  a  Union,  but  the  question  is  not  whether  the  old  plan 
was  bad,  but  whether  the  new  one  is  good.  To  the  clause 
before  the  committee  his  objections  were  threefold.  To 
the  apportionment — the  principle  of  representation  is  that 
a  free  agent  ought  to  be  concerned  in  governing  himself. 
Slaves  have  no  will  of  their  own,  therefore  the  rule  of  ap- 
portionment was  founded  on  an  unjust  principle,  but  if  the 
result  of  accommodation,  it  must  be  admitted,  utterly  re- 
pugnant as  it  was.  To  the  absence  of  a  prohibition  against 
a  reduction  of  the  number  of  the  House — the  first  Con- 
gress would  have  the  power  to  reduce  the  number,  a  power 
inconsistent  with  every  principle  of  a  free  government.  If 
the  only  security  is  the  integrity  of  those  trusted  with 
power,  it  is  idle  to  contend  about  constitutions.  To  the 
inadequacy  of  representation,  twenty  thousand  should  be 
entitled  to  a  representative." 

Hamilton  rose :  "  The  radical  defect  of  the  Confeder- 
ation is  that  the  laws  of  the  Union  apply  only  to  the  States 
in  their  corporate  capacity.  They  can  not  be  made  effect- 
ive but  by  an  army.  Can  any  reasonable  man  be  well  dis- 
posed toward  a  government  which  makes  war  and  carnage 
the  only  means  of  supporting  itself,  a  government  that  can 
only  exist  by  the  sword  ?  What  is  the  cure  for  this  great 
evil  ?  To  enable  the  national  laws  to  act  upon  individuals 
in  the  same  manner  as  those  of  the  State  do.  Why  not, 
then,  give  that  capacity  to  the  Confederation  ?  Because, 
though  such  a  system  may  be  safely  intrusted  with  certain 
powers,  to  give  it  unlimited  power  over  taxation  and  the 


THE   CONVENTION  OF  NEW  YORK,   1788.       107 

national  forces  would  be  to  establish  a  despotism ;  for,  the 
definition  of  a  despotism  is,  all  power  concentered  in  a 
single  body."  He  then  proceeded  to  disclose  the  reasonings 
and  conclusions  of  the  Federal  Convention ;  to  demonstrate 
that  the  project  submitted  was  the  outcome  of  a  series  of 
bargains ;  and  to  assert  that  if  a  convention  of  a  similar 
character  met  again,  met  twenty  times,  or  twenty  thousand 
times,  it  must  have  the  same  difficulties  to  encounter,  and 
the  same  clashing  interests  to  reconcile.  He  also  examined 
the  equity  of  that  bargain  which  apportioned  representa- 
tion. "  Much  has  been  said  as  to  the  impropriety  of  repre- 
senting men  who  have  no  wills  of  their  own.  Whether 
this  be  reasoning  or  declamation,  I  will  not  presume  to  say. 
It  is  the  unfortunate  situation  of  the  Southern  States  to 
have  a  great  part  of  their  population,  as  well  as  property, 
in  blacks.  The  regulation  complained  of  was  one  result  of 
the  spirit  of  accommodation  which  governed  the  Conven- 
tion, and  without  this  indulgence  no  union  could  have  been 
formed.  But,  considering  the  peculiar  advantages  we  de- 
rive from  them,  it  is  entirely  just  that  they  should  be  grati- 
fied. The  Southern  States  have  certain  staples — tobacco, 
rice,  indigo — which  must  be  capital  objects  in  treaties  of 
commerce  with  foreign  nations,  and  the  advantages  which 
they  necessarily  procure  will  be  felt  throughout  all  the 
States.  But  the  justice  of  this  plan  will  appear  in  another 
view.  The  best  writers  on  government  have  held  that 
representation  should  be  compounded  of  persons  and  prop- 
erty. This  rule  has  been  adopted,  as  far  as  it  could  be,  in 
the  Constitution  of  New  York.  It  will,  however,  be  by 
no  means  admitted  that  the  slaves  are  altogether  property. 
They  are  men,  though  degraded  to  the  condition  of  slavery. 
They  are  persons,  known  to  the  municipal  laws  of  the 
States  they  inhabit,  as  well  as  to  the  laws  of  Nature.  But 
representation  and  taxation  ought  to  go  together,  and  one 
uniform  rule  to  apply  to  both.  Would  it  be  just  to  com- 


108  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

pute  the  slaves  in  the  assessment  of  taxes,  and  discard  them 
from  the  estimate  in  the  apportionment  of  representation  ? 
Another  circumstance  ought  to  be  considered.  The  rule 
is  a  general  rule,  and  applies  to  all  the  States.  You  have 
a  great  number  of  people  in  your  State  who  are  not  rep- 
resented at  all,  and  have  no  voice  in  your  government. 
These  will  be  included  in  the  enumeration ;  not  three 
fifths,  but  the  whole.  This  proves  that  the  advantages  of 
the  plan  are  not  confined  to  the  Southern  States,  but  ex- 
tend to  other  parts  of  the  Union."  As  to  the  future  num- 
ber of  representatives,  he  "  admitted  that  there  were  no 
direct  words  of  prohibition  against  a  reduction,  but  the 
true  and  genuine  construction  of  the  clause  does  not  give 
Congress  power  to  reduce  representation  below  the  num- 
ber as  it  stood."  Upon  the  proper  number  to  send  a  repre- 
sentative, he  argued  that  "  the  proper  number  was  a  mat- 
ter of  opinion,  between  what  all  regarded  as  too  small,  and 
what  all  considered  too  great.  The  diversity  in  the  State 
Legislatures  proved  it ;  but  while  one  proportion  might  be 
more  or  less  wise,  no  proportion,  upon  the  basis  assumed, 
could  be  unjust."  More  of  an  argument  which  surveyed 
the  subject  from  every  side  need  not  be  cited,  except  so 
much  as  replied  to  an  objection  of  Melancthon  Smith,  who 
had  contended  for  the  smaller  number,  because  "  the  larger 
would  throw  the  office  into  the  hands  of  the  rich,  and  ex- 
clude the  middling  class,  always  the  superior  in  virtue  and 
patriotism."  "  The  people  have  it  in  their  power  to  elect 
the  most  meritorious  men.  While  property  continues  to 
be  pretty  equally  divided,  and  a  considerable  share  of  in- 
formation pervades  the  community,  the  tendency  of  the 
people's  suffrages  will  be  to  elevate  merit,  even  from  ob- 
scurity. As  riches  increase  and  accumulate  in  a  few  hands, 
as  luxury  prevails  in  society,  virtue  will,  in  a  greater  de- 
gree, be  considered  only  a  graceful  appendage  of  wealth, 
and  the  tendency  of  things  will  be  to  depart  from  the  re- 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  NEW  TORE,   1788.       109 

publican  standard.  This  is  the  real  disposition  of  human 
nature ;  it  is  what  neither  the  honorable  member  nor  I  can 
correct ;  it  is  a  common  misfortune  that  awaits  our  State 
Constitution  as  well  as  all  others.  But  experience  does  not 
justify  the  supposition  that  there  is  more  virtue  in  one  class 
of  men  than  in  another.  Look  through  the  rich  and  the 
poor  of  a  community,  the  learned  and  the  unlearned. 
Where  does  virtue  predominate  ?  The  difference,  indeed, 
consists  not  in  the  quantity,  but  in  the  kind  of  vices  which 
are  incident  to  various  classes.  Here  the  advantage  of 
character  belongs  to  the  wealthy ;  their  vices  are  probably 
more  favorable  to  the  prosperity  of  the  State  than  those 
of  the  indigent,  and  partake  less  of  moral  depravity."  To 
a  suggestion  that  the  failure  of  the  Confederation  was 
largely  due  to  the  efforts  of  powerful  and  designing  men, 
aiming  at  revolution  and  instigating  disaffection,  he  an- 
swered :  "  The  insinuation  is  false,  the  thing  is  impossible. 
I  will  venture  to  assert  that  no  combination  of  designing 
men  under  heaven  will  be  capable  of  making  a  government 
unpopular  which  in  its  principle  is  a  wise  and  good  one 
and  vigorous  in  its  operations." 

At  least  one  speech,  and  a  very  important  one,  of  Ham- 
ilton's is  not  reported.  Its  purport  can  be  guessed  only 
from  the  answer  of  Smith :  "  The  last  speaker  has  assured 
the  committee  that  the  States  would  be  checks  upon  the 
General  Government,  and  had  pledged  himself  to  point  out 
and  demonstrate  the  operation  of  those  checks.  For  him- 
self, he  could  not  see  the  possibility  of  checking  a  govern- 
ment of  independent  powers,  which  extended  to  all  objects 
and  measures  without  limitation.  His  own  aim  was  to 
provide  such  checks  as  would  not  leave  the  exercise  of 
government  to  the  operation  of  causes  which  in  their  na- 
ture are  variable  and  uncertain." 

Mr.  G.  Livingston  moved  an  amendment  to  the  Senate 
clause  that  no  person  shall  be  a  senator  for  more  than  six 


110  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

years  in  any  twelve  years,  and  that  the  Legislatures  of  the 
States  may  recall  either  or  both,  and  elect  others  in  their 
stead.  Lansing  supported  it :  "  We  are  told  that  in  one 
House,  individuals,  the  people  of  the  State,  are  represented, 
in  the  other  its  sovereignty.  Should  not  the  principal 
have  the  right  to  recall  his  agent  ?  If  the  agent  seeks  his 
personal  interest  in  disregard  of  that  of  the  State,  is  the 
latter  to  be  powerless  for  six  years  ? "  Smith  suggested 
the  additional  possibility  of  corruption,  both  in  the  official 
and  the  people.  He  must  have  been  asked,  although  the 
question  does  not  appear,  how  corruption  was  practicable, 
and  whence  the  fund  for  corruption.  "  More  than  one  of 
the  gentlemen  have  ridiculed  my  apprehensions  of  corrup- 
tion. How,  they  say,  are  the  people  to  be  corrupted  ?  By 
their  own  money.  In  many  countries  people  pay  their 
money  to  corrupt  themselves,  why  should  it  not  happen  in 
this  ?  I  presume  there  is  not  a  government  in  the  world 
in  which  there  is  a  greater  scope  for  influence  and  corrup- 
tion through  the  disposal  of  offices."  Hamilton  spoke 
twice  against  this  amendment :  "  The  zeal  for  liberty  be- 
came predominant  and  excessive  in  us,  as  was  natural, 
when  the  usurpation  of  Great  Britain  had  to  be  met.  That 
object  is  certainly  very  valuable,  but  there  is  another 
equally  important — a  principle  of  strength  and  stability  in 
the  organization  of  the  Government  and  vigor  in  its  oper- 
ations ;  a  purpose  not  to  be  accomplished  but  by  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  select  body  founded  particularly  on  this 
principle.  It  must  be  small,  hold  its  authority  during  a 
considerable  period,  and  have  such  an  independence  in  the 
exercise  of  its  powers  as  will  divest  it  as  much  as  possible 
of  local  prejudices.  It  should  be  so  formed  as  to  be  the 
center  of  political  knowledge,  to  pursue  always  a  steady 
line  of  conduct,  and  to  reduce  every  irregular  propensity 
to  system.  Without  this  establishment,  we  may  make  ex- 
periments without  end,  but  shall  never  have  an  efficient 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  NEW  YORK,   1788.       HI 

government.  It  is  an  unquestionable  truth  that  the  body 
of  the  people  in  every  country  sincerely  desires  its  pros- 
perity, but  it  is  equally  unquestionable  that  they  do  not 
possess  the  discernment  and  stability  necessary  for  system- 
atic government.  To  deny  that  they  are  frequently  led 
into  the  grossest  errors  by  misinformation  and  passion, 
would  be  a  flattery  their  own  good  sense  must  despise. 
That  branch  of  administration  which  involves  our  political 
relations  with  foreign  states,  a  community  will  ever  be 
incompetent  to.  These  truths  are  not  often  held  up  in 
public  assemblies,  but  they  can  not  be  unknown  to  any 
who  hear  me.  Consider  the  purposes  for  which  the 
Senate  was  instituted,  and  the  nature  of  the  business  to** 
be  transacted.  They,  together  with  the  President,  are  to 
manage  all  our  concerns  with  foreign  nations  and  un- 
derstand all  their  interests  and  political  systems.  This 
knowledge  is  not  soon  acquired ;  but  a  small  part  is  gained 
in  the  closet."  The  conclusion  he  deduced  was,  that  the 
amendment  assimilated  the  Senate  to  the  House,  and,  just 
in  proportion  as  the  resemblance  was  closer,  the  mischief 
was  greater.  Up  to  this  stage  of  the  debate,  the  advocates 
of  ratification  had  represented  the  Constitution  as  a  system 
of  checks  and  balances  by  which  power  and  liberty  were 
reconciled,  checks  and  balances  in  the  machinery  of  gov- 
ernment, a  check  and  balance  between  the  Union  and  each 
of  its  constituent  factors.  Assertion  of  the  latter  was  as 
constant  as  of  the  former.  "The  balance  between  the 
national  and  the  State  governments  ought  to  be  dwelt  on 
with  peculiar  attention.  It  forms  a  double  security  for 
the  people.  If  one  encroaches  on  their  rights,  they  will 
find  a  powerful  protector  in  the  other.  Indeed,  they  will 
both  be  prevented  from  overpassing  their  constitutional 
limits  by  a  certain  rivalship  which  will  ever  subsist  between 
them.  The  State  governments  possess  inherent  advan- 
tages, which  will  ever  give  them  an  influence  and  ascend- 


112  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

ency  over  the  national  Government,  and  will  forever  pre- 
clude the  possibility  of  Federal  encroachments."  The 
ground  upon  which  Hamilton  predicted  these  assertions 
was :  "  There  are  certain  social  principles  in  human  nature, 
from  which  we  may  draw  the  most  solid  conclusion  with 
respect  to  the  conduct  of  individuals  and  communities. 
We  love  our  families  more  than  our  neighbors  ;  we  love 
our  neighbors  more  than  our  countrymen  in  general.  The 
human  affections,  like  the  solar  heat,  lose  their  intensity  as 
they  depart  from  the  center,  and  become  languid  in  propor- 
tion to  the  expansion  of  the  circle  in  which  they  act.  On 
these  principles  the  attachment  of  the  individual  will  be 
first  and  forever  secured  by  the  State  governments,  and 
they  will  be  a  mutual  protection  and  support."  The 
answers  of  Smith  and  Lansing  were :  "  How,  upon  your 
theory,  can  a  State  government  oppose  the  Federal  Gov- 
ernment, except  by  inciting  its  citizens  to  hostility  ?  What 
remedy  against  misgovernment  do  you  propose  but  re- 
bellion ?  If  the  governments  are  rivals,  must  not  one 
finally  conquer  and  destroy  the  other  ?  They  ought  not  to 
be  and  need  not  be  rivals ;  there  should  not  be  opposition, 
there  should  be  harmony  between  them.  The  means  are 
in  our  hands,  the  task  is  easy.  What  would  be  the  func- 
tions of  a  government  in  an  independent  state  are,  in  a 
union,  divided  between  an  organization  created  by  a  con- 
stitution, and  an  organization  originally  existing.  The 
line  between  the  powers  of  each  ought  to  be  so  strongly 
marked  and  so  obvious,  that  misconception  will  be  im- 
possible to  a  sane  mind.  How,  otherwise,  can  right  and 
wrong  exist  ?  Such  a  line  is  possible  or  impossible : 
if  impossible,  constitutional  government  is  impossible, 
and  the  pretense  of  it  hypocrisy  ;  if  possible,  why  not 
draw  the  line,  or  if  you  think  it  drawn,  point  it  out  ? " 
The  experience  of  daily  life  seems  in  some  measure  to  sup- 
port that  view.  A  multitude  of  men  can  pass  through  a 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  NEW  YORK,   1788.       113 

narrow  street  with  ease  and  comfort  if  the  ascending  and 
descending  streams  of  travel  observe  the  law  of  the  road. 
The  subsequent  speeches  of  Hamilton  show  the  influence 
of  this  reasoning  upon  his  mind:  "  In  debates  of  this  kind, 
it  is  extremely  easy,  on  either  side,  to  say  a  great  number 
of  plausible  things.  It  is  to  be  acknowledged  that  there  is 
even  a  certain  degree  of  truth  in  the  reasonings  on  both 
sides.  In  this  situation,  it  is  the  province  of  judgment 
and  good  sense  to  determine  their  force  and  application, 
and  how  far  the  arguments  on  one  side  are  balanced  by 
those  on  the  other.  The  ingenious  dress  in  which  both 
may  appear  renders  it  a  difficult  task  to  make  this  decision, 
and  the  mind  is  frequently  unable  to  come  to  a  safe  and 
solid  conclusion.  There  are  two  objects  in  forming  sys- 
tems of  government :  safety  for  the  people,  and  energy  in 
the  administration.  When  these  objects  are  united,  the 
certain  tendency  of  the  system  will  be  the  public  welfare. 
If  the  latter  object  be  neglected,  the  people's  security  will 
be  as  certainly  sacrificed  as  by  disregarding  the  former. 
Good  constitutions  are  formed  upon  a  comparison  of  the 
liberty  of  the  individual,  with  the  strength  of  the  govern- 
ment. If  the  tone  of  either  be  too  high,  the  other  will  be 
weakened  too  much.  It  is  the  happiest  mode  of  concili- 
ating these  objects  to  institute  one  branch  endowed  with 
sensibility,  and  another  with  knowledge  and  firmness. 
Through  the  opposition  and  mutual  control  of  these  bodies 
"the  Government  will  reach  in  its  operations  the  perfect 
balance  between  liberty  and  power."  The  validity  of  this 
argument  rests  upon  the  assumption  that  the  two  bodies 
represent  distinct  and  hostile  interests,  and  that  each  would 
be  restrained  from  excess  by  the  fear  of  a  civil  war,  in 
which  each  could,  with  equal  justice,  claim  to  be  defend- 
ing the  right.  The  subsequent  admission  that  they  were 
agencies  of  the  same  principals  justified  Smith  and  Lansing 
in  denying  such  effect  in  the  system,  and  therefore  any 


SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

force  in  the  reasoning.  He  must  be  dull  indeed  who  does 
not  see  that,  in  the  absence  of  some  check,  a  majority  of 
the  States,  having  a  majority  of  population,  can  take  pos- 
session of  every  branch  of  the  Government  and  call  and 
make  their  wills  law,  the  other  States  occupying  to  them 
the  relation  which  Great  Britain  claimed  that  the  colonies 
occupied  to  her.  The  fact  has  been  proved  by  experience, 
and  the  impotence  of  the  judiciary  as  a  check  has  also 
been  proved  by  experience. 

Driven  from  his  claim  of  an  internal  check,  Hamilton 
instantly  changed  front :  "  A  Senator  was  an  agent  for 
the  Union,  not  simply  an  agent  for  a  State;  the  Senate 
should  be  formed  so  as  to  check  in  some  measure  the  State 
governments ;  the  interests  of  a  State  ought  to  be  sacri- 
ficed for  those  of  the  Union."  To  the  reply  of  Smith, 
"  The  interest  of  each  State  is  the  interest  of  every  State, 
and  must  be  so  in  a  well-regulated  government,  why  else 
was  an  equal  vote  given  to  each  in  the  Senate?"  his  re- 
joinder was :  "  It  has  been  remarked  that  there  is  an  incon- 
sistency in  our  admitting  that  the  equal  vote  in  the  Senate 
was  given  to  secure  the  rights  of  the  States,  and  at  the 
same  time  holding  that  their  interests  should  be  sacrificed 
to  those  of  the  Union.  The  committee  can  certainly  per- 
ceive the  difference  between  the  rights  of  a  State  and  its 
interests.  The  rights  of  a  State  are  defined  by  the  Con- 
stitution, and  can  not  be  invaded  without  a  violation  of 
it ;  but  the  interests  of  a  State  have  no  connection  with 
the  Constitution,  and  may  in  a  thousand  instances  be 
constitutionally  sacrificed."  At  this  period  Chancellor 
Livingston  informed  the  committee  "  that  the  ninth  State 
had  ratified  the  Constitution,  and  that  the  Confedera- 
tion was  consequently  dissolved.  The  question  now  be- 
fore the  committee  was  one  of  policy  and  expediency. 
He  presumed  the  Convention  would  consider  the  situa- 
tion of  their  country.  Some  might  contemplate  dis- 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  NEW  YORK,   1788.       115 

union  without  pain,  and  flatter  themselves  that  some  of 
the  Southern  States  would  form  a  league  with  us.  He 
could  not  look  without  horror  at  the  dangers  to  which  any 
such  confederacy  would  expose  the  State  of  New  York. 
It  might  be  political  cowardice,  but  he  had  felt  since  yes- 
terday an  alteration  of  circumstances  which  had  made  a 
most  solemn  impression  on  his  mind."  Smith  said  "  that 
the  change  of  circumstances  had  not  altered  his  feelings 
or  his  wishes  on  the  subject ;  he  had  long  been  convinced 
that  nine  States  would  receive  the  Constitution." 

Lansing  said  :  "  I  do  not  agree  that  our  particular  cir- 
cumstances are,  in  fact,  altered  since  yesterday.  That  the 
ninth  State  has  ratified  the  Constitution  is  an  event  which 
ought  not  to  influence  our  deliberations.  I  presume  that 
I  shall  not  be  charged  with  rashness  if  I  continue  to  insist 
that  it  is  still  our  duty  to  maintain  our  rights.  Our  dissent 
can  not  prevent  the  operation  of  the  Government ;  since 
nine  States  have  acceded  to  it,  let  them  make  the  experi- 
ment. It  has  been  said  that  some  might  contemplate  dis- 
union without  terror.  I  have  heard  no  sentiment  from  any 
gentleman  that  can  warrant  such  an  insinuation.  We  ought 
not,  however,  to  suffer  our  fears  to  force  us  to  adopt  a 
system  which  is  dangerous  to  liberty."  Upon  the  several 
clauses  of  the  Constitution,  as  the  reading  continued,  amend- 
ments were  offered  and  debates  ensued.  If  not  carrying 
conviction,  they  disclosed  exactly  how  far  men  were  apart, 
and  who,  on  one  or  both  sides,  were  anxious  to  find  some 
basis  of  agreement.  The  opposite  positions  upon  the  scope 
of  Federal  power  can  be  summed  up  on  one  side  in  the 
words  of  Hamilton,  "  When  you  have  divided  and  nicely 
balanced  the  departments  of  government,  when  you  have 
strongly  connected  the  virtue  of  your  rulers  with  their  in- 
terest ;  when  you  have  rendered  your  system  as  perfect  as 
human  forms  can  be,  you  must  have  confidence,  you  must 
give  power " ;  and,  on  the  other  side,  in  the  words  of 


116  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

Treadwell :  "  We  are  told  that  if  government  is  properly- 
organized,  and  the  powers  suitably  distributed  among  the 
several  members,  it  is  unnecessary  to  provide  any  other 
security  against  the  abuse  of  power ;  that  power  thus  dis- 
tributed needs  not  restriction.  Is  this  a  "Whig  principle  ? 
does  not  every  Constitution  on  the  continent  contradict 
this  position  ?  Whatever  be  the  design  of  the  preachers, 
the  tendency  of  their  doctrines  is  clear — to  corrupt  our 
political  faith,  to  take  us  off  our  guard,  to  lull  to  sleep  that 
jealousy  which,  we  are  told  by  all  writers,  and  is  proved 
by  all  experience,  to  be  essentially  necessary  for  the  pres- 
ervation of  freedom.  In  this  Constitution  we  have  de- 
parted widely  from  the  principles  and  political  faith  of 
'76,  when  the  spirit  of  liberty  ran  high  and  danger  put  a 
curb  on  ambition.  Here  we  have  no  security  for  the  rights 
of  individuals,  for  the  existence  of  our  State  governments, 
no  Bill  of  Eights,  no  proper  restriction  of  power.  Our 
lives,  our  property,  our  consciences,  are  left  wholly  at  the 
mercy  of  the  Legislature ;  the  powers  of  the  judiciary  may 
be  extended  to  any  degree  short  of  Almighty.  A  union 
with  our  sister  States  I  as  ardently  desire  as  any  man,  and 
that  upon  the  most  generous  principles.  The  design  of  a 
union  is  safety.  In  one  sense  this  may  bring  us  to  a  state 
of  safety ;  for  it  may  reduce  us  to  such  a  condition  that 
we  may  be  sure  nothing  worse  can  happen,  and  conse- 
quently have  nothing  to  fear.  This  is  a  dreadful  kind  of 
safety,  but  it  is  the  only  kind  of  safety  I  can  see  in  this 
union."  Amendments  and  debates  thereon  (not  recorded) 
occupied  yet  more  than  a  fortnight ;  then  Lansing  moved 
a  conditional  ratification,  with  a  Bill  of  Rights  prefixed  and 
amendments  subjoined.  The  motion  was  carried.  The 
vote  is  not  given,  but  it  was  undoubtedly  thirty  to  twenty- 
seven.  Four  days  after,  Mr.  Jones  moved  that  the  words 
"  in  full  confidence  "  be  substituted  in  the  form  of  ratifi- 
cation for  the  words  "  on  condition."  That  motion  was 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  NEW   YORK,   1788. 

carried  by  thirty-one  to  twenty-nine.  M.  Smith,  G.  Liv- 
ingston, and  Williams,  had  passed  over  to  their  former 
adversaries.  How  they  were  won  is  not  told,  but  may  be 
easily  guessed  from  the  declaration  by  the  Convention  of  a 
right  of  external  check  : 

"  The  delegates  of  the  people  of  the  State  of  New  York 
declare  and  make  known  that  all  power  is  originally  vested 
in,  and  consequently  derived  from  the  people,  and  that 
government  is  instituted  by  them  for  their  common  inter- 
est, protection,  and  security ;  that  the  powers  of  government 
may  be  resumed  by  the  people  whenever  it  shall  become 
necessary  to  their  happiness ;  that  every  power,  jurisdic- 
tion and  right,  which  is  not  by  the  Constitution  clearly 
delegated  to  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  or  to  the 
departments  of  government  thereof,  remains  in  the  people 
of  the  several  States  or  to  their  respective  State  govern- 
ments to  whom  they  may  have  granted  the  same ;  and  that 
the  clauses  in  said  Constitution  which  declare  that  Con- 
gress shall  not  exercise  certain  powers  do  not  imply  that 
Congress  is  entitled  to  any  powers  not  given  by  said  Con- 
stitution, but  such  clauses  are  to  be  construed  either  as  ex- 
ceptions to  certain  specific  powers,  or  inserted  merely  for 
greater  caution."  *  The  circular  letter  from  the  Conven- 
tion to  the  Governors  of  the  several  States  discloses  more 
of  the  compromise  which,  in  their  view,  justified  the  trans- 
fer of  votes.  A  few  sentences  will  exhibit  it : 

"  Several  articles  in  the  Constitution  appear  so  excep- 
tionable to  a  majority  of  us,  that  nothing  but  the  fullest 
confidence  of  obtaining  a  revision  of  them  by  a  general 
convention,  and  an  invincible  reluctance  to  separate  from 
our  sister  States,  could  have  prevailed  upon  a  sufficient  num- 
ber to  ratify  it,  without  stipulating  for  previous  amend- 
ments. We  all  unite  in  the  opinion  that  such  a  revision 

*  Rhode  Island  made  the  same  claim  of  a  right  of  external  check  in  nearly 
the  same  words. 


118  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

will  be  necessary  to  recommend  it  to  the  approbation  and 
support  of  a  numerous  body  of  our  constituents."  The 
final  vote  was  thirty  to  twenty-seven.  Most  of  the  coun- 
ties were  unanimously  for,  or  against  ratification.  The 
trading-classes  and  the  sea-washed  counties  were  unani- 
mous in  their  desire  for  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution  ; 
the  agricultural  class  and  the  interior  counties  were  the 
opponents.  Before  the  final  vote  was  taken,  Lansing  made 
a  last  effort  to  compel  amendments.  He  moved  a  resolu- 
tion that  the  State  of  New  York  reserve  the  right  to  with- 
draw from  the  Union  after  a  certain  number  of  years,  unless 
the  amendments  proposed  should  previously  be  submitted 
to  a  general  convention.  That  motion  was  negatived.  The 
vote  upon  it  is  not  in  the  printed  report.  The  sense  of 
the  Convention  on  the  subject  of  its  long  list  of  proposed 
amendments,  is  expressed  in  one  paragraph  of  the  circular 
letter :  "  Our  amendments  will  manifest  that  none  of  them 
originated  in  local  views ;  they  are  such  as,  if  acceded  to, 
must  equally  affect  every  State  in  the  Union.  Our  attach- 
ment to  our  sister  States,  and  the  confidence  we  repose  in 
them,  can  not  be  more  forcibly  demonstrated  than  by  ac- 
ceding to  a  government  which  many  of  us  think  very  im- 
perfect, and  devolving  the  power  of  determining  whether 
that  government  shall  be  rendered  perpetual  in  its  present 
form,  or  altered  agreeably  to  our  wishes,  and  a  minority  of 
the  States  with  whom  we  unite."  * 

*  The  debates  in  the  Convention  of  New  York  are  like  a  Homeric  battle, 
Hamilton  against  a  host.  His  mind,  "  like  an  ample  shield,  took  all  their 
darts,  with  verge  enough  for  more."  The  display  of  intellectual  power  is 
the  more  remarkable,  from  his  total  lack  of  faith  in  the  plan.  Of  all  men 
who  have  ever  lived  in  the  United  States,  his  was  the  most  complete  mind. 
He  seemed  to  absorb  information.  Upon  any  subject  he  could  leap  fully 
armed  into  the  saddle,  ready  to  meet  all  comers.  If  right,  he  was  irresisti- 
ble ;  if  wrong,  master  of  sophistry,  he  was  almost  irrefutable.  His  ideal  of 
government  was  based  upon  human  nature,  as  exhibited  for  thousands  of 
years,  not  upon  the  then  characteristics  of  American  nature.  He  believed 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  NEW  YORK,   1788.       H9 

that  the  existing  passion  for  liberty  must  be  evanescent,  and  that  his  coun- 
trymen would  soon  become  as  other  men — more  eager  to  rule,  than  jealous 
of  rule.  Instead  of  a  Federal  Union,  he  wished  a  legislative  Union,  with 
exceptions  of  power,  and  a  Senate  embodying  the  good  features  of  the  Senate 
of  Rome ;  both  it  and  the  President  to  be  elevated  above  party,  by  a  tenure 
beyond  party.  He  purposed  that  the  democratic  element  should  be  fully 
represented  in  the  House.  His  political  career  in  the  new  Union  was  shaped 
by  a  belief,  often  expressed,  that  the  Federal  would  be  invaded  by  the  State 
power,  a  consequence  only  to  be  averted  by  the  gradual  absorption  of  all 
the  limitations  upon  Federal  power.  His  theory  of  construction  was  inspired 
by  a  conviction  that  the  federal  principle  must  rest  on  force  or  on  influence, 
not  on  good  faith.  No  man,  even  believing  that  theory  fatal,  ever  distrusted 
his  motives  or  doubted  his  patriotism.  To  those,  Burr,  his  sole  rival  in  New 
York,  did  full  justice,  although  a  mutual  personal  enmity  of  long  date  was 
conjoined  with  political  divergence.  To  those  who  with  Gorham  thought  an 
hereditary  monarchy  the  best  of  governments,  there  lacked  an  aristocracy, 
an  insuperable  objection,  as  he  admitted ;  to  those  who  thought  with  Hamil- 
ton, there  lacked  a  plutocracy ;  to  its  creation,  therefore,  he  addressed  all  his 
faculties. 


THE  NORTH  CAROLINA  CONVENTION, 

1788. 

WHEN  the  Convention  of  North  Carolina  was  organized, 
Galloway  moved  that  the  Constitution  be  discussed  clause 
by  clause. 

Willie  Jones  moved  that  the  question  upon  its  adoption 
be  immediately  put.  It  had  so  long  been  the  subject  of 
the  deliberation  of  every  man  that  the  members  of  the 
Convention  were  (he  believed)  prepared  to  vote. 

Iredell  was  surprised  at  the  motion :  "  A  Constitution 
has  been  formed  after  much  deliberation.  It  has  had  the 
sanction  of  men  of  the  first  characters,  for  their  probity 
and  understanding.  It  has  also  had  the  solemn  ratification 
of  ten  States  in  the  Union.  It  ought  not  to  be  adopted  or 
rejected  in  a  moment.  Shall  the  representatives  of  North 
Carolina,  assembled  for  the  express  purpose  of  deliberating 
upon  the  most  important  question  that  ever  came  before  a 
people,  refuse  to  discuss  it,  and  discard  reasoning  as  use- 
less ?  I  should  not  choose  to  determine  on  any  question 
without  mature  reflection  ,•  and  on  this  occasion  my  repug- 
nance to. a  hasty  decision  is  equal  to  the  magnitude  of  the 
subject.  I  readily  confess  my  present  opinion  strongly  in 
its  favor ;  but,  notwithstanding,  I  have  not  come  here  re- 
solved, at  all  events,  to  vote  for  its  adoption.  I  have  come 
to  learn,  and  to  judge.  The  Constitution  ought  to  be  dis- 
cussed in  such  a  manner  that  all  possible  light  may  be 
thrown  on  it.  If  they  who  think  that  it  would  be  a  bad 
government  will  unfold  the  reasons  of  their  opinion,  we 


THE  NORTH  CAROLINA    CONVENTION,   1788.    121 

may  all  concur  in  it.  Can  it  be  supposed  that  any  here  are 
so  obstinate  and  tenacious  of  their  opinion,  that  they  will 
not  recede  upon  reasons  to  change  it  ?  Has  not  every  one 
here  received  useful  knowledge  from  communication  with 
others  ?  Have  not  many  of  the  members  of  this  house, 
when  members  of  the  Assembly,  frequently  changed  opin- 
ions upon  subjects  of  legislation  ?  If  so,  surely  a  subject 
of  so  complicated  a  nature,  and  which  involves  such  seri- 
ous consequences,  requires  the  most  ample  discussion.  I 
hope,  therefore,  that  we  shall  imitate  the  laudable  example 
of  the  other  States,  and  go  into  a  committee  of  the  whole 
house,  that  the  Constitution  may  be  discussed  clause  by 
clause." 

Jones,  if  members  differed  from  him  as  to  the  propriety 
of  his  motion,  submitted  to  their  views. 

Rev.  Mr.  Caldwell,  in  order  to  obviate  the  difficulty  at- 
tending discussion,  conceived  it  necessary  to  lay  down  cer- 
tain fundamental  principles  of  free  government,  compare 
the  Constitution  with  them,  and  judge  it  by  its  consonance 
to  them. 

Davie  observed  that,  to  lay  down  a  number  of  original 
principles  would  require  a  double  investigation,  the  princi- 
ples would  have  to  be  established,  and  then  the  comparison 
would  have  to  be  made. 

Caldwell  presented  his  principles :  "  A  government  is  a 
compact  between  the  rulers  and  the  people.  Such  compact 
ought  to  be  lawful  in  itself.  It  ought  to  be  lawfully  ex- 
ecuted. Unalienable  rights  ought  not  to  be  given  up,  if 
not  necessary.  The  compact  ought  to  be  mutual.  It  ought 
to  be  plain,  obvious,  and  easily  understood." 

Iredell :  "  The  first  principle  is  erroneous.  In  other 
countries,  where  the  origin  of  government  is  obscure,  and 
its  formation  different  from  ours,  government  may  be 
deemed  a  compact  between  the  rulers  and  the  people,  with 
the  consequence  that,  unless  the  rulers  are  guilty  of  op- 
6 


122  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

pression,  the  people,  upon  the  principle  of  contract,  which, 
can  not  be  annulled  without  the  consent  of  both  parties, 
have  no  right  to  new-model  their  government.  Our  gov- 
ernment is  founded  upon  much  nobler  principles.  Our 
people  are  known  with  certainty  to  have  originated  it  them- 
selves. Those  in  power  are  their  servants  and  agents,  and 
the  people,  without  their  consent,  may  new-model  their 
government  whenever  they  think  proper ;  not  merely  be- 
cause it  is  oppressively  exercised,  but  because  they  think 
another  form  will  be  more  conducive  to  their  welfare.  It 
is  upon  the  footing  of  this  very  principle  that  we  are  now 
met,  to  consider  this  Constitution  before  us." 

Caldwell  admitted  that  the  government  proposed  did 
not  resemble  the  European  governments,  but  thought  it  yet 
partook  of  the  nature  of  a  compact. 

Maclaine  said  the  "principles"  were  taken  from  sources 
which  can  not  hold  here.  In  England  the  government  is  a 
compact  between  the  people  and  the  king. 

Goudry  thought  that  there  was  a  quibble  upon  words. 
Compact,  agreement,  covenant,  bargain,  or  what  not,  the 
intent  of  the  instrument  was  a  concession  of  power  by  the 
people  to  rulers.  We  know  private  interest  generally  gov- 
erns mankind.  Power  belongs  originally  to  the  people, 
but,  if  rulers  are  not  well  guarded,  that  power  may  be 
usurped  from  them ;  hence,  the  necessity  of  general  rules. 

Iredell  said :  "The  line  between  power  which  is  given, 
and  which  is  retained,  ought  to  be  as  accurately  drawn  as 
possible.  In  this  system,  the  line  is  most  accurately  drawn, 
by  the  positive  grant  of  powers  to  the  General  Government. 
But  a  compact  between  the  rulers  and  the  ruled  is  certainly 
not  the  principle  of  this  government.  Will  any  man  say 
that,  if  there  be  a  compact,  it  can  be  altered  without  the 
consent  of  both  parties  ?  Those  who  govern,  unless  they 
grossly  abuse  their  trust,  which  is  held  an  implied  violation 
of  the  compact,  and  therefore  a  dissolution  of  it,  have  a 


THE  NORTH  CAROLINA   CONVENTION,   1788.    123 

right  to  say  that  they  do  not  choose  that  the  government 
should  be  changed.  But  have  any  of  the  officers  of  our 
government  a  right  to  say  so,  if  the  people  choose  to  change 
it  ?  Surely  not." 

Spencer :  "  I  conceive  that  it  will  retard  business  to 
consider  the  proposal.  It  does  not  apply  to  the  present 
circumstances.  When  there  is  a  king,  or  other  governors, 
there  is  a  compact  between  the  people  and  him.  In  this 
case,  in  regard  to  the  government  it  is  proposed  to  adopt, 
there  is  no  ruler  or  governor." 

The  previous  question,  being  put,  was  carried  by  an 
immense  majority ;  then  the  motion  to  consider  the  Con- 
stitution, clause  by  clause,  was  debated  and  carried  by  a 
great  majority. 

Caldwell  inquired  the  meaning  of  "  We,  the  people." 

Davie  supposed  the  question  to  be  prompted  by  the  as- 
sumption that  the  Federal  Convention  had  exceeded  its 
powers ;  as  a  member  of  that  Convention,  he  could  answer 
for  its  action.  Its  mission  was  "  to  decide  upon  the  most 
effectual  means  of  removing  the  defects  of  our  Federal 
Union.  That  was  a  general  discretionary  authority,  to  pro- 
pose any  alteration  thought  necessary  and  proper.  The 
State  Legislatures  were  afterward  to  review  the  proceedings. 
Through  their  recommendation  the  plan  is  submitted  to 
the  people,  and  it  must  remain  a  dead  letter,  or  receive  its 
operation  from  the  fiat  of  this  Convention.  The  general 
objects  of  the  Union  are  to  protect  us  against  foreign  in- 
vasion, internal  commotions  and  insurrections,  and  to  pro- 
mote the  commerce,  agriculture,  and  manufactures  of  Amer- 
ica. To  neither  was  the  Confederation  competent ;  and,  as 
it  would  have  been  dangerous  to  lodge  additional  power  in 
a  single  body,  a  different  organization  was  necessary.  To 
form  some  balance,  the  departments  of  government  were 
separated,  and  the  Legislature  divided  into  two  branches. 
The  House  is  immediately  elected  by  the  people,  the  Sen- 


124:  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

ate  represents  the  sovereignty  of  the  States.  The  differ- 
ence of  the  States,  in  point  of  importance  and  magnitude, 
was  an  additional  reason  for  the  two  branches.  The  pro- 
tection of  the  small  States,  against  the  ambition  and  influ- 
ence of  the  larger,  could  only  be  effected  by  arming  them 
with  equal  power  in  one  branch  of  the  Legislature.  With- 
out that  check,  the  consent  of  the  smaller  States  could  not 
have  been  obtained.  The  executive  is  separated  in  its 
functions  from  the  legisktive  as  well  as  the  nature  of 
things  would  admit.  A  radical  defect  of  the  old  system 
was,  that  it  legiskted  for  States,  not  individuals,  and  that 
its  powers  could  only  be  executed  by  military  force,  in- 
stead of  by  the  intervention  of  the  civil  magistrate.  Every 
one  acquainted  with  the  relative  situation  of  the  States, 
and  the  genius  of  our  citizens,  must  acknowledge  that,  if 
the  government  was  to  be  carried  on  by  military  force,  the 
citizens  of  America  would  be  rendered  the  most  implaca- 
ble enemies  to  one  another ;  and,  if  it  could  be  thus  carried 
into  effect  against  the  small  States,  it  could  not  be  put  in 
force  against  the  larger  and  more  powerful.  The  Conven- 
tion knew  that  all  governments,  merely  federal,  had  been 
short-lived,  or  had  existed  from  principles  extraneous  to 
their  constitution,  or  from  external  causes,  which  had  no 
dependence  on  the  nature  of  their  governments ;  therefore 
it  departed  from  that  solecism  in  politics,  the  principle  of 
legislation  for  States,  in  their  political  capacity.  The  great 
extent  of  country  appeared  a  formidable  difficulty,  but  a 
confederate  government  appears,  at  least  in  theory,  capa- 
ble of  embracing  the  various  interests  of  the  most  extensive 
territory.  There  was  a  real  difficulty  in  conciliating  a  num- 
ber of  jarring  interests,  arising  from  the  incidental,  but 
unalterable,  difference  between  the  States,  in  point  of  ter- 
ritory, situation,  climate,  and  rivalship  in  commerce.  Each, 
therefore,  amicably  and  wisely  relinquished  its  particular 
views.  I  hope  that  the  same  spirit  of  amity,  of  mutual 


THE  NORTH  CAROLINA    CONVENTION,   1788.    125 

deference,  and  concession,  to  which  the  Federal  Convention 
attributed  the  Constitution,  will  govern  the  deliberation 
and  decision  of  this  Convention." 

Taylor  returned  to  "  "We,  the  people."  He  saw  in 
these  words  an  intention  of  consolidation.  Maclaine  was 
astonished  to  hear  objections  to  the  preamble :  "  Is  not 
this  a  dispute  about  words,  without  any  meaning  what- 
ever? This  Constitution  is  a  blank  until  it  is  adopted  by 
the  people.  When  that  is  done  here,  is  it  not  the  people 
of  North  Carolina  that  do  it,  joined  with  the  people  of 
the  other  States  that  have  adopted  it  ?  The  expression, 
then,  is  right." 

Caldwell  remarked  that,  while  all  legislative  power  was 
placed  in  the  Congress,  the  Yice-President  was  associated 
with  the  legislative  power  by  his  casting  vote. 

Davie  stated  why  the  Federal  Convention  imposed  that 
duty  on  the  Yice-President.  "  The  commercial  jealousy 
between  the  Eastern  and  Southern  States  had  a  principal 
share  in  this  business.  It  might  happen,  in  important 
cases,  that  the  voices  would  be  equally  divided.  Indecision 
might  be  inconvenient,  and  dangerous  to  the  public. 
The  Yice-President,  in  consequence  of  his  election,  is  the 
creature  of  no  particular  State  or  district.  He  must  pos- 
sess the  confidence  of  the  States  in  a  very  great  degree, 
and  is  consequently  the  most  proper  person  to  decide  on 
cases  of  that  kind.  It  is  impossible  that  any  officer  could 
be  chosen  more  impartially."  Maclaine  added  that  a  pro- 
vision of  the  sort  was  to  be  found  in  all  legislative  bodies, 
was  useful,  expedient,  and  calculated  to  prevent  the  opera- 
tion of  the  government  from  being  impeded. 

Lenoir  observed  that  the  President  was  also  connected, 
to  some  extent,  with  the  legislative  powers  ;  whereupon 
Iredell  attempted  a  distinction  between  the  power  to  legis- 
late and  the  power  to  prevent  legislation.  There  are  no 
two  provisions  in  the  Constitution  more  wise  than  the 


126  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

casting  vote  of  the  Yice-President  and  the  veto  of  the 
President,  and  none  more  defensible ;  but  to  contend  that 
the  power  which  enables  something  to  become,  or  forbids 
it  to  become  law,  is  not  a  legislative  power,  is  to  juggle 
with  words.  The  impolicy  of  not  meeting  an  issue 
squarely,  was  demonstrated  on  the  next  objection;  that 
the  executive  was  blended  with  the  legislative  power,  as 
the  Senate  acted  upon  treaties.  The  answer  might  have 
been :  This  is  a  government  sui  generis.  There  is  in  it 
an  association,  to  some  extent,  of  the  legislative  and  exec- 
utive functions,  very  prudent  and  proper.  There  is  an 
agency  for  making  statutes,  and  an  agency  for  making 
treaties ;  the  functions  are  different,  if  the  persons  are  the 
same.  Instead  of  which,  a  verbal  distinction  was  drawn, 
which  did  not  satisfy  inquiry,  and  increased  suspicion. 
Upon  the  word  "  sole,"  in  the  clause  which  gives  to  the 
House  of  Representatives  the  power  of  impeachments, 
debate  was  sharp.  No  one  contended  that  the  word  was 
not  superfluous,  although  it  was  claimed  that  the  surplus- 
age could  not  injure,  as  by  the  context  it  was  plain  that 
impeachment  was  limited  to  officers  of  the  United  States. 
The  answer  in  substance  was  :  Every  unnecessary  word  in 
a  Constitution  is  dangerous;  casuistry  can  find  exercise 
enough  in  the  imperfection  of  language,  without  extrane- 
ous aid.  "Sole"  may  contain  danger.  Upon  the  Fed- 
eral regulation  of  the  time,  place,  and  manner  of  elections, 
Governor  Johnston  was  forced  to  say :  "  Although  a 
great  admirer  of  the  Constitution,  I  can  not  comprehend 
the  reason  of  this  part.  This  power  in  Congress  appears 
useless,  so  long  as  the  State  Legislatures  have  the  power 
not  to  choose  senators ;  but  I  do  not  consider  this  blemish 
in  the  Constitution  sufficient  for  rejection.  I  observe  that 
every  State,  which  has  adopted  and  recommended  altera- 
tions, has  given  directions  to  remove  this  objection." 

Spencer,  conscious  as  he  was  of  the  excellences  of  the 


TEE  NORTH  CAROLINA   CONVENTION,   1788.    127 

Constitution,  and  reluctant  to  find  fault,  could  not  consent 
to  a  provision  which  sapped  the  foundations  of  those  gov- 
ernments on  which  the  happiness  of  the  States  and  of  the 
General  Government  must  depend.  Iredell  appealed  to 
the  candor  and  moderation  of  the  last  speaker  to  consider 
the  language  in  connection  with  the  rest  of  the  instrument. 
"  Representatives  were  to  be  chosen  every  two  years ;  they 
must  be  chosen.  Whether  in  January,  March,  or  any  other 
month,  was  all  that  was  left  for  future  congressional  regu- 
lation. He  could  see  in  the  possibilities  of  a  State  Legis- 
lature being  unable  to  act  in  case  of  war,  or  in  the  combi- 
nation of  some  great  States  not  to  send  representatives, 
the  reasons  which  prompted  the  clause." 

He  was  careful  not  to  touch  upon  "  place  and  manner." 
Spencer  responded  :  "  I  only  meant  to  say  that  the  words 
are  exceedingly  vague.  They  may  admit  of  the  construc- 
tion just  given  ;  they  may  admit  of  a  contrary  construction. 
In  a  matter  of  so  great  moment,  words  ought  not  to  be  so 
vague  and  indeterminate.  No  man  wishes  for  a  Federal 
Government  more  than  I  do.  I  consider  it  necessary  to 
our  happiness ;  but  at  the  same  time  when  we  form  a  gov- 
ernment which  must  entail  happiness  or  misery  on  poster- 
ity, nothing  is  of  more  consequence  than  settling  it  so  as 
to  exclude  animosity,  and  a  contest  between  the  Federal 
and  the  individual  governments.  The  words  under  con- 
sideration are  words  of  very  great  extent,  and  so  vague  and 
uncertain  that  they  must  ultimately  destroy  the  whole  lib- 
erty of  the  United  States." 

Davie  asserted  two  reasons  for  the  existence  of  the 
clause.  If  he  was  justified  by  facts,  they  must  be  part  of 
an  unwritten  history  of  the  Federal  Convention.  The 
principal  reason  was  to  prevent  the  dissolution  of  the  Gov- 
ernment by  designing  States.  Without  this  control  in 
Congress,  the  large  States  might  successfully  combine  to 
destroy  the  Federal  Government.  Another  principal  rea- 


128  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

son  was,  that  it  would  operate  in  favor  of  the  people, 
against  the  ambitious  designs  of  the  Federal  Senate.  He 
next  inquired  as  to  the  effect  of  the  clause.  A  fundament- 
al principle  beyond  the  reach  of  the  General  or  State  gov- 
ernment is,  that  representatives  shall  be  chosen  every  two 
years ;  that  the  qualifications  of  these  electors  shall  be  the 
qualifications  of  electors  to  the  most  numerous  branch  of 
the  State  Legislature,  and  that  senators  shall  be  chosen  for 
six  years.  All  the  power  of  the  State  Legislature  is  to 
regulate  the  when,  the  where,  and  the  how;  that  was 
equally  the  power  of  Congress — no  less,  no  more. 

Bloodworth  said :  "  It  was  easy  to  mention  that  the 
control  of  Congress  should  be  exerted  when  a  State  neg- 
lected, refused,  or  was  unable,  in  case  of  invasion,  to  regu- 
late elections.  If  that  was  the  meaning,  why  was  it  not 
expressed  ?  If  more  was  meant,  that  was  a  sufficient  rea- 
son to  reject  the  Constitution.  There  seemed  to  be  a  strange 
inconsistency  in  the  arguments  adduced." 

Spencer,  willing  to  give  the  General  Government  im- 
post, excise,  and  direct  taxation,  in  case  of  war,  was  unwill- 
ing to  concede  the  latter  power  during  peace,  until  requi- 
sitions had  been  made,  neglected,  or  refused.  The  power 
of  direct  taxation  should  be  kept  as  near  to  the  people  as 
possible. 

Whitmill  Hill  remarked  that  while  the  general  wish 
was  to  empower  Congress  to  raise  all  necessary  sums,  there 
was  a  great  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  better  mode. 
Two  circumstances  might  weigh  with  the  committee :  First, 
that  the  people  of  North  Carolina  had  the  honesty  and  the 
ability  to  pay  any  reasonable  tax ;  secondly,  that  when  it 
was  once  known  to  foreign  nations  that  the  Government 
and  its  finances  were  upon  a  respectable  basis,  money  for 
any  emergency  could  be  borrowed  on  advantageous  terms. 

Governor  Johnston  denied  the  assumption  that,  under 
the  proposed  system,  the  power  of  taxation  was  taken  out 


THE  NORTH  CAROLINA    CONVENTION,   1788.    129 

of  the  hands  of  the  people :  "  Taxes  must  be  voted  by  their 
representatives.  If  there  were  danger  from  that  source, 
where  can  political  security  be  found  ?  It  is  said  that  our 
proportion  of  representation  is  small ;  then  our  proportion 
of  taxation  is  small ;  and,  unless  we  suppose  that  all  the 
members  of  Congress  will  combine  to  ruin  their  constitu- 
ents, there  can  be  no  reason  for  fear." 

Goudry  and  McDowell  disclosed  the  reasons  for  the 
overwhelming  opposition  to  the  grant  of  power  of  direct 
taxation  :  "  Some  represent  us  as  honest,  but  not  rich ; 
others  as  rich,  but  not  honest.  The  fact  is,  we  are  very 
poor,  and  not  able  to  bear  taxation  for  more  than  one  gov- 
ernment. If  there  are  two,  with  equal  right  to  tax,  one 
must  give  way.  The  tendency  of  the  Constitution  to  de- 
stroy the  State  governments  must  be  clear  to  every  man  of 
common  understanding." 

Other  clauses  were  read  without  debate,  until  that  which 
admitted  the  slave-trade  was  reached. 

McDowell  asked  the  reasons  of  the  Federal  Convention 
for  that  exception. 

Spraight  answered  that  it  was  the  result  of  a  compro- 
mise between  the  Eastern  and  the  Southern  States.  South 
Carolina  and  Georgia  had  lost  a  great  many  slaves  during 
the  war,  and  wished  to  supply  the  loss.  As  North  Carolina 
had  not  passed  any  law  to  prohibit  the  importation  of  ne- 
groes, her  delegates  had  not  felt  authorized  to  contend  for 
an  immediate  prohibition  of  it. 

By  both  sides  the  utmost  repugnance  was  manifested 
to  the  clause.  The  Convention  only  yielded  its  detesta- 
tion, to  the  reasoning  of  Iredell,  that  the  Constitution  really 
presented  the  only  means,  so  far  as  Americans  were  con- 
cerned, of  terminating  an  odious  traffic.  On  the  subject 
of  slavery  itself,  the  sentiment  of  North  Carolina  and  Vir- 
ginia appears  to  have  been  identical.  Two  difficulties  stood 
in  the  way  of  manumission :  a  right  of  property,  which 


130  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

had  been  universally  recognized  up  to  that  period,  and  a 
repugnance  of  race.  Perhaps  both  were  never  more  clearly 
and  calmly  stated  than  in  this  discussion,  by  Galloway. 
After  expressing  his  horror  of  an  "  abominable  traffic,"  he 
continued :  "  With  respect  to  the  abolition  of  slavery,  it 
requires  the  utmost  consideration.  The  property  of  the 
Southern  States  is  principally  in  slaves ;  if  slavery  is  done 
away  with,  this  property  will  be  destroyed.  If  we  must 
manumit  our  slaves,  to  what  country  shall  we  send  them  ? 
It  is  impossible  for  us  to  be  happy,  if,  after  manumission, 
they  are  to  stay  among  us."  The  aversion  of  race  is  to 
some  extent  cruel,  and  to  some  extent  silly,  but  it  is  not  a 
mere  prejudice ;  it  has  some  reason  in  the  nature  of  things. 

The  clause  which  vested  executive  power  having  been 
read,  and  no  observation  made,  Davie  expressed  "  surprise 
at  the  silence  and  gloomy  jealousy  of  the  opposition. 
Out-of-doors,  no  feature  of  the  Constitution  had  met 
with  such  violent,  indeed,  virulent  censure." 

Taylor  thought  that,  even  if  the  Convention  possessed 
the  power  to  amend  the  Constitution,  every  part  need  not 
be  discussed,  as  some  were  not  objectionable ;  his  objec- 
tion was  to  the  power  of  Congress  to  determine  the  time 
of  choosing  the  electors  and  the  day  on  which  they  should 
give  their  votes.  His  meaning,  in  the  objection  "that 
everything  which  could  be,  should  be,  definitely  fixed, 
beyond  the  future  passions  of  men,"  was  mistaken  for  con- 
cern as  to  a  detail,  not  as  to  a  principle. 

The  answers,  with  justice,  sustained  the  detail,  but  did 
not  touch  the  scruple.  Upon  the  association  of  the  Sen- 
ate with  the  President,  in  treaty-making  and  appointment 
to  office,  Spencer  detailed  the  grounds  of  opposition,  which, 
if  neither  accepted  nor  acceptable,  were  based  upon  a 
careful  study  of  political  science :  "  It  is  an  essential 
article  in  our  Constitution  that  the  executive,  the  legisla- 
tive, and  the  supreme  judicial  powers  of  government 


THE  NORTH  CAROLINA   CONVENTION,   1788.    131 

ought  to  be  forever  separate  and  distinct  from  each  other. 
The  Senate,  in  the  proposed  plan,  are  possessed  of  legis- 
lative power  in  conjunction  with  the  House.  They  are 
possessed  of  the  sole  power  of  trying  impeachments,  and 
by  this  clause,  in  effect,  they  possess  the  chief  executive 
power.  They  form  treaties  which  are  to  be  the  law  of  the 
land.  They  control  the  appointment,  practically,  of  all 
the  officers  of  the  United  States.  The  President  may 
nominate,  but  they  have  a  negative  upon  his  nomination. 
He  will  be  obliged,  finally,  to  acquiesce  in  the  appoint- 
ment of  those  whom  in  reality  the  Senate  will  nominate, 
or  else  no  appointment  will  be  made.  Hence,  it  is  easy  to 
perceive  that  the  President,  in  order  to  do  any  business,  or 
to  answer  any  purpose  in  this  department  of  his  office,  and 
to  keep  himself  out  of  perpetual  hot  water,  will  be  under 
a  necessity  to  form  a  connection  with  that  powerful  body, 
and  be  contented  to  put  himself  at  the  head  of  the  leading 
members  who  compose  it.  I  do  not  expect,  at  this  day, 
that  the  outline  and  organization  of  the  proposed  govern- 
ment will  be  materially  changed,  but  it  would  have  been 
infinitely  better,  and  more  secure,  if  the  President  had 
been  provided  with  a  Standing  Council,  composed  of  a 
member  from  each  State,  whose  term  of  office  might  have 
been  the  same  as  his  own.  Two  very  important  conse- 
quences would  result,  which  can  not  result  from  the  pres- 
ent plan.  The  first,  that  the  executive  department,  being 
separate  and  distinct,  the  President  and  his  Council,  any 
or  either,  would  be  amenable  to  the  justice  of  the  land. 
As  it  is,  I  do  not  conceive  that  the  President  can  even  be 
tried  by  the  Senate,  with  any  effect,  or  to  any  purpose,  for 
any  misdemeanor  in  office,  unless  it  should  extend  to  high 
treason,  or  unless  they  should  wish  to  fix  the  odium  of  any 
measure  upon  him,  in  order  to  exculpate  themselves. 
The  other  important  consequence  is,  that  the  President 
would  have  an  independence  which  he  does  not  have  in 


132  SEVEN  CON  VENTIONS. 

this  plan.  If  no  other  argument  for  a  council  could  be 
urged,  the  diminution  of  the  power  of  the  Senate  would  be 
sufficient."  Davie  admitted  "  that  a  total  separation  of  the 
branches  of  government  was  desirable,  but  it  has  never 
been  found  entirely  practicable.  So  far  as  it  was  departed 
from  in  this  system,  the  causes  would  be  found  in  the  ex- 
treme jealousy  of  executive  power  in  the  American  mind, 
and  the  difference  in  size,  wealth,  and  population  of  the 
States.  The  smaller  States  had  a  disproportionate  influ- 
ence in  the  government,  which  they  insisted  was  necessary 
to  their  safety.  That  influence  is  exerted  in  the  Senate. 
The  difficulty  could  not  be  got  over.  It  arose  from  the 
unalterable  nature  of  things.  Upon  some  subjects  the 
smaller  States  would  not  agree  that  the  House  should  have 
a  voice,  and  upon  the  same  subject  none  of  the  States 
would  agree  that  the  President  should  have  an  exclusive 
voice.  Not  only  the  present  distribution  of  power  is  good 
in  itself,  but  no  one  can  suggest  a  better.  A  council 
would  be  open  to  every  objection  that  can  be  urged  against 
the  Senate,  and  to  other  objections  which  can  not  be  urged 
against  the  Senate.  The  Senate  represents  the  Federal 
principle  of  the  government  and  is  the  safeguard  against 
consolidation.  Its  great  power  is  commensurate  with  its 
functions."  Iredell  added  :  "  God  forbid  that  in  any  coun- 
try a  man  should  be  punished  for  want  of  judgment! 
For  errors  of  the  heart,  should  any  be  committed  here, 
there  is  a  ready  way  to  punishment.  That  is  a  responsi- 
bility which  answers  every  purpose  a  people  jealous  of 
their  liberties  can  ask.  Parties  must  exist,  and  may  be 
bitter ;  the  malignity  of  party  will  interpret  difference  of 
opinion,  as  deliberate  wickedness." 

Upon  the  judiciary  clause,  debate  was  not  conducive  to 
harmony.  Davie  urged  the  undeniable  political  truth  that 
the  judicial  must  be  coextensive  with  the  legislative  power. 
The  proposition  was  not  denied;  the  contention  turned 


THE  NORTH  CAROLINA    CONVENTION,   1788.    133 

upon  the  point  whether  the  judicial  was  not,  or  might  not, 
become  more  extensive,  and  the  Constitution  become  judge- 
made,  not  convention-made.  The  object  of  a  Constitution 
being  to  fix  the  meum  and  tuum  between  the  States,  and 
between  the  General  Government  and  the  States,  the  judi- 
ciary, it  was  conceded,  might  be  qualified  and  trusted  to 
decide  whether  either  was  invaded,  but  not  to  determine 
whether  the  meum  and  tuum  had  been  properly  parti- 
tioned. This  course  of  reasoning  led,  naturally,  to  the 
consideration  of  the  necessity  for  a  Bill  of  Rights.  Davie 
and  others  insisted  that,  though  necessary  in  a  monarchy, 
it  was  unnecessary  in  such  a  government,  the  Constitution 
itself  being  a  Bill  of  Rights,  as  it  excluded  whatever  was 
not  included. 

Spencer  answered :  "  It  is  said  that  what  is  not  given 
up  to  the  United  States  will  be  retained  by  the  individual 
States.  I  know  it  ought  to  be  so,  and  should  be  under- 
stood so,  but  it  is  not  declared,  as  it  was  in  the  Confedera- 
tion. What  is  not  declared  is  apt  to  be  overlooked.  The  lan- 
guage in  the  Articles  of  Confederation  was  the  equivalent 
of  a  Bill  of  Rights." 

Iredell  asked  "  what  more  could  be  necessary  when  the 
people  declare  how  much  they  give.  The  Constitution 
may  be  considered  as  a  great  power  of  attorney.  If  we 
had  formed  a  general  Legislature,  with  undefined  powers, 
a  Bill  of  Rights  would  have  been  not  only  proper,  but  ne- 
cessary, to  operate  exceptions  to  the  legislative  authority." 
Spencer's  belief  that  what  is  generally  understood  ought 
to  be  distinctly  stated,  seems  to  be  approved  by  events. 
Had  the  friends  of  the  Constitution  embodied  in  it,  or  in 
an  amendment,  the  declarations  they  made  in  conventions, 
the  epithets  of  their  posterity  might  have  been  differently 
distributed.  The  omission  of  mention  of  a  jury  in  civil 
cases,  while  specified  in  criminal  cases,  excited  great  alarm. 

Iredell  stated  the  cause  of  the  omission :   "  Let  any 


134:  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

gentleman  consider  the  difficulties  in  which  the  Federal 
Convention  was  placed.  A  Union  was  absolutely  necessary. 
Everything  could  be  agreed  upon  except  the  regulation  of 
the  trial  by  jury  in  civil  cases.  All  were  anxious  to  estab- 
lish it  on  the  best  footing,  but  found  that  they  could  fix 
upon  no  permanent  rule  that  was  not  liable  to  great  objec- 
tions and  difficulties.  If  the  delegates  could  not  agree 
among  themselves,  they  had  still  less  reason  to  believe  that 
all  the  States  would  have  unanimously  agreed  to  any  one 
plan  that  could  be  proposed.  They  therefore  thought  it 
better  to  leave  the  regulations  to  the  Legislature.  It  has 
been  said  that  the  objection  might  have  been  obviated  by 
the  addition  of  five  or  six  lines.  If,  by  the  addition  of  five 
or  six  hundred  lines,  this  invaluable  object  could  have  been 
secured,  I  should  have  thought  the  Convention  criminal  in 
omitting  it." 

Among  the  amendments  to  the  Constitution,  a  few 
lines  dissipated  doubts  and  dispelled  fears  upon  that  point. 

Iredell  expkined  the  reasons  for  the  "  fugitive-slave  " 
clause  :  "  Some  of  the  Northern  States  have  emancipated 
their  slaves.  If  any  of  our  slaves  go  there,  and  remain  a 
certain  time,  they  would,  under  present  laws,  be  entitled 
to  their  freedom,  so  that  their  masters  could  not  get  them 
again,  to  prevent  which  this  clause  is  inserted."  The  rea- 
sons for  the  prohibition  to  the  States,  of  issuing  paper 
money,  and  making  anything,  save  gold  and  silver,  a  legal 
tender,  were  asked  of  those  members  who  had  been  dele- 
gates to  the  Federal  Convention.  The  answer  was :  "  Mis- 
chief had  been  done,  it  could  not  be  repaired,  but  some 
limitations  to  that  great  political  evil  had  to  be  formed. 
The  people  of  Massachusetts  and  Connecticut  had  been 
great  sufferers  by  the  dishonesty  of  Rhode  Island,  and 
similar  complaints  existed  against  this  State.  The  clause 
became,  in  some  measure,  a  preliminary,  with  the  delegates 
who  represented  the  other  States.  '  You  have,'  said  they, 


THE  NORTH  CAROLINA    CONVENTION,   1788.    135 

'  by  your  iniquitous  laws,  and  paper  emissions,  shamefully 
defrauded  our  citizens.  The  Confederation  prevented  our 
compelling  you  to  do  them  justice ;  but,  before  we  con- 
federate with  you  again,  you  must  not  only  agree  to  be 
honest,  but  put  it  out  of  your  power  to  be  dishonest.' " 

Galloway  asked  if  the  inhibition  on  a  State  to  pass  a 
law  impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts  applied  to  the 
public  securities  of  a  State.  Davie  answered :  "  In  no  part 
of  the  Constitution  is  power  vested  to  interfere  with  the 
public  securities  of  a  State.  The  clause  refers  to  contracts 
between  individuals." 

Abbot  wished  to  know,  as  treaties  were  to  become  the 
supreme  law  of  the  land,  whether  a  treaty  could  engage 
to  some  particular  religion,  and  also,  as  no  religious  test 
was  required,  whether,  in  the  oath  to  support  the  Constitu- 
tion, Juno,  Minerva,  or  Pluto,  might  not  be  the  deities  in- 
voked. 

Iredell  answered,  "The  question  has  also  been  asked 
whether  the  Pope  may  not  be  elected  President."  With 
polite  circumlocution,  he  suggested  that  the  assumption  of 
sanity,  as  the  normal  condition  of  mankind,  was  the  only 
possible  answer  to  some  questions.  "  The  absence  of  any 
religious  test  was  the  glory  of  the  Constitution.  Men  are 
left  to  believe  as  they  can ;  admit  the  least  difference,  and 
the  door  is  opened  to  persecution.  Whatever  form  binds 
the  conscience,  is  the  essence  of  an  oath."  Abbot  further 
asked  the  import  of  the  guarantee  of  a  republican  form  of 
government. 

Iredell  replied,  "With  thirteen  States,  confederated 
upon  a  republican  principle,  it  was  essential  to  the  har- 
mony and  existence  of  the  Confederacy,  that  each  should 
have  a  republican  government,  and  that  no  one  should 
have  a  right  to  establish  a  monarchy  or  an  aristocracy." 

The  reading  of  the  Constitution  finished,  the  question 
next  in  order  was,  What  will  be  the  relation  of  North 


136  SEVEN   CONVENTIONS. 

Carolina  to  the  other  States,  if  she  refuses  to  adopt? 
"  She  will  be  a  foreign  State,"  said  Davie,  "  and  can  com- 
municate with  the  United  States  only  through  embassa- 
dors."  "  What  then,"  it  was  asked,  "  becomes  of  the  faith 
plighted  by  the  Articles  of  Confederation  ?  If  some 
States  can  absolve  themselves  at  will  from  the  obligations 
of  those,  why  not  from  the  obligations  of  the  Constitu- 
tion." .  In  the  Federal  Convention  the  same  inquiry  had 
been  made :  "  If  nine  States  can  withdraw  from  thirteen, 
why  not  six  from  nine,  four  from  six?"  Answer  was 
avoided  there,  but  not  in  the  Convention  of  North  Caro- 
lina. 

"  The  great  principle,"  said  Iredell,  "  the  fundamental 
principle  upon  which  our  government  is  founded,  is  the 
safety  of  the  people.  For  their  welfare  government  is 
instituted,  and  this  ought  to  be  its  object,  whatever  its 
form.  Our  governments  have  clearly  been  created  by  the 
people  themselves  ;  the  same  authority  that  created  can 
destroy,  and  the  people  may  undoubtedly  change  the  gov- 
ernment, not  because  it  is  ill-exercised,  but  because  they 
conceive  that  another  form  will  be  more  conducive  to 
their  welfare.  It  is  suggested  that,  though  ten  States 
have  adopted  the  Constitution,  they  had  no  right  to  dis- 
solve the  old  Confederation,  that  the  Articles  still  subsist, 
and  the  old  Union  remains,  of  which  we  are  a  part.  That 
this  is  true  may  well  be  doubted.  All  writers  agree  that, 
if  the  principles  of  a  Constitution  are  violated,  the  Consti- 
tution itself  is  dissolved,  or  may  be,  at  the  pleasure  of  the 
parties  to  it.  The  principles  of  the  Confederation  have 
not  seldom  been  violated,  and  North  Carolina,  as  well  as 
others,  has  been  an  offender.  This  Constitution  is  pro- 
posed to  the  thirteen  States.  The  desire  was,  that  all 
should  agree ;  but,  if  not,  care  was  taken  that  at  least  nine 
might  save  themselves  from  destruction." 

Davie  took  other  ground  :  "  It  is  said  that  it  is  a  rule 


THE  NORTH  CAROLINA    CONVENTION,   1788.    137 

of  law  that  the  same  solemnities  are  necessary  to  annul  as 
were  necessary  to  create  or  establish  a  compact ;  and  that, 
as  thirteen  States  created,  so  thirteen  States  must  concur 
in  the  dissolution  of  the  Confederacy.  This  may  be  the 
talk  of  a  lawyer  or  a  judge,  but  is  not  the  talk  of  a  poli- 
tician. Every  man  of  common  sense  knows  that  political 
power  is  political  right.  In  every  republican  community, 
whether  confederated  or  separate,  a  majority  binds  the 
minority.*  The  voice  of  the  majority  of  the  people  of 
America  gave  the  Confederation  validity;  the  same  au- 
thority can  and  will  annul  it.  Adoption  places  us  in  the 
Union  ;  rejection  extinguishes  the  right." 

If  Iredell  was  right,  the  claimants  under  the  Articles 
of  Confederation  had  no  cause  of  complaint ;  if  Davie 
was  right,  it  made  no  difference  if  they  had,  and  therefore 
both,  with  Johnston,  urged  adoption  by  arguments  which 
reason  could  not  answer.  "  You  will,  you  admit,  be  satis- 
fied with  this  Constitution  if  amended ;  adopt,  and  your 
strength,  added  to  that  of  those  States,  eager  for  the  same 
amendments,  can  carry  them ;  reject,  and  your  weakness 
will  count  against  you,  in  place  of  your  strength  counting 
for  you.  Adopt,  and  you  can  help  shape  the  new  govern- 
ment and  share  in  the  feast ;  reject  now,  and  when  you 
adopt,  as  you  eventually  must,  you  will  have  to  accept  the 
shaping  of  others,  and  find  only  the  crumbs." 

Upon  the  motion  to  ratify,  the  yeas  were  84,  and  the 

*  Pennsylvania  is  an  illustration.  The  charter  of  that  colony  reserved  to 
Great  Britain  the  right  of  taxation.  Her  claims  to  independence  could  not, 
therefore,  have  been  based  upon  an  invasion  of  charter  liberties,  that  usurpa- 
tion of  an  unwarranted  jurisdiction  denounced  by  the  other  colonies,  but  must 
have  rested  upon  an  inherent  right  in  one  community,  upon  its  judgment  of 
the  necessity  to  renounce  a  political  connection  with  another.  Two  speeches 
of  great  ability,  made  in  her  Convention,  in  advocacy  of  ratification  of  the 
Constitution,  exist,  though  other  record  of  debate  is  lost.  Neither  recog- 
nizes any  obligation  of  faith  under  the  Articles  of  Confederation,  and  they 
differ  as  to  the  character  and  effect  of  the  instrument  they  recommend. 


138  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

nays  184.  Upon  the  motion  neither  to  adopt  nor  reject, 
the  yeas  were  184,  and  the  nays  84.  By  the  same  vote 
any  impost  passed  by  the  United  States  was  recommended 
to  be  passed  by  the  Legislature  of  North  Carolina,  the 
proceeds  to  be  held  at  the  disposition  of  Congress. 

The  motive  of  the  majority,  if  surmise  be  permissible, 
was  to  serve  the  desire  for  amendments,  the  difference  of 
opinion  between  the  majority  and  minority  being  as  to 
whether  such  service  would  be  more  efficient  by  presence 
in,  or  absence  from,  the  councils  of  the  new  Union. 

At  the  first  session  of  Congress,  held  in  the  city  of  New 
York,  4th  of  March,  1789,  twelve  amendments  were  pro- 
posed to  the  Legislatures  of  the  States,  of  which  ten  were 
adopted.  On  the  llth  of  January,  1T90,  the  President 
communicated  to  both  Houses  of  Congress  the  ratification 
of  the  Constitution  by  North  Carolina. 


THE  SOUTH  CAROLINA  CONVENTION, 

1788. 

THE  debates  in  the  Convention  of  South  Carolina  are 
said  to  have  been  distinguished  by  the  ability  with  which 
ratification  was  advocated  and  opposed,  but  no  report  of 
them  is  extant.  A  fragment  remains ;  from  that,  from  the 
vote  upon  the  question,  and  from  the  debate  in  the  Legis- 
lature, upon  the  motion  for  the  call  of  a  convention,  some 
knowledge  may  be  acquired  of  those  who  favored  and  those 
who  opposed  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  and  some 
conception  of  the  reasoning  upon  which  their  action  was 
based.  What,  in  later  years,  was  termed  "  the  slave  power," 
the  professions,  and  the  commercial  class,  as  a  general  rule, 
were  passionate  adorers  of  the  Constitution  ;  the  yeomanry 
of  the  upper  parishes  were  obdurate  skeptics.  As  in  other 
States,  favor  and  disfavor  seem  to  have  been  largely  local. 

In  the  House  of  Representatives  of  the  State  of  South 
Carolina,  upon  the  motion  for  the  call  of  a  State  Conven- 
tion, after  the  Constitution  had  been  read,  Charles  Pinck- 
ney,  a  delegate  to  the  Federal  Convention,  opened  the 
debate,  by  enumerating  the  causes  which  led  to  that  Con- 
vention, and  by  stating  that,  when  it  met,  the  first  question 
in  the  view  of  almost  every  member  was,  "  Shall  the  old 
plan  be  amended,  or  a  new  one  devised  ? "  "  Conscious  that 
the  Confederation,  though  possessing  the  outlines  of  a  good 
government,  was,  strictly  speaking,  a  league  destitute  of 
the  elements  of  permanency  and  coercive  operation,  the 
Convention  felt  the  necessity  of  establishing  a  government 


140  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

which,  instead  of  requiring  the  intervention  of  thirteen 
Legislatures  between  demand  and  compliance,  operated 
upon  the  people  in  the  first  instance.  Upon  that  point 
the  members  did  not  differ,  however  much  they  differed 
upon  the  question  of  power.  Upon  the  distribution  of 
influence,  in  a  system  possessing  extensive  national  authori- 
ties, the  compromise  between  the  larger  and  the  smaller 
States,  though  originally  opposed  by  him,  seemed  far 
from  injudicious.  The  judiciary,  under  wise  manage- 
ment, would  be  the  key-stone  of  the  arch,  for  in  peace 
more  depended  upon  the  integrity  and  energy  of  the  ju- 
diciary than  upon  any  other  branch  of  the  government. 
The  Executive  was  not  constructed  upon  a  principle  as 
firm  and  permanent  as  he  could  wish,  but  as  much  so  as 
the  genius  and  temper  of  the  people  would  permit.  As 
commander-in-chief  of  the  land  and  naval  forces,  he  could 
neither  raise  nor  support  them  by  his  authority,  and  his 
negative  upon  laws  could  be  overridden.  He  could  not 
make  a  treaty,  nor  appoint  to  office,  without  the  concur- 
rence of  a  Senate,  in  which  the  States  had  each  an  equal 
voice.  In  a  Union  so  extensive  as  this  would  be,  composed 
of  so  many  State  governments,  inhabited  by  a  people  char- 
acterized, as  our  citizens  are,  by  an  impatience  of  any  act 
which  looks  like  an  infringement  of  their  rights,  an  inva- 
sion of  them  by  the  Federal  head  appeared  the  most  remote 
of  all  public  dangers.  To  what  limits  a  republic  of  States 
may  extend,  how  far  it  may  be  capable  of  uniting  the  lib- 
erty of  a  small  commonwealth  with  the  safety  of  a  peace- 
ful empire,  whether  among  the  co-ordinate  powers  dis- 
sensions and  jealousies  may  not  arise,  which,  for  the  want 
of  a  common  superior,  will  proceed  to  fatal  extremities, 
were  questions  upon  which  the  example  of  any  nation  did 
not  authorize  decision.  It  was  an  experiment  admittedly, 
but  an  experiment  which  could  be  made  upon  a  scale  so 
extensive,  and  under  circumstances  so  promising,  as  to  be 


THE  SOUTH  CAROLINA   CONVENTION,  1788.    141 

the  fairest  in  favor  of  human  nature,  and  its  firm  estab- 
lishment better  calculated  to  answer  the  great  ends  of 
public  happiness  than  any  ever  yet  devised."  In  his  ad- 
dress to  the  Convention,  Pinckney  gave  wider  scope  to  his 
reasoning :  "  The  first  knowledge  necessary  to  be  acquired 
is  that  of  a  people  for  whom  a  system  is  to  be  formed,  for, 
unless  acquainted  with  their  situation,  their  habits,  opin- 
ions, and  resources,  it  would  be  impossible  to  frame  a  gov- 
ernment upon  adequate  or  practicable  principles.  None 
of  the  distinctions  of  rank  which  exist  in  Europe  do,  or,  in 
all  probability,  ever  will,  exist  in  the  Union.  The  only 
distinction  which  may  take  place  is  that  of  wealth.  Riches, 
no  doubt,  will  have  their  influence ;  and,  when  suffered  to 
increase  to  large  amounts  in  a  few  hands,  may  become  dan- 
gerous, particularly  when,  from  the  cheapness  of  labor  and 
the  scarcity  of  money,  a  great  proportion  of  the  people  are 
poor.  That  danger  is  very  little  to  be  apprehended  for 
two  reasons — the  destruction  of  the  right  of  primogeni- 
ture, and  the  nearly  equal  division  of  landed  property  in 
the  Eastern  and  Northern  States.  Few  have  large,  and 
few  have  not  small  tracts.  The  greater  part  of  the 
people  are  employed  in  cultivating  their  own  lands,  the 
rest  in  handicraft  and  commerce.  Plain  tables,  clothing, 
and  furniture  prevail  in  their  houses,  and  expensive  ap- 
pearances are  avoided.  Among  the  landed  interest  few 
are  rich,  and  few  are  very  poor,  nor,  while  the  States  are 
capable  of  supporting  so  many  more  inhabitants  than  they 
contain  at  present,  while  so  vast  a  territory  on  our  frontier 
remains  uncultivated  and  unexplored,  while  the  means  of 
subsistence  are  so  much  within  every  man's  power,  are  those 
dangerous  distinctions  of  fortune,  prevalent  in  other  coun- 
tries, to  be  expected.  The  people  of  the  Union  may  be 
classed  as  follows :  Commercial  men,  who  will  be  of  con- 
sequence, or  not,  in  the  political  scale,  as  commerce  may 
be  an  object  of  the  attention  of  the  Government.  Presum- 


14:2  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

ing  that  proper  sentiments  upon  that  subject  will  ultimately 
prevail,  it  does  not  appear  that  the  commercial  line  will 
ever  have  much  influence  in  the  politics  of  the  Union. 
Foreign  trade  is  one  of  those  enemies  to  be  extremely 
guarded  against,  more  so  than  any  other,  as  none  will  have 
a  more  unfavorable  operation ;  it  is  the  root  of  the  present 
distress,  the  source  from  which  future  national  calamities 
will  grow,  unless  great  care  is  taken  to  prevent  it.  Divided 
as  we  are  from  the  Old  World,  we  should  have  nothing  to 
do  with  its  politics,  and  as  little  as  possible  with  its  com- 
merce ;  it  can  never  improve,  but  must  inevitably  corrupt 
us.  Another  class  is  that  of  professional  men,  who,  from 
their  education  and  pursuits,  must  and  will  have  consider- 
able influence,  while  government  retains  the  republican 
principle,  and  its  affairs  are  regulated  in  assemblies  of  the 
people.  The  third  class,  with  which  may  be  connected  the 
mechanical  interest,  is  the  landed  interest ;  the  owners  and 
cultivators  of  the  soil,  the  men  attached  to  the  truest  inter- 
est of  their  country,  from  those  motives  that  always  bind 
and  secure  the  affections  of  a  nation.  Here  rests,  and  it 
is  to  be  hoped  will  always  continue  to  rest,  all  the  authority 
of  the  Government.  Fortunately  for  their  harmony,  these 
classes  are  connected  with  and  dependent  on  each  other ; 
from  which  mutual  dependence,  mediocrity  of  fortune  is 
the  leading  feature  in  our  national  character.  Another 
distinguishing  feature  of  the  Union  is  its  division  into  in- 
dividual States,  differing  in  extent  of  territory,  manners, 
products,  and  population.  Those  acquainted  with  the 
Eastern  States,  the  reasons  of  their  migration,  and  their 
pursuits,  habits,  and  principles,  know  that  they  are  essen- 
tially different  from  those  of  the  Middle  and  Southern 
States;  that  they  retain  all  those  opinions  respecting 
government  and  religion  which  first  induced  their  ances- 
tors to  cross  the  Atlantic;  and  that  they  are  perhaps 
more  purely  republican  in  habits  and  sentiments  than  any 


THE  SOUTH  CAROLINA    CONVENTION,  1788.     143 

other  part  of  the  Union.  The  inhabitants  of  New  York, 
and  the  eastern  part  of  New  Jersey,  originally  Dutch  set- 
tlements, seem  to  have  altered  less  than  might  have  been 
expected  in  the  course  of  a  century ;  indeed,  the  greater 
part  of  New  York  may  still  be  considered  a  Dutch  settle- 
ment, the  people  in  the  interior  generally  using  the  Dutch 
language  in  their  families,  and  having  little  varied  from 
their  ancient  customs.  Pennsylvania  and  Delaware  are 
nearly  one  half  inhabited  by  Quakers,  whose  passive  prin- 
ciples upon  the  governmental  questions,  and  rigid  opinions 
upon  the  personal,  render  them  extremely  different  from 
the  citizens  of  the  Eastern  and  Southern  States.  Maryland 
was  originally  a  Roman  Catholic  colony ;  a  great  number 
of  its  inhabitants,  among  whom  some  of  the  most  wealthy 
and  cultivated,  still  profess  that  faith.  A  striking  differ- 
ence must  always  exist  between  the  Independents  of  the 
East,  the  Calvinists  and  Quakers  of  the  Middle  States,  and 
the  Roman  Catholics  of  Maryland ;  but  that  is  not  to  be 
compared  with  the  difference  between  the  inhabitants  of 
the  Northern  and  Southern  States  ;  by  Southern  and  North- 
ern, meaning  Maryland  and  the  States  south  of  her,  and, 
by  Northern,  the  others.  Nature  has  drawn  as  strong 
marks  of  distinction  in  the  habits  and  manners  of  the  peo- 
ple as  in  their  climates  and  productions.  The  Southern 
citizen  beholds,  with  a  kind  of  surprise,  the  simple  man- 
ners of  the  East,  and  is  often  induced  to  entertain  unde- 
served opinions  of  the  apparent  purity  of  the  Quakers; 
while  they,  in  turn,  seem  concerned  at  what  they  term  the 
extravagance  and  dissipation  of  their  Southern  brethren, 
and  reprobate,  as  an  unpardonable  moral  and  political  evil, 
the  dominion  held  over  a  part  of  the  human  race."  Prem- 
ising that  systems  and  laws  have  a  powerful  effect  upon 
manners,  and  that  all  the  States  had  adhered  to  the  repub- 
lican principle,  though  differing  as  to  the  best  mode  of 
preserving  it,  he  passed  in  review  the  Constitutions  of  the 


144  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

several  States,  giving  the  palm  to  New  York.  Turning  to 
antiquity,  he  claimed  that  from  its  history  instruction  could 
not  be  drawn,  because  little  of  it  was  accurately  known, 
and  that  little  showed  that  representation,  the  fundamental 
of  a  republic,  had  not  been  practiced.  In  the  modern 
world  there  had  been,  in  no  sense  of  the  word,  a  confeder- 
ated republic;  and  he  analyzed  the  systems  which  bore 
some  resemblance  to  the  one  proposed,  and  distinguished 
their  non-conformity.  He  then  examined  the  three  simple 
systems  of  government — monarchy,  oligarchy,  and  democ- 
racy— exhibited  their  advantages  and  disadvantages,  and 
claimed  that  the  Constitution  embodied  all  the  good,  and 
eliminated  all  the  bad,  of  each.  Moreover,  if  a  republic 
did  not  exclude  dissensions  and  tumults,  they  must  be  less 
dangerous  in  large  confederated  states  than  in  small  societies. 
To  return  to  the  debate  in  the  Legislature.  Judge 
Pendleton  said  that  "  ministers  in  England  might  be  im- 
peached for  advising  illegal  measures.  How  could  the 
Senate  be  punished,  before  what  tribunal  arraigned,  and  if 
the  President  were  impeached  for  making  a  bad  treaty, 
must  he  not  be  sheltered  by  the  consent  of  the  Senate  ? " 
General  C.  C.  Pinckney  answered :  "  That  question  unveils 
one  of  the  geatest  difficulties  in  framing  the  Constitution. 
The  treaty-making  power  must  be  placed  somewhere,  and 
might  be  placed  in  three  depositories  ;  to  each  there  were 
objections,  therefore  the  least  liable  to  objection  was  se- 
lected. As  the  Senate  was  not  a  permanent  body,  senators 
might  be  tried  by  succeeding  senators."  Mr.  Lowndes 
suggested  that  "as  treaties  became  the  law  of  the  land,  the 
President  and  two  thirds  of  the  Senate  were  absolute." 
Mr.  Pringle  interposed  a  distinction  between  the  power  to 
make  law  through  treaties  and  a  general  legislative  power. 
Mr.  Lowndes  continued :  "  If  this  Constitution  is  adopted, 
the  sun  of  the  Southern  States  will  set,  never  to  rise.  Ex- 
clusive of  Rhode  Island,  six  of  the  Eastern  States  formed  a 


THE  SOUTH  CAROLINA    CONVENTION,  1788.    145 

majority  in  the  House.  Is  it  consonant  with  reason,  with 
wisdom,  or  with  policy,  to  suppose  that,  in  a  Legislature 
where  a  majority  has  different  interests  from  a  minority, 
the  minority  has  the  smallest  chance  of  gaining  ade- 
quate advantages  ?  Our  delegates,  undoubtedly,  did  all  in 
their  power  to  procure  a  proportionate  share  in  this  new 
government,  but  the  little  they  had  gained  proved  what 
may  be  expected  in  the  future.  The  interest  of  the  North- 
ern States  will  so  predominate  as  to  divest  this  State  of 
any  pretensions  to  the  title  of  a  republic.  What  cause  was 
there  of  jealousy  for  the  importation  of  negroes?  That 
trade  can  be  justified  on  the  principles  of  religion,  humani- 
ty, and  justice ;  for  to  translate  a  set  of  human  beings  from 
a  bad  country  to  a  better  was  fulfilling  every  part  of  those 
principles."  Mr.  Rutledge  answered  :  "  We  have  our  full 
share  of  the  House ;  fears  of  the  Northern  interest,  at  all 
times  prevailing,  are  unfounded,  for  several  of  the  North- 
ern States  are  already  full  of  people,  and  the  migrations  to 
the  South  are  great.  We  shall,  in  a  few  years,  rise  high 
in  our  representation,  while  their  States  will  keep  their 
present  position." 

General  Pinckney,  in  answer  to  Mr.  Lowndes,  who  had 
reiterated  that  all  the  advantages  which  captivated  gentle- 
men were  small  in  proportion  to  the  evils  to  be  appre- 
hended from  a  majority,  governed  by  ideas  and  prejudices 
differing  extremely  from  theirs,  spoke  more  fully  :  "  Every 
member  who  attended  the  Convention  was,  from  the  begin- 
ning, sensible  of  the  necessity  of  giving  greater  powers  to 
the  Federal  Government.  As  we  found  it  necessary  to 
give  it  very  extensive  powers  over  the  persons  and  estates 
of  citizens,  we  thought  it  right  to  draw  one  branch  of  the 
Legislature  immediately  from  the  people,  and  that  both 
wealth  and  numbers  should  be  considered  in  representa- 
tion. We  were  at  a  loss  for  some  time  for  a  rule  to  ascer- 
tain the  proportionate  wealth  of  the  States.  At  last  we 
7 


14:6  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

thought  that  the  productive  labor  of  the  inhabitants  was 
the  best  rule.  In  conformity  to  this  rule,  joined  to  a  spirit 
of  concession,  we  determined  that  representatives  should 
be  apportioned  among  the  several  States,  by  adding  to  the 
whole  number  of  free  persons  three  fifths  of  the  slaves. 
We  thus  obtained  a  representation  for  our  property,  and  I 
did  not  expect  we  conceded  too  much  to  the  Eastern  States, 
when  they  allowed  us  a  representation  for  a  species  of  prop- 
erty which  they  have  not  among  them.  The  numbers  in 
the  different  States,  according  to  the  most  accurate  accounts 
we  could  obtain,  were : 

New  Hampshire 102,000 

Massachusetts 360,000 

Rhode  Island 58,000 

Connecticut 202,000 

New  York 233,000 

New  Jersey 130,000 

Pennsylvania 360,000 

Delaware 37,000 

Maryland,  including  f  80,000  negroes 218,000 

Virginia,  including  f  280,000  negroes 420,000 

North  Carolina,  including  f  60,000  negroes 200,000 

South  Carolina,  including  f  80,000  negroes 150,000 

Georgia,  including  f  20,000  negroes 90,000 

South  Carolina  has  one  thirteenth  of  the  representatives, 
all  she  is  entitled  to,  and  all  she  has  in  the  Confederation. 
As  the  Eastern  States  are  full  of  people,  and  the  migration 
is  south  and  south westwardly,  it  is  not  probable  that  the 
representation  of  the  South  will  be  inadequate.  The  South- 
ern States  have  been  termed  the  weak  States ;  they  are  so 
weak  that  they  could  not  form  a  Union  by  themselves, 
that  would  effectually  protect  them.  Without  a  Union 
with  the  other  States,  South  Carolina  would  soon  fall.  Is 
any  one  such  a  Quixote  as  to  suppose  that  this  State  could 
maintain  her  independence  alone,  or  in  connection  with 
the  other  Southern  States  ?  Let  an  invading  power  send  a 


THE  SOUTH  CAROLINA    CONVENTION,  1788.    147 

naval  force  into  the  Chesapeake,  to  keep  Yirginia  in  alarm, 
and  attack  South  Carolina,  with  such  a  naval  and  military 
force  as  Sir  Henry  Clinton  brought  here  in  1780,  and, 
though  they  might  not  soon  conquer  us,  they  would  cer- 
tainly do  us  infinite  mischief,  and,  if  they  considerably  in- 
creased their  numbers,  we  should  probably  fall.  From  the 
nature  of  our  climate,  and  the  fewness  of  our  inhabitants, 
undoubtedly  the  weaker,  should  we  not  endeavor  to  form 
a  close  union  with  the  Eastern  States,  which  are  strong  ? 
Ought  we  not  to  endeavor  to  increase  that  species  of 
strength  which  will  render  them  of  most  service  to  us 
in  peace  and  in  war,  their  navy  ?  By  doing  this,  we  ren- 
der it  their  particular  interest  to  afford  us  every  assistance 
in  their  power,  as  every  wound  we  receive  will  eventually 
affect  them.  Their  country  is  full  of  inhabitants,  and  so 
impracticable  to  an  invader  by  their  numerous  stone  walls, 
and  a  variety  of  other  circumstances,  that  they  need  not 
apprehend  danger  from  attack.  They  can  enjoy  their  in- 
dependence without  our  assistance.  If  our  government  is 
to  be  founded  on  equal  compact,  what  inducement  can 
they  possibly  have  to  be  united  with  us,  if  we  do  not  grant 
them  some  privileges  with  regard  to  their  shipping?  Sup- 
pose they  were  to  unite  with  us  without  having  those  priv- 
ileges, can  we  flatter  ourselves  that  such  union  would  be 
lasting  ?  Interest  and  policy  concurred  in  prevailing  upon 
us  to  submit  the  regulation  of  commerce  to  the  General 
Government.  But  justice  and  humanity  require  it  like- 
wise. Who  have  been  the  greatest  sufferers  in  the  Union 
by  our  obtaining  our  independence  ?  The  Eastern  States. 
They  have  lost  everything  but  their  country  and  freedom. 
As  to  the  restriction  upon  the  African  trade  after  1808, 
your  delegates  had  to  contend  with  the  religious  and  po- 
litical prejudices  of  the  Eastern  and  Middle  States,  and  the 
interested  and  inconsistent  opinion  of  Yirginia.  So  long 
as  there  is  an  acre  of  swamp-land  uncultivated  in  South 


148  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

Carolina,  I  favor  the  importation  of  negroes.  Our  climate, 
and  the  flat,  swampy  situation  of  our  country,  oblige  us 
to  cultivate  our  lands  with  them.  Without  them  the  State 
would  be  a  desert.  Those  members  of  the  Convention 
who  opposed  an  unlimited  importation,  alleged  that  slaves 
increased  the  weakness  of  any  State  which  admitted  them  ; 
that  they  were  a  dangerous  species  of  property,  which  an 
invading  enemy  could  easily  turn  against  ourselves  and 
the  neighboring  States,  and  that  as  we  were  allowed  a  rep- 
resentation for  them,  our  influence  in  the  government 
would  be  increased  in  proportion,  as  we  were  less  able  to 
defend  ourselves.  Show  us  some  period,  said  the  members 
from  the  Eastern  States,  when  it  may  be  in  our  power,  if 
we  please,  to  put  a  stop  to  the  importation  of  this  weak- 
ness, and  we  will  endeavor,  for  your  convenience,  to  restrain 
the  religious  and  political  prejudices  of  our  people  upon 
this  subject.  The  Middle  States  and  Virginia  made  no 
such  proposition  ;  they  were  for  immediate  and  total  prohi- 
bition. A  committee  of  the  States  was  appointed  to  accom- 
modate this  matter,  and,  after  a  great  deal  of  difficulty,  it 
was  settled  on  the  footing  recited  in  the  Constitution.  By 
this  settlement  we  have  secured  an  unlimited  transporta- 
tion of  negroes  for  twenty  years.  Nor  is  it  declared  that 
it  shall  then  stop ;  it  may  be  continued.  "We  have  a  se- 
curity that  the  General  Government  can  never  emancipate 
them,  for  no  such  authority  is  granted,  and  it  is  admitted 
on  all  hands  that  the  General  Government  has  no  powers 
but  what  are  expressly  granted  by  the  Constitution,  and 
that  all  rights  not  expressed  were  reserved  by  the  several 
States.  We  have  obtained  a  right  to  recover  our  slaves  in 
whatever  part  of  America  they  may  take  refuge,  which  is 
a  right  we  had  not  before.  We  have  made  the  best  terms 
for  the  security  of  that  species  of  property  it  was  in  our 
power  to  make,  and  upon  the  whole  they  are  not  bad." 
Mr.  Lowndes  persisted  :  "  The  Confederation  recognized 


THE  SOUTH  CAROLINA    CONVENTION,  1788.    149 

the  status  of  the  States  as  fixed  by  themselves,  in  the  treaty 
of  peace  with  Great  Britain.  That  recognition  did  not 
appear  in  the  proposed  plan,  and  the  possibilities  of  danger 
from  that  omission  overbalanced  any  advantages." 

Mr.  Barnwell  characterized  the  supposed  inevitable 
antagonism  of  the  Eastern  States  as  a  prejudice :  "  There 
were  no  facts  to  support  it.  When  the  arm  of  oppression 
lay  heavy  upon  us,  were  they  not  the  first  to  arouse ;  when 
the  sword  of  civil  discord  was  drawn,  were  they  not  the 
first  in  the  field ;  when  war  deluged  their  plains  with  blood, 
did  they  demand  Southern  troops  for  the  defense  of  the 
North ;  when  war  floated  to  the  South,  did  they  withhold 
their  assistance  ?  When  we  stood  with  the  spirit,  but  the 
weakness  of  youth,  they  supported  us  with  the  vigor  and 
prudence  of  age.  When  our  country  was  subdued,  when 
our  citizens  submitted  to  superior  power,  those  States 
showed  their  attachment.  I  see  here  no  man  who  does 
uot  know  that  the  shackles  of  the  South  were  broken  asun- 
der by  the  arms  of  the  North.  We  are  indeed  in  a  mi- 
nority, but  there  must  be  a  majority  somewhere.  Either 
North  or  South  must  be  in  that  relation  to  each  other. 
That  this  Constitution  is  not  the  best  possible  to  be  framed 
is  undeniable,  but  it  is  the  best  our  situation  admits  of." 
Mr.  Edward  Rutledge  compared  the  governmental  powers 
in  the  old  and  new  Constitutions :  "  They  differed  very 
little,  except  in  the  essential  point  of  giving  a  power  to 
Government  of  enforcing  its  obligations.  Surely  no  man 
could  object  to  that.  So  far  from  not  preferring  the 
Northern  States  with  a  Navigation  Act,  policy  dictated  to 
us  to  increase  their  strength  by  every  means  in  our  power. 
In  the  day  of  danger,  we  should  have  no  resource  but 
in  the  naval  strength  of  our  Northern  friends.  We  must 
hold  oui  country  by  courtesy,  unless  we  have  a  navy,  and 
can  never  become  a  great  nation  till  powerful  upon  the 
waters." 


150  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

General  Pincknej  dated  independence  from  "  that  dec- 
laration which  babes  should  be  taught  to  lisp  in  their 
cradles,  youth  to  recite  as  an  indispensable  lesson,  young 
men  to  regard  as  their  compact  of  freedom,  and  the  old  to 
repeat  with  ejaculations  of  gratitude  for  the  blessings  it 
would  bestow  on  their  posterity.  The  separate  independ- 
ence and  individual  sovereignty  of  the  several  States,  were 
never  thought  of  by  the  patriots  who  framed  it.  The  seve- 
ral States  are  not  even  mentioned  by  name  in  any  part  of  it, 
as  if  it  were  intended  to  impress  this  maxim  on  Americans, 
that  our  freedom  and  independence  arose  from  our  Union, 
and  that  without  it,  we  could  be  neither  free  nor  independ- 
ent. Let  us  consider  all  attempts  to  weaken  the  Union, 
by  maintaining  that  each  State  is  separately  and  individual- 
ly independent,  as  a  species  of  political  heresy,  which  can 
never  benefit  us,  but  may  bring  on  us  the  most  serious  dis- 
tresses." 

Mr.  Lowndes  was  "  pained  to  appear  pertinacious,  but 
as  his  constituents  were  in  favor  of  the  Constitution,  and 
therefore  he  should  not  sit  in  the  Convention,  he  relied 
upon  the  indulgence  of  the  House  for  the  performance  of 
his  duty  to  his  State,  by  whose  decision  he,  as  a  good  citi- 
zen, must  cheerfully  abide.  The  arguments  adduced  he 
must  consider  specious.  Supposing  we  considered  our- 
selves so  aggrieved  as  to  insist  on  redress,  what  was  the 
probability  of  relief  ?  In  revolving  a  misfortune,  some 
little  gleams  of  comfort  resulted  from  a  hope  of  being 
able  to  resort  to  an  impartial  tribunal.  Would  that  be 
found  in  Congress?  As  to  migration  from  the  Eastern 
to  the  Southern  States,  our  country  from  its  excessive 
heats  is  so  uncomfortable,  that  our  acquaintance  is  rather 
shunned  than  solicited." 

Mr.  Lincoln  "  had  listened  with  eager  attention  to  all 
the  arguments  in  favor  of  the  Constitution,  and  the  more 
he  heard  the  more  he  was  convinced  of  its  evil  tendency. 


THE  SOUTH  CAROLINA    CONVENTION,  1788.    151 

You  contended  ten  years  for  liberty.  What  is  liberty? 
The  power  of  governing  yourself.  If  you  adopt  this  Con- 
stitution, do  you  have  that  power  ?  no ;  you  give  to  it  men 
who  live  a  thousand  miles  from  you.  What  security  have 
you  for  a  republican  form  of  government,  when  it  de- 
pends upon  the  will  and  pleasure  of  a  few  men,  with  an 
army,  a  navy,  and  a  rich  treasury  at  their  back,  to  alter 
and  change  it  at  their  will  ? " 

The  motion  for  a  Convention  passed  by  a  majority  of 
one.  Of  the  opposition  as  of  the  advocacy  in  that  Con- 
vention, a  solitary  memorial  is  extant. 

Patrick  Dollard  claimed  that  "  his  people,  the  people 
of  Prince  Frederick  Parish,  were  brave,  honest,  and  in- 
dustrious, and  that  they  had  been  conspicuous  in  the  late 
bloody  struggle.  Nearly  to  a  man  they  are  opposed  to 
this  Constitution.  Willing  to  vest  ample  and  sufficient 
powers  in  Congress,  they  will  not  agree  to  make  over  to 
them,  or  to  any  set  of  men,  their  birthright.  They  are 
highly  alarmed  at  the  long  and  rapid  strides  taken  in  this 
Constitution  toward  despotism.  They  say  it  is  big  with 
political  evils,  and  pregnant  with  a  great  variety  of  woes 
to  the  people  of  the  Southern  States,  and  especially  to 
South  Carolina ;  that  it  is  particularly  calculated  for  a  des- 
potic aristocracy,  and  carries  with  it  the  appearance  of  a 
phrase  much  in  use  in  despotic  reigns,  the  favorite  of  Arch- 
bishop Laud — '  non-resistance.'  " 

The  Constitution  was  adopted,  by  a  vote  of  one  hun- 
dred and  forty-nine  to  seventy-three. 


THE  CHARLESTON  CONVENTION,   1860. 

THE  Charleston  Convention  was  as  important  in  its 
effects  as  any  that  ever  met  in  the  United  States,  and, 
although  a  party  Convention,  deserves  the  same  considera- 
tion as  the  Federal  and  ratifying  Conventions ;  for  there 
the  majority  of  the  Democratic  party  of  the  free  States 
renounced  the  principles  on  which  the  Jeffersonian  party 
had  succeeded  in  1800.  The  southern  claim  in  that  Con- 
vention was  no  new  claim,  an  assertion  of  passion,  or  a 
manoeuvre  of  politicians,  but  the  deliberate  conviction  of 
every  year  since  the  ratification  of  the  Constitution — a 
ratification  mainly  due  in  the  Southern  States  to  the  slave- 
holding  interest.  In  1826,  Hayne  expressed  the  sense  of 
rights,  in  defense  of  which  the  non-slaveholder  and  the 
slaveholder  were  ready  to  risk  any  extremity  : 

"  The  question  of  slavery  is  one  in  all  its  bearings  of 
extreme  delicacy,  concerning  which  I  know  of  but  a  sin- 
gle wise  and  safe  rule,  either  for  the  States  in  which  it 
exists  or  for  the  Union.  It  must  be  considered  and  treat- 
ed entirely  as  a  domestic  question.  In  respect  to  foreign 
nations,  the  language  of  the  United  States  ought  to  be, 
that  it  concerns  the  peace  of  our  political  family,  and  there- 
fore we  can  not  permit  it  to  be  touched ;  and  in  respect 
to  the  slaveholding  States,  the  only  safe  and  constitutional 
ground  on  which  they  can  stand  is,  that  they  will  not  per- 
mit it  to  be  called  in  question  either  by  their  sister  States 
or  by  the  Federal  Government.  It  is  a  subject  upon  which 
I  always  advert  with  exteme  reluctance — never,  until  it  is 
forced  upon  me.  I  consider  our  rights  in  that  species  of 


THE  CHARLESTON  CONVENTION,   1860.          153 

property  as  not  open  even  to  discussion,  either  here  or  else- 
where, and  duties  imposed  by  our  situation,  we  are  not  to 
be  taught  by  fanatics  political  or  religious.  To  call  into 
question  our  rights,  is  gravely  to  violate  them  ;  to  attempt 
to  instruct  us  on  the  subject,  is  to  insult  us ;  to  assail  our 
institutions,  is  wantonly  to  invade  our  peace.  The  Southern 
States  will  never  permit,  never  can  permit,  any  interfer- 
ence whatever  in  their  domestic  concerns,  and  the  very  day 
on  which  the  attempt  shall  be  made  by  the  authorities  of 
the  Federal  Government  we  will  consider  ourselves  driven 
out  of  the  Union ! " 

On  the  23d  of  April,  1860,  the  delegates  to  a  National 
Democratic  Convention  met  at  Charleston.  Called  to  order, 
and  a  president  pro  tern,  appointed,  it  proceeded  to  com- 
plete its  organization.  A  committee  on  organization  and 
a  committee  on  credentials  were  constituted.  In  each, 
the  delegations  selected  one  of  their  number  to  represent 
them.  Contesting  delegations  from  New  York  and  Illinois 
being  present,  the  Convention  ordered  neither  of  the  sit- 
ting delegations  to  vote  in  their  own  case.  An  attempt  to 
exclude  a  contested  delegation  (until  the  right  was  adjudi- 
cated) from  any  action  in  the  Convention,  had  previously 
been  made,  but  failed. 

The  committee  on  organization  reported  a  list  of  officers, 
Caleb  Gushing  (of  Massachusetts)  the  president.  It  recom- 
mended that  the  rules  and  regulations  of  the  Conventions 
of  1852  and  1856  be  adopted,  with  the  addition  "  That 
in  any  State  which  has  not  provided,  or  directed  by  its 
State  Convention,  how  the  vote  may  be  given,  the  Con- 
vention will  recognize  the  right  of  each  delegate  to  cast 
his  individual  vote." 

To  the  officers  reported  there  was  no  objection,  to  the 
additional  rule  there  was ;  and,  a  division  of  the  question  be- 
ing demanded,  the  first  clause  only  was  carried.  The  retiring 


154:  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

president  and  his  successor  addressed  the  Convention.  The 
former  urged  the  fact  that  the  Democratic  party  knew  no 
sections  of  the  Union,  its  tie  of  brotherhood,  East,  West, 
North,  and  South,  being  a  common  belief  in  certain  politi- 
cal principles.  The  latter  asserted  that  the  mission  of  the 
party  had  been,  and  was,  to  maintain  the  public  liberties, 
to  reconcile  popular  freedom  with  order,  to  maintain  the 
sacred  reserved  rights  of  the  States,  and  to  stand  sentinel 
at  the  outposts  of  the  Constitution.  He  characterized  the 
other  party  as  aiming  at  a  sectional  conspiracy  of  one  half 
of  the  States  against  the  other  half,  with  the  mingled  stu- 
pidity and  insanity  of  fanaticism,  hurrying  the  knd  to 
revolution  and  civil  war.  Business  resumed,  a  committee 
to  report  a  platform  and  resolutions  was  constituted,  each 
delegation  selecting  one  of  its  members  to  sit.  Until  a 
platform  should  have  been  adopted,  the  Convention  deter- 
mined not  to  ballot  for  nominees. 

The  majority  report  of  the  committee  on  credentials 
(adopted)  awarded  seats  to  the  sitting  delegations  and  dele- 
gates. 

The  minority  report  (rejected)  divided  the  vote  of  New 
York  equally  between  the  contesting  delegations. 

The  committee  on  the  platform,  by  its  chairman,  pre- 
sented a  report,  the  judgment  of  seventeen  States : 

"  That  the  platform  adopted  at  Cincinnati  be  affirmed, 
with  the  following  resolutions : 

"1.  The  national  Democracy  of  the  United  States 
hold  these  cardinal  principles  upon  the  subject  of  slavery 
in  the  Territories :  That  Congress  has  no  power  to  abolish 
slavery  in  the  Territories ;  that  a  Territorial  Legislature 
has  no  power  to  abolish  slavery  in  the  Territories,  nor  to 
prohibit  the  introduction  of  slaves,  nor  any  power  to  ex- 
clude slavery  therefrom,  nor  any  power  to  destroy  or  im- 
pair the  right  of  property  in  slaves,  by  any  legislation 
whatsoever. 


THE  CHARLESTON  CONVENTION,   1860,         155 

"  2.  That  the  enactments  of  State  Legislatures  to  defeat 
the  faithful  execution  of  the  fugitive-slave  law  are  hostile 
in  character,  subversive  of  the  Constitution,  and  revolu- 
tionary in  their  effect. 

"  3.  That  it  is  the  duty  of  the  Federal  Government  to 
protect,  when  necessary,  the  rights  of  persons  and  property 
on  the  high-seas,  in  the  Territories,  or  wherever  else  its 
constitutional  authority  extends. 

"  4.  That  the  Democracy  of  the  nation  recognizes  the 
imperative  duty  of  the  Government  to  protect  the  natural- 
ized citizen  in  all  his  rights,  whether  at  home  or  in  foreign 
lands,  to  the  same  extent  as  its  native  citizens. 

"5.  The  national  Democracy  earnestly  recommends 
the  acquisition  of  the  Island  of  Cuba  at  the  earliest  prac- 
ticable period. 

"  6.  Whereas,  one  of  the  greatest  necessities  of  the  age, 
in  a  political,  commercial,  postal,  and  military  point  of 
view,  is  a  speedy  communication  between  the  Atlantic  and 
Pacific  coasts,  therefore,  that  the  national  Democratic  party 
hereby  pledge  themselves  to  use  every  means  in  their  power 
to  secure  the  passage  of  some  bill  for  the  construction  of 
a  Pacific  Railroad  from  the  Mississippi  River  to  the  Pacific 
Ocean  at  the  earliest  practicable  moment." 

Payne  (of  Ohio)  presented  a  minority  report,  which 
embodied  the  views  of  fifteen  States  : 

"  We,  the  Democracy  of  the  Union,  in  convention  as- 
sembled, hereby  declare  our  affirmance  of  the  resolutions 
unanimously  adopted  and  declared  as  a  platform  of  princi- 
ples by  the  Democratic  Convention  at  Cincinnati  in  the 
year  1856,  believing  that  Democratic  principles  are  un- 
changeable in  their  nature  when  applied  to  the  same  sub- 
ject-matter, and  we  recommend  as  the  only  further  resolu- 
tions the  f ollowing : 

"  That  all  questions  in  regard  to  rights  of  property  in 
States  or  Territories  are  judicial  in  their  character,  and  the 


156  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

Democratic  party  is  pledged  to  abide  by,  and  faithfully 
carry  out,  such  determination  of  those  questions  as  has 
been,  or  may  be,  made  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States. 

"That  it  is  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  afford 
ample  and  complete  protection  to  all  its  citizens,  whether 
at  home  or  abroad,  whether  native  or  foreign  born. 

"  That  one  of  the  necessities  of  the  age,  in  a  military, 
commercial,  and  postal  point  of  view,  is  speedy  communi- 
cation between  the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific  States,  and 
the  Democratic  party  pledge  such  constitutional  govern- 
ment aid  as  will  insure  the  construction  of  a  railroad  to  the 
Pacific  coast  at  the  earliest  practicable  period. 

"  That  the  Democratic  party  are  in  favor  of  the  acquisi- 
tion of  the  Island  of  Cuba  on  such  terms  as  shall  be  honor- 
able to  ourselves  and  just  to  Spain. 

"  That  the  enactments  of  State  Legislatures  to  defeat 
the  faithful  execution  of  the  fugitive-slave  law  are  hostile 
in  character,  subversive  of  the  Constitution,  and  revolu- 
tionary in  effect." 

Butler  (of  Massachusetts)  presented  a  second  minority 
platform : 

"  "We,  the  Democracy  of  the  Union,  in  convention  as- 
sembled, hereby  declare  our  affirmance  of  the  Democratic 
resolutions  unanimously  adopted  and  declared  as  a  platform, 
of  principles  at  Cincinnati,  in  the  year  1856,  without  addi- 
tion or  alteration,  believing  that  Democratic  principles  are 
unchangeable  in  their  nature  when  applied  to  the  same 
subject-matter,  and  we  recommend  as  the  only  further 
resolution  the  following : 

"  It  is  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  extend  its  pro- 
tection alike  over  all  its  citizens,  whether  native  or  natural- 
ized." 

Cochrane  (of  New  York)  offered  an  amendment  to  the 
Butler  report : 


THE  CHARLESTON  CONVENTION,   1860.         157 

"  That  the  several  States  of  the  Union  are,  under  the 
Constitution,  equal,  and  that  the  people  thereof  are  entitled 
to  the  free  and  undisturbed  possession  of  their  rights  of 
person  and  property  in  the  common  Territories ;  and  that 
any  attempt  by  Congress  or  a  Territorial  Legislature  to 
annul,  abridge,  or  discriminate  against  such  equality  or 
rights  would  be  unwise  in  policy  and  repugnant  to  the 
Constitution  ;  and  that  it  is  the  duty  of  the  Federal  Gov- 
ernment, whenever  such  rights  are  violated,  to  aiford  the 
necessary,  proper,  and  constitutional  remedies  for  such  vio- 
lations; that  the  platform  of  principles  adopted  by  the 
Convention  at  Cincinnati,  and  the  foregoing  resolutions, 
are  hereby  declared  the  platform  of  the  Democratic  party." 

The  proposition  of  Mr.  Cochrane,  being  a  third  amend- 
ment, could  not,  under  the  rules,  be  considered,  and  Bigler 
(of  Pennsylvania)  moved  that  the  majority  and  minority 
reports  be  recommitted  to  the  committee,  with  instructions 
to  report  in  an  hour  the  following  resolutions : 

"  That  the  platform  adopted  by  the  Democratic  party 
at  Charleston  be  affirmed,  with  the  following  explanatory 
resolutions : 

"  That  the  government  of  a  Territory  organized  by  an 
act  of  Congress  is  provisional  and  temporary,  and  during 
its  existence  all  citizens  of  the  United  States  have  an  equal 
right  to  settle  in  the  Territory,  without  their  rights  either 
of  person  or  property  being  destroyed  or  impaired  by  Con- 
gressional or  Territorial  legislation. 

"  That  it  is  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  maintain 
all  the  constitutional  rights  of  property  in  the  Territories, 
and  to  enforce  all  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  refer- 
ence thereto,"  etc.* 

A  division  of  the  question  being  demanded,  recommit- 
ment was  ordered,  but  the  instructions  were  tabled. 

*  Those  resolutions  on  which  there  was  substantial  agreement  will  be  de- 
signated by  "  etc." 


158  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

At  this  stage  the  rule  of  the  Convention  as  to  the  unit 
and  individual  vote  had  to  be  construed.  Georgia  "re- 
quested "  its  delegates  to  vote  as  a  unit.  The  chair  decided 
that  so  its  vote  must  be  cast.  Later,  New  Jersey  having 
instructed  its  delegation  to  vote  on  one  subject  as  a  unit, 
and  "  recommended "  it  to  vote  as  a  unit  upon  all  other 
subjects,  the  chair  decided  that  its  vote  must  be  cast  as  a 
unit.  The  decision,  on^appeal,  was  overruled. 

The  committee  on  the  platform  and  resolutions  re- 
ported (its  chairman  stating  that  its  report  was  understood 
to  embody  in  substance  the  views  of  Bayard,  Cochrane,  and 
Bigler) : 

"  That  the  platform  adopted  by  the  Democratic  party 
at  Cincinnati  be  affirmed,  with  the  following  explanatory 
resolutions : 

"  That  the  government  of  a  Territory  organized  by  an 
act  of  Congress  is  provisional  and  temporary,  and  during 
its  existence  all  citizens  of  the  United  States  have  an  equal 
right  to  settle  with  their  property  in  the  Territory,  without 
their  rights  either  of  person  or  property  being  destroyed 
or  impaired  by  Congressional  or  Territorial  legislation. 
That  it  is  the  duty  of  the  Federal  Government,  in  all  its 
departments,  to  protect,  when  necessary,  the  rights  of  per- 
sons and  property  in  the  Territories  or  wherever  its  con- 
stitutional authority  extends. 

"  That  when  the  settlers  in  a  Territory  have  an  adequate 
population,  and  form  a  State  Constitution,  the  right  of  sov- 
ereignty commences,  and,  being  consummated  by  admission 
into  the  Union,  they  stand  on  an  equal  footing  with  the 
people  of  the  other  States ;  and  the  State  thus  organized 
ought  to  be  admitted  into  the  Federal  Union,  whether  its 
Constitution  prohibits  or  recognizes  the  institution  of  slav- 
ery," etc. 

The  minority  submitted  its  report : 

"  That  we,  the  Democracy  of  the  Union,  in  convention 


THE  CHARLESTON  CONVENTION,   1860.         159 

assembled,  hereby  declare  our  affirmance  of  the  resolutions 
unanimously  adopted  and  declared  as  a  platform  of  prin- 
ciples by  the  Democratic  Convention  at  Cincinnati  in  the 
year  1856,  believing  that  Democratic  principles  are  un- 
changeable in  their  nature  when  applied  to  the  same  subject- 
matter,  and  we  recommend  as  the  only  further  resolutions 
the  following : 

"  Inasmuch  as  difference  of  opinion  exists  in  the  Demo- 
cratic party,  as  to  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  powers  of 
a  Territorial  Legislature,  and  as  to  the  powers  and  duties 
of  Congress,  under  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
over  the  institution  of  slavery  within  the  Territories  : 

"  Resolved,  that  the  Democratic  party  will  abide  by 
the  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 
upon  those  questions  of  constitutional  law,"  etc. 

The  second  minority  report  (Butler)  repeated  the  origi- 
nal words. 

The  question  was  first  taken  upon  the  Butler  report. 
It  was  rejected.  The  minority  report  was  then  adopted  as 
a  substitute  for  the  majority  report.  A  division  of  the  ques- 
tion being  demanded,  separate  votes  were  taken  upon  each 
of  its  propositions :  that  which  pledged  the  Democratic 
party  to  abide  by  the  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  upon 
questions  of  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  powers  of  a  Ter- 
ritorial Legislature,  and  of  the  powers  and  duties  of  Con- 
gress in  regard  to  slavery  in  the  Territories,  was  defeated  ; 
the  others  were  adopted. 

Stuart  (of  Michigan)  moved  to  reconsider,  and  also  to 
lay  the  motion  to  reconsider  upon  the  table,  but  gave  way 
to  Walker  (of  Alabama),  who,  under  instructions  from  his 
delegation,  presented  a  communication  to  the  chair,  and 
announced  that  Alabama  withdrew  from  the  Convention. 
The  delegations  from  Mississippi,  South  Carolina,  Florida, 
Texas,  Louisiana,  and  Arkansas  followed  the  same  course, 
and  duly  announced  the  same.  As  the  reasoning  in  each 


160  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

communication  was  identical,  if  its  expression  varied,  the 
citation  of  one  will  exhibit  all. 

"  To  the  President  of  the  Democratic  Convention. 

"  SIR  :  As  chairman  of  the  delegation  which  has  the 
honor  to  represent  Mississippi  on  this  floor,  I  desire  to  be 
heard  by  you,  and  by  the  Convention. 

"  In  common  consultation  we  have  met  here,  the  repre- 
sentatives of  sister  States,  to  resolve  the  principles  of  a 
great  party.  While  maintaining  principles,  we  profess  no 
spirit  save  that  of  harmony,  conciliation,  the  success  of  our 
party,  and  the  safety  of  our  organization.  But  to  the  for- 
mer the  latter  must  yield,  for  no  organization  is  valuable 
without  it,  and  no  success  is  honorable  which  does  not 
crown  it. 

"  We  came  here  simply  asking  a  recognition  of  the 
equal  rights  of  our  State  under  the  laws  and  Constitution 
of  our  common  Government,  that  our  rights  of  property 
should  be  asserted,  and  the  protection  of  that  property, 
when  necessary,  should  be  yielded  by  the  Government 
which  claims  our  allegiance.  We  had  regarded  govern- 
ment and  protection  as  correlative  ideas,  and,  so  long  as  the 
one  was  maintained,  the  other  still  endured.  After  a  delib- 
eration of  many  days  it  has  been  announced  to  us  by  a  con- 
trolling majority  of  nearly  one  half  of  the  States  of  the 
Union,  and  that,  too,  in  the  most  solemn  and  impressive 
manner,  that  our  demand  can  not  be  met,  and  our  rights 
can  not  be  recognized.  While  it  is  granted  that  the  ca- 
pacity of  the  Federal  Government  is  ample  to  protect  all 
other  property  within  its  jurisdiction,  it  is  claimed  to  be 
impotent  when  called  upon  to  act  in  favor  of  a  species  of 
property  recognized  in  fifteen  sovereign  States.  Within 
those  States,  even  Black  Republicans  admit  it  to  be  guar- 
anteed by  the  Constitution,  and  to  be  only  assailed  by  a 
higher  law  ;  without,  they  claim  the  right  to  prohibit  and 


THE   CHARLESTON  CONVENTION,   1860.         161 

destroy  it.  The  controlling  majority  of  Northern  repre- 
sentatives on  this  floor,  while  they  deny  all  power  to  de- 
stroy, equally  deny  all  power  to  protect ;  and  this,  they 
assure  us,  is,  and  must,  and  shall  be  the  condition  of  our 
co-operation  in  the  next  presidential  election. 

"  In  this  state  of  affairs  our  duty  is  plain  and  obvious. 
The  State  which  sent  us  here  announced  to  us  her  prin- 
ciples. In  common  with  seventeen  of  her  sister  States, 
she  has  asked  a  recognition  of  her  constitutional  rights. 
They  have  been  plainly  and  explicitly  denied  to  her.  We 
have  offered  to  yield  everything,  except  an  abandonment 
of  her  rights  ;  everything,  except  her  honor,  and  it  has 
availed  us  nothing. 

"  As  representatives  of  Mississippi,  knowing  her  wishes, 
as  honorable  men,  regarding  her  commands,  we  withdraw 
from  the  Convention,  and,  so  far  as  our  action  is  concerned, 
absolve  her  from  all  connection  with  this  body,  and  all  re- 
sponsibility for  its  action. 

"  To  you,  sir,  as  presiding  officer  of  the  Convention, 
while  it  has  existed  in  its  integrity,  we  desire,  collectively, 
as  a  delegation,  and  individually,  as  men,  to  tender  the  high- 
est assurances  of  our  profound  respect  and  consideration." 

The  communication  of  the  Arkansas  delegation  dis- 
closes its  additional  reason  for  withdrawal : 

"  That,  by  the  usages  and  customs  of  the  Democracy, 
as  developed  in  its  practice  in  former  conventions  ;  by  the 
compact  believed  to  have  been  made  by  Democrats  of  the 
United  States,  when  conventions  were  first  agreed  to  be 
founded  ;  the  report  of  the  committee  on  the  platform 
became  the  platform  of  the  party,  and  therefore  this  Con- 
vention had  no  duty  to  perform  in  relation  thereto,  but  to 
receive,  confirm,  and  publish  the  same,  and  cause  it  to  be 
carried  into  effect,  wherever  in  the  respective  States  the 
Democracy  were  able  to  enforce  their  decrees  at  the  ballot- 
box. 


162  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

"  Tins  opinion  is  confirmed  by  the  history  of  the  past, 
which  shows  that  in  all  instances  the  sovereignty  of  the 
States,  not  the  electoral  vote  of  the  States,  has  uniformly 
been  represented  in  the  committee  on  a  platform,  and  that 
the  report  of  the  committee  has  invariably  been  registered 
as  the  supreme  law  of  the  Democratic  party,  by  unanimous 
consent  of  the  entire  Convention,  without  changing  or  in 
any  manner  altering  any  part  or  portion  thereof.  It  is  a 
part  of  our  traditional  learning,  confidently  believed,  that 
the  Democracy  of  the  United  States,  by  a  peculiar  system 
of  checks  and  balances,  formed  after  the  fashion  of  the 
Federal  Government,  had  contracted  and  bound  them- 
selves to  fully  recognize  the  sovereignty  of  the  States  in 
making  the  platform,  and  of  the  population  or  masses  of 
the  States  in  naming  the  candidate  to  be  placed  on  the 
platform.  That  many  States  have  been  uniformly  allowed 
to  vote  the  full  strength  of  their  electoral  college  in  these 
conventions,  when  it  was  well  known  that  the  said  States 
had  never  heretofore,  and  probably  would  never  hereafter, 
give  a  single  electoral  vote  at  the  polls  to  the  candidate 
whom  they  had  so  large  a  share  in  nominating,  can  not  be 
accounted  for  on  any  other  principle  than  that  it  was  in- 
tended as  a  recognition  of  the  sovereignty  and  equality  of 
said  States. 

"  Would  it  be  right  for  the  numerical  majority  to  de- 
prive the  Black  Republican  States,  represented  on  this 
floor,  of  the  representation  which  by  custom  they  have  so 
long  enjoyed,  because  it  is  evident  that  they  will  be  unable 
to  vote  the  Democratic  ticket  in  the  next  presidential  elec- 
tion ?  If  wrong,  how  much  more  unjust  to  deprive  all  the 
States  of  their  vested  right  to  make  and  declare  the  plat- 
form in  the  usual  and  customary  manner !  The  South  has 
heretofore  felt  safe,  because  of  the  checks  and  balances 
imposed  upon  the  machinery  of  conventions.  Where  she 
retained  an  equal  power  to  write  the  creed  of  faith,  she 


THE  CHARLESTON  CONVENTION,    1860.         163 

could  trust  her  Northern  sisters,  with  their  immense  popu- 
lations, to  name  the  candidate,  and  all  would  alike  support 
the  creed  and  the  candidate." 

Twenty-six  of  the  thirty-six  delegates  from  Georgia 
announced  that  they  withdrew  from  the  Convention.  Ten 
refused  to  abide  by  their  decision,  but  when  they  sought 
to  vote,  the  vote  was  challenged,  and  the  chair  decided  that, 
under  the  instructions  of  Georgia  to  its  delegation,  they 
were  excluded  from  separate  action.  Upon  an  appeal,  the 
Convention  sustained  the  chair. 

It  is  clear  now,  if  it  was  not  then,  that  upon  the  nature 
of  a  federal  republic,  upon  the  scope  of  a  Constitution, 
and  upon  the  principles  of  the  Democratic  party,  there 
was  a  divergence  between  the  Democracy  North  and 
South,  too  radical  to  admit  of  further  concert  of  action. 
Between  the  Republican  party  and  the  Northern  Democ- 
racy the  distinction  was  of  form,  not  substance.*  Both 
claimed  that  a  numerical  majority  could  rightfully  dictate 
to  the  Southern  States  what  thenceforth  should  be  their 
constitutional  rights  ;  one,  through  the  agency  of  elections, 
the  other,  through  that  of  party  conventions.  The  "bad 
robber "  in  the  nursery  tale  proposes  to  dispatch  "  the 
babes  in  the  wood  "  at  a  blow.  The  "  good  robber  "  pre- 
vents by  killing  him,  and  then  leaves  the  children  to  die 
from  starvation.  The  Southern  claim  of  rights  had  only 
the  choice  between  the  "  bad  robber  "  and  the  "  good  rob- 
ber." 

Mr.  Cook  (of  Ohio)  moved  that  the  Convention,  by  a  call 
of  States,  proceed  to  nominate  candidates  for  the  presidency 
and  vice-presidency,  and  asked  the  previous  question,  which 
he  withdrew  for  the  moment,  whereupon  Bidwell  (of  Cali- 
fornia) read  the  resolutions  of  California : 

*  The  Democratic  party  in  the  free  States  was  far  from  unanimity ;  at 
least  one  third  held  to  its  once  universal  theory  of  constitutional  rights,  but 
of  course  was  powerless. 


164:  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

"  1.  That  the  platform  adopted  at  Cincinnati,  in  1856, 
is  hereby  affirmed. 

"  2.  That  to  entitle  a  Territory  to  form  a  Constitution 
for  admission  into  the  Union  as  a  sovereign  State,  it  should 
contain  a  reasonable  number  of  inhabitants,  not  less  than 
the  number  required  for  a  representative  in  Congress. 

"  3.  That  the  true  interpretation  of  the  Cincinnati  plat- 
form is  hereby  declared  to  be,  that  the  right  to  hold  slaves 
in  a  Territory  rests  on  the  same  ground  and  is  entitled  to 
the  same  protection  as  other  property. 

"  4.  That  any  infraction  of  the  rights  of  property  in  a 
Territory  would  be  a  judicial  question,  and  that  it  is  the 
duty  of  Congress  to  pass  such  laws  as  may  be  necessary  to 
secure  the  faithful  execution  of  the  mandates  of  the  courts. 

"  5.  That  Congress  has  the  power  at  any  time  to  change 
or  repeal  any  Territoral  organic  act,  and  to  revise  or  annul 
any  Territorial  act  conflicting  therewith." 

Howard  (of  Tennessee)  offered  a  resolution,  "  That  the 
president  of  the  Convention  be  directed  not  to  declare  any 
person  nominated  for  the  office  of  President  or  Yice-Presi- 
dent,  who  has  not  received  a  number  of  votes  equal  to  two 
thirds  of  the  votes  of  all  the  electoral  colleges."  Mr.  Cook 
called  up  his  resolution,  upon  which  the  previous  question 
had  already  been  moved  and  seconded.  It  was  carried. 

Against  the  Howard  resolution  a  point  of  order  was 
made,  that  in  effect  it  changed  an  existing  rule  of  the  Con- 
vention, viz.,  "That  two  thirds  of  the  votes  given  shall 
nominate,"  and  must  therefore  He  over  a  day.  The  chair 
decided  that  the  resolution  was  in  order.  Upon  an  appeal, 
the  decision  was  sustained,  and  then  the  resolution  was 
carried. 

Douglas,  Guthrie,  Dickinson,  Hunter,  Johnson,  Lane, 
were  then  nominated  by  delegations  or  delegates.  Fifty- 
seven  ballots  were  taken  without  a  result.  The  vote  for 
Douglas  was  constant  at  150  to  152,  for  the  other  candidates 


THE  CHARLESTON   CONVENTION,  1860.         165 

100  to  102.  Having  become  satisfied  that  a  nomination  was 
impossible  either  with  or  without  the  Howard  resolution, 
the  Convention  adjourned,  to  reassemble  at  Baltimore  on 
the  18th  of  June.  It  recommended  to  the  Democratic 
party  of  the  several  States  the  filling  of  all  vacancies  in 
their  respective  delegations. 

The  clause  in  the  Constitution,  upon  the  meaning  of 
which  the  free  and  the  slave  States  crossed  swords,  is  : 

"  The  Congress  shall  have  power  to  dispose  of,  and 
make  all  needful  rules  and  regulations  respecting  the  Ter- 
ritory, or  other  property  belonging  to  the  United  States  ; 
and  nothing  in  this  Constitution  shall  be  construed  to 
prejudice  any  claim  of  the  United  States,  or  of  any  par- 
ticular State." 

In  the  Federal  Convention  that  clause  was  accepted 
instantly  and  almost  unanimously.*  In  the  ratifying  con- 
ventions of  the  States,  while  almost  every  other  delegation 
of  power  was  subjected  to  sharp  scrutiny,  acute  criticism, 
and  demand  for  exposition,  that  was  admitted  without 
question,  though  even  the  jurisdiction  over  ten  miles 
square  excited  jealousy.  It  is  evident  that  all  men  then 
understood  it  alike,  or  supposed  that  they  did. 

*  Maryland  only,  No. 


THE  CHAKLESTON  CONVENTION  AD- 
JOUKNED  TO  BALTIMOKE. 

To  appreciate  easily  the  proceedings  of  the  Convention 
at  Baltimore,  the  situation  must  be  understood. 

The  Federal  Government,  under  its  power  to  dispose 
of  the  Territory,  etc.,  causes  the  land  to  be  surveyed  and 
divided  into  plots.  It  establishes  knd- offices  to  sell  and 
to  give  evidences  of  title  under  its  laws.  It  commissions 
a  Governor,  and,  under  its  authority,  a  Territorial  Legis- 
lature is  elected.  When  satisfied  that  the  population  is 
sufficient,  it  authorizes,  or  recognizes,  a  Convention  called 
to  frame  a  Constitution.  Upon  that  Constitution  it  admits 
the  Territory  into  the  Union,  as  a  State.  No  one,  there- 
fore, denied  that  the  Convention  which  framed  a  Constitu- 
tion could  settle  therein  its  internal  policy  as  to  property 
in  slaves.  Before  it  became  a  State,  the  status  of  that  prop- 
erty in  it  was  the  bone  of  contention.  The  Republican  party 
held  that  the  words  "  to  make  all  necessary  rules  and  regu- 
lations for  the  disposal,"  invested  the  Federal  Government 
with  the  right  to  prohibit  slavery  in  the  Territories.  This 
position  the  Democratic  party  denied,  but,  as  to  the  power 
of  a  Territorial  Legislature  on  the  subject,  Democrats  in 
different  sections  of  the  Union  differed  widely.  A  ma- 
jority of  them  in  the  Free  States  held  that  the  right  of 
property  in  slaves  was  a  subject  within  the  jurisdiction  of 
a  Territorial  Legislature,  and  that  its  action  thereon  was 
beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Federal  authority.  This 


CONVENTION  AT  BALTIMORE,  1860.  167 

doctrine  was  known  as  "  non-intervention  "  and  "  popular 
sovereignty." 

A  minority  of  them  in  the  free  States,  and  nearly  all 
in  the  slave  States,  held  that  non-intervention  was  practi- 
cally hostile  intervention,  because  property  of  every  kind, 
only  existing  by  convention,  and  only  continuing  to  exist 
by  the  protection  of  law,  the  abdication  by  the  Federal 
Government  of  the  duty  of  protecting  any  species  of  prop- 
erty in  the  Territories  was  equivalent  to  destroying  it; 
that  non-intervention  vested  in  a  Territorial  Legislature  of 
a  few  thousand  settlers  a  power  not  possessed  by  the  Fed- 
eral Government,  and  therefore  not  communicable  by  it ; 
a  power  only  capable  of  being  exercised  by  three  fourths 
of  the  States ;  and  that  it  assumed,  in  addition,  a  question 
to  be  open,  which  was  closed  by  the  Constitution.  Com- 
mon right  in  each  State  for  a  citizen  of  it  to  enter  into  a 
Territory  with  such  property  as  his  State  recognized,  and 
to  keep  it,  protected  by  the  Union,  until  the  Territory  was 
admitted  as  a  State,  had  been  denied  by  a  majority  at 
Charleston,  which  equally  denied  the  right  of  an  appeal 
to  and  of  a  decision  by  the  constitutional  umpire,  the  Su- 
preme Court,  the  practical  effect  being  to  make  the  will  of 
a  majority,  the  Constitution.  Hence  the  secession  of  dele- 
gations. 

Mr.  Douglas,  a  man  of  remarkable  energy  and  ability, 
was  so  committed  to  "  non-intervention  at  all  hazards,"  that 
he  could  not,  with  a  decent  regard  to  consistency,  accept 
a  nomination  upon  any  platform  which  did  not  recognize, 
still  less  upon  one  which  conflicted  with  it.  His  following 
could  have  nominated  him  at  Charleston  after  the  seces- 
sions, by  rescinding  the  two-thirds  rule,  but,  as  neither  the 
platform  nor  the  nomination  in  that  case  could  have  re- 
ceived the  vote  of  a  single  Southern  State,  he  would  have 
been  a  sectional  candidate  upon  a  sectional  platform ;  there- 
fore the  Convention  was  adjourned  to  Baltimore,  in  the 


168  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

hope  that  some,  if  not  all  of  the  Southern  States  would 
sacrifice  constitutional  belief  for  the  unity  of  the  party. 

At  the  assemblage  of  the  Convention,  the  president 
directed  those  States  present  at  the  adjournment  to  be 
called.  They  being  reported  by  the  secretary  present,  he 
called  the  body  to  order,  and  stated  the  business  left  un- 
finished— the  resolutions  constituting  a  platform,  and  the 
ulterior  question  of  adopting  the  majority  report  as 
amended.  He  recalled  the  fact  that  a  motion  to  proceed 
to  a  ballot  for  nominations  had  been  carried,  under  which 
many  ballotings  had  been  taken;  then,  that  motion  had 
been  laid  on  the  table,  and  a  motion  to  adjourn  had  been 
carried,  with  a  recommendation  to  the  several  States  to 
supply  vacancies  in  their  delegations,  the  construction  of 
which  language,  and  the  scope  of  its  application,  the  Con- 
vention, not  the  chair,  must  determine.  The  chair  had 
received  communications  purporting  to  be  the  credentials 
of  delegations  from  certain  States;  they  would  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  Convention,  the  chair  having  no  authority 
to  canvass  credentials.  The  president  then  briefly  urged 
the  necessity  of  maintaining  the  integrity  of  the  Demo- 
cratic party,  as  the  issue,  in  the  political  contest  about  to 
be  waged,  was  victory  or  defeat  for  the  Constitution. 

The  first  question  to  be  settled  was  the  meaning  of 
vacancies.  The  chair  decided  that  it  had  neither  the  power 
to  decide  whether  there  were  or  were  not  vacancies,  nor 
the  right  to  make  a  suggestion  to  the  Convention  on  the 
subject.  The  question  was  settled  by  the  adoption  of  a 
resolution  offered  by  Mr.  Church  (of  New  York),  "  That  the 
credentials  of  all  persons  claiming  seats  in  this  Convention, 
made  vacant  by  the  secession  of  delegates  at  Charleston, 
be  referred  to  the  committee  on  credentials,  and  said  com- 
mittee is  instructed,  as  soon  as  practicable,  to  examine  and 
report  the  names  of  persons  entitled  to  such  seats."  By 
unanimous  consent,  the  claims  of  contesting  delegates  to 


CONVENTION  AT  BALTIMORE,  1860.  169 

seats  in  the  sitting  delegations  were  referred  to  the  same 
committee. 

The  majority  of  the  committee  reported  that  the  seats 
of  the  original  delegations  from  Alabama,  Mississippi, 
Louisiana,  Texas,  and  Florida  had  become  vacant ;  that 
those  from  Georgia,  Arkansas,  and  Delaware  had  become 
partially  so  ;  that  from  Florida  none  appeared  with  cre- 
dentials ;  that  from  Mississippi  and  Texas  there  were  dele- 
gations whose  claim  to  seats  was  not  contested ;  that  there 
were  two  delegations  from  Arkansas,  one  of  three,  one  of 
six,  claiming  the  three  vacant  seats,  which  should  be  ad- 
mitted, the  six  to  cast  two  of  the  votes,  the  three,  one ; 
but  if  either  should  neglect  to  take  their  seats  or  cast  their 
votes,  the  other  should  cast  the  three  votes. 

That  the  delegation  from  Louisiana  (the  Soule)  be  ad- 
mitted. 

That  the  delegation  from  Alabama  (the  Forsyth)  be 
admitted. 

That  the  delegation  from  Texas  be  admitted. 

That  the  delegation  from  Georgia,  of  which  H.  L. 
Beming  is  chairman,  be  admitted,  with  power  to  cast  half 
the  vote  of  the  State ;  that  the  delegation  of  which  Colonel 
Gardner  is  chairman  be  admitted,  with  power  to  cast  half 
the  vote  of  the  State ;  and  if  either  of  the  delegations  neg- 
lected or  refused  to  cast  the  vote  as  above  indicated,  that 
the  ten  delegates  present  may  cast  the  whole  vote  of  the 
State;  that  James  A.  Bayard  and  William  G.  Whitely 
are  entitled  to  seats  from  the  county  of  New  Castle,  Dela- 
ware. 

That  E.  L.  Chaffee,  who  (as  substitute  for  B.  F.  Hal- 
lett)  was  admitted  at  Charleston,  is  entitled  to  a  seat,  and 
said  Hallett,  who  has  assumed  said  seat,  is  not. 

That  John  O.  Fallon,  Jr.  (as  substitute  for  Gardy), 
duly  admitted  at  Charleston  as  a  delegate  from  the  Eighth 
Congressional  District  of  Missouri,  is  entitled  to  a  seat. 
8 


170  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

A  minority  report  gave  seats  to  Hallett,  of  Massachu- 
setts ;  to  Gardy,  of  Missouri ;  and  to  Bayard  and  Whitely  as 
delegates  from  Delaware.  It  held  that  the  original  dele- 
gations from  Alabama,  Arkansas,  Georgia,  Louisiana,  and 
Texas  were  entitled  to  seats;  as  to  Mississippi,  agreeing 
with  the  majority.  It  advised  that  the  delegation  from 
Florida  to  Charleston  be  invited  to  take  seats  and  cast  the 
vote  of  Florida.  Its  reasoning  was,  that  "  vacancies  in  a 
delegation"  meant  and  was  intended  to  mean  vacancies, 
not  new  delegations ;  that  the  original  delegations  contin- 
ued such  until  the  power  which  had  conferred  withdrew 
their  function ;  but  if  otherwise,  a  new  delegation  must 
be  commissioned  by  the  same  authority  which  had  com- 
missioned the  old.  "  The  right  of  persons  to  seats  is  to 
be  determined  by  the  fact  that  they  were  appointed  ac- 
cording to  its  usages  by  the  constituency  they  claim  to 
represent;  wanting  those  essential  prerequisites,  they  are 
not  entitled  to  seats,  even  if  there  are  no  contestants ; 
with  them,  they  are  entitled  to  seats,  if  there  are  contest- 
ants." The  facts  which  the  report  stated  as  the  basis  of 
its  conclusions  are : 

In  Alabama,  Georgia,  and  Mississippi,  the  Democratic 
Executive  Committees  had  called  conventions  of  the  party, 
by  which  the  course  of  their  delegations  at  Charleston  had 
been  approved,  and  they  were  accredited  to  Baltimore.  In 
Louisiana  the  old  Convention  was  reassembled,  a  new  Con- 
vention not  being  possible ;  in  that,  the  course  of  its  delega- 
tion at  Charleston  was  approved,  and  it  was  accredited  to 
Baltimore.  In  Texas,  time  not  permitting  the  assemblage 
of  its  Democracy  in  convention,  its  Executive  Committee 
accredited  the  delegation  to  Baltimore.  In  Delaware,  under 
the  rules  of  the  party,  the  old  Convention  reassembled  and 
acted. 

The  majority  report,  except  as  to  the  Georgia  delega- 
tion, was  adopted.  Upon  the  motion  of  Mr.  Church  (of 


CONVENTION  AT  BALTIMORE,  1860. 

New  York),  the  old  delegation  was  declared  entitled  to  seats. 
The  chair  thereupon  directed  tickets  to  be  issued  to  the 
admitted  delegates.  Russell  (of  Yirginia)  then  announced, 
by  the  instructions  of  a  large  majority  of  the  delegation, 
that  they  could  no  longer  participate  in  the  deliberations 
of  the  Convention,  having,  in  their  judgment,  exhausted 
all  honorable  efforts  to  avert  that  necessity,  and  having 
arrived  at  that  conclusion  after  long,  mature,  and  anxious 
consideration. 

Lauder  (of  North  Carolina)  had  the  painful  duty  imposed 
on  him  to  announce  that  a  very  large  majority  of  the  dele- 
gation of  North  Carolina  were  compelled  to  retire  from  the 
Convention.  The  recent  vote  had  satisfied  them  that  the 
Northern  Democracy  was  no  longer  willing  to  attribute 
to  the  South  equality  in  the  Union. 

Ewing  (of  Tennessee)  stated  that  the  Tennessee  delega- 
tion had  exhibited,  as  far  as  they  knew  how,  an  anxious  de- 
sire to  harmonize  the  Convention,  but,  upon  the  result  that 
day  obtained,  twenty  of  its  members  would  have  to  retire. 
Four  would  remain. 

Stevens  (of  Oregon) :  "  By  the  action  to-day  delegations 
as  much  entitled  to  seats  as  our  own  have  been  excluded. 
For  this  injustice  to  and  ignoring  of  the  weaker  States,  the 
delegation  from  Oregon  will  take  no  further  part  in  the 
deliberations  of  the  Convention." 

Ten  of  the  delegation  from  Kentucky  deemed  it  incon- 
sistent with  duty  to  themselves  and  to  their  constituents 
to  participate  further  in  the  deliberations  of  the  Conven- 
tion. Five,  "without  intending  to  vacate  our  seats,  and 
with  the  intention  of  co-operating  with  the  Convention,  if 
its  unity  and  harmony  be  restored  by  any  future  event, 
will  not  in  the  mean  time  participate  in  its  deliberations, 
nor  hold  ourselves  or  our  constituents  bound  by  its  action." 

Two  delegates  from  Missouri  then  retired  from  the 
Convention.  A  vote  upon  the  resolution  to  proceed  to 


172  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

nominate  candidates  for  the  presidency  and  vice-presi- 
dency being  in  order,  the  chair  addressed  the  Convention  : 

"  The  delegations  of  a  majority  of  the  States  of  this 
Union  have,  either  in  whole  or  in  part,  in  one  form  or  an- 
other, ceased  to  participate  in  the  deliberations  of  this 
body.  I  deem  it  due  to  myself,  and  to  the  members  of 
the  Convention,  as  to  whom  my  action  would  no  longer 
represent  the  will  of  a  majority  of  the  Convention,  to  re- 
sign my  office,  take  my  seat  as  one  of  the  Massachusetts 
delegation,  and  abide  its  determination  upon  the  future 
action  of  the  Convention."  The  admission  of  sham  dele- 
gations was  the  cause  of  these  withdrawals. 

David  Todd  (of  Ohio)  assumed  the  chair,  and  stated  that, 
if  there  were  no  privileged  questions  intervening,  the  secre- 
tary would  proceed  with  the  call  of  the  States. 

Mr.  Butler  attempted  to  address  the  chair  to  present  a 
protest,  and  asked  the  same  respectful  hearing  for  Massa- 
chusetts which  had  been  given  to  everybody  else.  Objec- 
tion being  made,  he  was  compelled  to  be  silent  until  Massa- 
chusetts was  called.  He  then,  under  instructions  from  the 
majority  of  the  delegation,  presented  a  protest  against  the 
action  of  the  Convention  in  excluding  Mr.  Hallett.  He 
also  announced  that  part  of  the  Massachusetts  delegation 
would  no  longer  participate  in  the  deliberations  of  the 
Convention.  The  members  whom  he  spoke  of  thereupon 
retired. 

Two  ballotings  were  had;  in  the  latter  one  hundred 
and  ninety-four  and  a  half  votes  were  cast,  of  which  one 
hundred  and  eighty-one  and  a  half  were  for  Douglas,  who 
was  thereupon,  by  unanimous  resolution,  declared  the  regu- 
lar nominee  of  the  Democratic  party.  Benjamin  Fitz- 
patrick  received  the  nomination  as  Yice-President.  He 
declined,  and  the  nomination  was  then  tendered  by  the 
National  Democratic  Committee  to  Herschel  V.  Johnson 
(of  Georgia),  who  accepted. 


CONVENTION  AT  BALTIMORE,  1860.  173 

After  the  nomination,  the  Convention,  with  but  one  or 
two  dissenting  voices,  resolved, 

"  That  it  is  in  accordance  with  the  interpretation  of  the 
Cincinnati  platform  that,  during  the  existence  of  the  Terri- 
torial governments,  the  measure  of  restriction,  whatever  it 
may  be,  imposed  by  the  Federal  Constitution  on  the  power 
of  the  Territorial  Legislature  over  the  subject  of  the  do- 
mestic relations,  as  the  same  has  been,  or  shall  hereafter 
be,  finally  determined  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States,  should  be  respected  by  all  good  citizens,  and  en- 
forced with  promptness  and  fidelity  by  every  branch  of 
the  General  Government." 

If  this  resolution  was  meant  to  embody  the  resolution 
to  the  same  apparent  effect  rejected  at  Charleston,  it  would 
seem  wiser  to  have  adopted  it  there,  where  it  might  have 
averted  a  secession.  If  its  ambiguity  in  the  words  "  do- 
mestic relations "  was  meant  "  to  keep  the  promise  to  the 
ear  and  break  it  to  the  hope,"  the  attempt  at  a  trap  for 
voters  was  not  successful.  It  nowhere  appears  in  the  rec- 
ord of  the  Baltimore  Convention  that  the  unfinished  busi- 
ness, stated  by  the  chair  after  its  organization,  was  consid- 
ered ;  if  so,  and  any  action  were  needed  to  establish  a  plat- 
form, none  existed. 

The  temper  of  the  free-State  delegations  can  not  be 
misunderstood  or  misrepresented,  for  it  found  expression. 
"  Admit  that  we  are  wrong,"  said  Church,  "  we  have  the 
right  to  be  wrong."  The  right  to  be  wrong  may  be  insep- 
arable from  any  political  relation  between  communities  or 
individuals,  but  the  English  race  has  always  been  impatient 
of  the  claim.* 

*  After  the  election  of  Jefferson,  some  men,  timid  from  his  application 
of  the  fourth  premise  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence  to  the  Union, 
asked  him  how  he  construed  the  Constitution.  As  its  friends  asserted  it  to 
be,  and  the  people  believed,  matters  of  full  publicity  and  general  notoriety,  was 
the  answer.  As  contract  must  be  a  conception  of  the  mind  before  honesty 


174  SEVEN  CONVENTIONS. 

One  lesson  taught  by  the  history  of  the  Charleston 
Convention  is,  that  a  rule  of  voting  in  such  a  body  should 
be  uniform — the  individual  vote  or  the  vote  by  delega- 
tions. Either  is  fair,  though  the  former  seems  more  com- 
mendable, but  no  other  rule  is  fair.  Another  is  the  neces- 
sity, in  public  as  in  private  affairs,  of  avoiding  the  use  of 
terms  necessarily  ambiguous.  The  word  "  people,"  in  the 
Territorial  dispute,  was  the  source  of  untold  woes.  Men 
could  and  would  construe  it  by  their  desires.  Therefore, 
if  an  umpire  was  rejected,  they  must  quarrel.  To  the  con- 
struction of  language  the  majority  principle  is  not  applica- 
ble. Six  men  have  no  more  natural  right  to  govern  five 
men  than  five  to  govern  six.  If  the  eleven  agree  that 
upon  any  subjects  the  will  of  six  shall  control  that  of  five, 
to  such  extent  the  majority  has  the  right  of  sway,  and  the 
minority  the  duty  of  obedience.  But,  if  there  is  a  dispute 
as  to  what  they  had  agreed  on,  the  right  derived  from 
agreement  no  longer  exists.  They  then  stand  as  before 
the  compact,  and  must  find  an  umpire,  separate,  or  fight. 

can  be  a  conception,  as  a  denial  of  contract  must  be  a  rejection  of  honesty, 
the  Jeffersonian  party  held  the  Constitution  to  be  a  mutual  contract  of  the 
States,  honesty  as  indispensable  between  States  in  a  Union  as  between  men 
in  a  society ;  and  the  law  of  contract  to  be,  that  a  disregard  of  it  by  one 
party  is  the  absolution  from  it  of  another  party.  In  communities  whose 
religion  is  the  belief  of  a  covenant  made  by  God  with  one  race,  amplified  and 
extended  through  his  Son  to  all  races,  the  relation  which  the  Omnipotent 
thought  fit  between  Omnipotence  and  men,  ought  to  be  recognized  as  just 
between  men  and  men  and  States  and  States.  If  there  be  any  obligation 
with  a  divine  sanction,  it  is  that  of  covenant.  Very  many  of  the  party  hi  the 
free  States,  which  asserted  itself  the  heir  of  the  Jeffersonian  party,  substi- 
tuted sentimentality,  which  is  self-indulgence,  for  honesty,  which  is  self- 
control. 


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of  the  ambition  of  political  leaders,  and  of  the  rise  of  great  parties  in  the  nation. 
Yet  the  history  of  the  people  is  the  chief  theme.  At  every  stage  of  the  splendid 
progress  which  separates  the  America  of  Washington  and  Adams  from  the  Amer- 
ica in  which  we  live,  it  has  been  the  author's  purpose  to  describe  the  dress,  the 
occupations,  the  amusements,  the  literary  canons  of  the  times ;  to  note  the  changes 
of  manners  and  morals ;  to  trace  the  growth  of  that  humane  spirit  which  abol- 
ished punishment  for  debt,  and  reformed  the  discipline  of  prisons  and  of  jails;  to 
recount  the  manifold  improvements  which,  in  a  thousand  ways,  have  multiplied 
the  conveniences  of  life  and  ministered  to  the  happiness  of  our  race;  to  describe  the 
rise  and  progress  of  that  long  series  of  mechanical  inventions  and  discoveries  which 
is  now  the  admiration  of  the  world,  and  our  just  pride  and  boast ;  to  tell  how, 
under  the  benign  influence  of  liberty  and  peace,  there  sprang  up,  in  the  course  of  a 
tingle  century,  a  prosperity  unparalleled  in  the  annals  of  human  affairs. 

"  The  pledge  given  by  Mr.  McMaster,  that '  the  history  of  the  people  shall  be 
the  chief  theme,' is  punctiliously  and  satisfactorily  fulfilled.  He  carries  out  hie 
promise  in  a  complete,  vivid,  and  delightful  way.  We  should  add  that  the  liter- 
ary execution  of  the  work  is  worthy  of  the  indefatigable  industry  and  unceasing 
vigilance  with  which  the  stores  of  historical  material  have  been  accumulated, 
weighed,  and  sifted.  The  cardinal  qualities  of  style,  lucidity,  animation,  and 
energy,  are  everywhere  present.  Seldom,  indeed,  has  a  book,  in  which  matter 
of  substantial  value  has  been  so  happily  united  to  attractiveness  of  form,  been 
offered  by  an  American  author  to  his  fellow-citizens." — New  York  Sun. 

"  To  recount  the  marvelous  progress  of  the  American  people,  to  describe 
their  life,  their  literature,  their  occupations,  their  amusements,  is  Mr.  McMaster's 
object.  His  theme  is  an  important  one,  and  we  congratulate  him  on  his  success. 
It  has  rarely  been  our  province  to  notice  a  book  with  BO  many  excellences  and 
BO  few  defects."— New  York  Herald. 

"Mr.  McMaster  at  once  shows  his  grasp  of  the  various  themes  and  his  special 
capacity  as  a  historian  of  the  people.  His  aim  is  high,  but  he  hits  the  mark." — 
New  1'ork  Journal  of  Commerce. 

"I  have  had  to  read  a  good  deal  of  history  in  my  day,  but  I  find  eo  much 
freshness  in  the  way  Professor  McMaster  has  treated  his  subject  tLat  it  is  quite 
like  a  new  story." — Philadelphia  Press. 

"Mr.  McMaster's  enccess  as  a  writer  seems  to  us  distinct  and  decisive.  In 
the  first  place  he  has  written  a  remarkably  readable  history.  His  style  is  clear 
and  vigorous,  if  not  always  condensed.  He  has  the  facnlty  of  felicitous  com- 
parison and  contrast  in  a  marked  degree.  Mr.  McMaster  has  produced  one  of 
the  most  spirited  of  histories,  a  book  which  will  be  widely  read,  and  the  enter- 
taining quality  of  which  is  conspicuous  beyond  that  of  any  work  of  its  kind."— 
Boston  Gazette.  

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and  which  may  be  cited  aa  giving  an  idea  of  the  scope  and  nature  of  his  work, 
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tucky, Early's  invasion,  service  in  the  Adjutant-General's  office,  President  Lin- 
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"  An  agreeable  intermingling  of  personal  anecdotes  and  historical  statements. 
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"  The  General  bore  an  important  and  honorable  part  in  the  struggle,  and  has 
the  rare  gift  of  telling  briefly,  humorously,  and  pathetically  of  what  he  saw  and 
heard  during  all  the  eventful  years."— New  York  Journal  of  Commerce. 

"The  author  writes  in  a  charitable  spirit  of  Scott,  Stone,  Lee,  Buckner, 
Burke,  McClellan,  Blair,  Sheridan,  Stanton,  Lincoln,  and  many  others.  General 
Townsend  fully  disposes  of  the  malicious  rumor  that  Stanton  committed  suicide. 
These  anecdotes  are  well  worth  buying  and  reading  from  beginning  to  end." — 
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events  in  description.  A  battle  or  a  siege,  which,  without  his  skill,  would  occupy 
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"An  attempt  to  picture  the  prevailing  characteristics  and  tendencies  of  each 
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"  It  can  not  be  denied  that  this  is  a  history  of  some  importance,  in  spite  of 
the  questionable  obiect  for  which  it  was  written.  The  work  was  prepared  with 
the  utmost  care — a  care  which  extended  in  some  instances  to  special  surveys,  to 
insure  perfect  accuracy  in  the  descriptions."— Dr.  C.  K.  Adams's  Manual  of  His- 
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